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In the wake of the Cold War, a new world disorder seems to be emerging 
wherein the legitimacy of many states is being challenged from within by increasing 
non-state calls for self-determination from the likes of religious cults, hate groups, 
isolationist movements, ethnic groups, and revivalist movements. These 
movements often prey on the insecurities of the population, offering to fill 
psychological, sociological, political, or religious security needs of those who would 
join them. Of note: religious oriented groups appear to share a common ideological 
thread that rejects existing social, economic, and political structure demanding a 
structural revision of the world, a world where they become the authoritarian, 
dominant influence. These are the Post Modern Terrorists who possess a 
"ripeness" to threaten use of weapons of mass destruction. 
Executive Order No. 12938 signed by President Clinton on November 14, 
1994 declared a national emergency with respect to the unusual and extraordinary 
threat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (those weapons categorized as 
nuclear, chemical or biological) posed to the national security, foreign policy, and 
economy of the United States. 
This study presents an argument suggesting that terrorist groups operating 
under a veneer of religion are truly the most likely candidates to threaten use of 
weapons of mass destruction in a mass casualty causing terrorist act. 
v 
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To date, most informed opinions on non-state political violence have 
suggested that terrorist of the future will neither seek to develop nor threaten to 
use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Arguments supporting this position 
are typically presented through a framework of outdated assumptions that have 
been in use since the days of the late nineteenth century Russian Nihilist 
movement. 
These assumptions suggest that: ( 1) terrorist groups are nothing more 
than a collection of frustrated, political actors bent on correcting a perceived flaw 
in the socio-political order of the state. The cause to take up terrorism evolves 
adjunct to their failure or inability to influence the political, economic and/or 
·social conditions that define their environment; (2) that these frustrated actors 
adopt terrorism as a means to force their political agenda through the use of 
directed and carefully modulated violence. This violence is designed to 
communicate a complex message that primarily gains the terrorist group public 
recognition for their cause. Unmitigated destruction and violence is not the goal 
as noted by Brian Jenkins who suggests that "terrorists want a lot of people 
watching, not a lot of people dead;" (3) terrorists are mirror imaging rational 
actors, e.g., their behavior is normative. As such, they understand that 
exceeding a certain violence threshold may result in a globally enjoined effort to 
eradicate them. Finally it is assumed that the technology and associated costs 
involved in the development and production of weapons of mass destruction are 
beyond the reach of the non-state group. For these reasons the image of the 
classical terrorist of the twentieth century has not included WMD. However, 
these traditional arguments have all been weakened due to the changing nature 
of the terrorist phenomenon. Specifically these changes are emerging in areas 
related to supply and demand variables that certainly influence a non-state 
group's decision to develop and threaten use of WMD. 
XV 
WMD may have strong appeal to non-state groups that embrace a 
religious ideology affiliated with apocalyptic millennialism, redemptive fanaticism 
or racisUethnic hate. Where traditional terrorists typically conduct their actions 
within certain violence thresholds, those operating under the aforementioned 
belief systems are arguably not subject to the same constraints as they conduct 
their acts to satisfy a higher authority, namely God. These groups may be 
attracted to the power that ownership of WMD provides precisely because WMD 
use can result in mass casualties arid mass disruption against an "enemy" 
defined by their religious beliefs. Non-state groups operating under the cloak of 
religion might very well be the most likely candidates to use the unlimited or 
disproportionate violence WMD afford. 
Much as scientific, technological, and social changes continually 
influence the art and science of warfare, so too have these factors influenced 
the behavior and enhanced the capabilities of the terrorist. The divergence from 
traditional means to ends in recent terrorist acts is evident in the 1993 World 
Trade Center complex bombing; the 1995 Oklahoma Federal Building bombing 
and the Tokyo nerve gas attack; and the 1996 bombing of U.S. personnel in 
Saudi Arabia. New twists on old ideological imperatives, coupled with the 
availability of more lethal weapons and weapon related technologies, are rapidly 
enabling the terrorists to cause large-scale death and destruction. Again, for the 
terrorist empowered by an underpinning of religion, the ability to please God by 
killing his enemies enmasse with WMD becomes an end unto itself. 
The ultra-violent terrorist act followed by silence has increased in 
frequency. Many times in recent years terrorist acts have been committed 
without a group stepping forward to claim credit for the event. Where traditional 
terrorists use the event to gain access to a bullypulpit to air their grievances, 
these silent terrorists desire to send a message that creates a superordinary 
sense of overwhelming fear and vulnerability amongst their enemies. 
Additionally, non-state, religiously oriented groups arguably have no great need 
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for media assistance to articulate their cause, as the intended audience is their 
own closed-cell constituency - and God. 
The change in the characterization of terrorism may be indicative of a 
new era, one in which the traditional, constrained terrorist of the twentieth 
century is supplanted by the ultra-violent post-modern terrorist of the twenty-
first century. Post-modern because of the manner in which they employ 
advanced technology, and anonymity, to commit destructive acts traditionally 
viewed as disproportionate to their goals. Capitalizing on the highly cultivated 
fear WMD use engenders may convince these groups that they possess a power 
great enough to compel the state to concede to their demands. If the state is not 
prepared to respond effectively to multiple WMD crises, and to manage the 
consequence of such attacks, non-state groups may actually be able to achieve 
their desired goals. Armed with WMD, the non-state group may achieve its 
objective, circumventing the need to engage in a protracted terrorist campaign. 
WMD use can cause mass casualties and substantial infrastructure 
disruption, far more than that caused by any previous acts of terrorist. Since the 
threat to use WMD affords the non-state group a powerful tool (to compel, deter, 
or destroy) that heretofore has not been available to them, non-state 
proliferation presents a serious security concern to the global community. 
Despite the existence of a robust, widely supported international regime to 
control the spread of WMD, the consensus of various scholars and policy 
makers identifjes WMD proliferation as a top security threat to our nation. 
Senator Sam Nunn's address concerning proliferation echoes these sentiments: 
The number one security challenge in the United States now and probably for 
years ahead is to prevent these weapons of mass destruction, whether 
chemical, biological or nuclear, and the scientific knowledge of how to make 
them, from going all over the world to rogue groups, to terrorist groups, to 
rogue nations. 
In November of 1995 Congressional hearings on the potential for non-
state group employment of WMD concluded with the assertion that non-state 
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proliferation poses a difficult challenge to our national security primarily 
because these groups are exceptionally hard to target, and much harder to 
deter, much more so than an identifiable rogue state. It is quite clear that 
when a non-state group, such as Aum Shinrikyo, is able to develop a WMD 
capability, a major failure within the international community has occurred 
that must certainly be remedied. That failure relates to two significant 
deficiencies. First, our collective, intelligence capabilities need to be 
improved. Strategies that might facilitate improvement include the 
development of more robust international information sharing protocols 
between national-level investigative bodies. Interpol and the FBI provide 
good examples. Other improvements might be found in the development of 
cooperative efforts enjoined by foreign, federal, state, and local law 
enforcement and intelligence-related communities. As discussed in 
Congressional hearings held in November of 1995, the threat posed by Aum 
was never even on our intelligence "radar screens." If we are going to 
marginalize the efforts of groups such as Aum, we must fine tuDe our 
intelligence apparatus so that we can identify these groups, their capabilities, 
and intentions. By doing this we assure ourselves the ability to operate 
inside the terrorist group's "decision making loop." Operating inside this 
"loop" will allow us to preempt the terrorist action before it occurs. Second, 
export controls and domestic efforts to restrict the sale of chemical/biological 
precursors, dual use technology and equipment must be strengthened. 
xviii 
Aum has proven that a determined non-state group can amass material, 
know-how, and equipment to develop and threaten the use of WMD. The 
concern now lies in discerning what the next group will do, having learned 
from Aum's mistakes. A robust effort to improve our knowledge of terrorist 
groups through human and open source intelligence gathering, coupled with 
strengthened efforts to conttol access to chemical and biological agents, their 
precursors and duel use equipment, will certainly help to minimize the WMD 





This study seeks to present an heuristic argument suggesting that non-
state groups motivated by religious ideologies affiliated with apocalyptic 
millenialism, radicalized redemption, or racisUethnic hate are the most likely 
candidates to threaten use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in a terrorist 
action. The objective of this research is two fold: first, to develop an 
understanding of why WMD use is attractive to these groups, and second, to 
identify the critical pre-condition indicators (variables) that exist in a group that 
possesses WMD potential. Through the theoretical frameworks developed by 
this study, discernment of the motivations and intentions underpinning the non-
state WMD threat becomes a possibility. At least one of these frameworks may 
possess a sufficient predictive power that might be used to forecast the 
emergence of a non-state group that might threaten WMD use. 
Most studies attempting to analyze terrorist group motivations and 
intentions meet with the same constraint: lack of an empirical data base to 
support a relevant hypothesis. Underlying this assumption Alex P. Schmid, a 
professor with The Center for the Study of Social Conflicts, Leiden, Switzerland, 
suggests that: 
It has to be stressed from the beginning that the term 'theory' is taken 
more in the sense of "current thinking" and interpretation than in terms of 
formal proposition which have been operationalized and tested 
empirically. Theories in the more rigorous sense of that term, with 
1 
prognostic power, are inexistent.1 
The same data constraints which have thwarted other attempts to provide 
general theories regarding aspects of the terrorist phenomenon affect this study 
as well.2 At present no general theory, hypothesis, or attribute set specifically 
designed to analyze the threat of WMD terrorism exists. This condition then 
begs the question, how can any worthwhile conclusions be made in support of 
an argument if there is no empirical data? To offset the absence of empirical 
data on this aspect of terrorism, exploratory research was conducted to select a 
suitable methodology and framework for analysis. Conclusions suggested that 
case study and framework-comparative method would be most appropriate for 
the task. 
1 Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism: Research Guide to Concepts Theories. 
Data Bases and Literature. (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1983), 161. 
2 Martha Crenshaw and Nathan Leites attribute this to the lack of systematic, 
standardized, analysis. See Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 
Comparative Politics, vol. xii, no. 4 (July, 1981), 379; also Martha Crenshaw,"The 
Subjective Reality of the Terrorist: Ideological and Psychological Factors in Terrorism," 
in Robert 0. Slater and Michael Stohl, eds., Current Perspectives on International 
Terrorism, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 13; also Nathan Leites, 
"Understanding the Next Act," Terrorism, v.3, n. 1-2 (1979), 1. 
2 
1. Case Selection 
There is a ''universe" of cases in which WMD use by terrorists has been 
documented.3 In this "universe" the acts have ranged from assassinations using 
toxin tipped umbrellas, to product contamination, to the dispersion of toxic nerve 
gas in a crowded subway complex in an effort to cause mass casualties. For 
this study the focus is narrowed to examine that area of the universe involving 
religiously oriented non-state groups which advocate the use of ultra-violent 
means to cause mass casualties. Cases selected for this study include the 
Japanese terror cult "Aum Shinrikyo," whose members dispersed nerve gas in a 
Tokyo subway; "The Jihad Organization," comprising the Islamic radicals who 
have been accused of bombing the World Trade Center complex; and a right-
wing extremist (U.S.) group known as "The Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the 
Lord" (CSAL). 
These cases were chosen for the following reasons. First, they represent 
a cultural and geographic spread that magnifies seemingly inherent differences 
between them. Second, they occurred in the past decade (two of them after 
1993), a time characterized by remarkable advances in technology and science 
and changes in the orientation, of global power structures. These advances and 
changes have fueled speculation concerning the emergence of terrorist 
3 Bruce Hoffman, Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum, 
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1994), 3. Also see Ron Purver, "Chemical and Biological 
Terrorism: The Threat According to the Open Literature," report. Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service, (June, 1995). 
3 
" ... super-violence, mass destruction terrorism, or nationally-disruptive 
terrorism,"4 speculation that has been recognized as a reality. Third, in all three 
cases, groups violated or planned to violate the established "norms" of expected 
terrorist group behavior, i.e., their doctrine and strategy called for goal 
attainment through the use of violence to cause mass casualties or mass 
disruption. Traditional understanding of terrorism suggests that acts of violence 
are constrained, committed to gain attention, not to cause mass casualties. 
These cases may well represent the beginning of a "paradigmatic shift" 
regarding the utility of constrained violence. Though it appears that religiously-
oriented, non-state terrorist groups have taken the lead in committing ultra-
violent terrorist acts, a contagion (copy-cat) effect may infect other, more 
secularly oriented groups. Studies focusing on the intensity of violence in 
terrorist acts would elucidate this paradigm shift. For now, the hypothesis 
remains an interesting question outside the scope of this particular study. 
An antithetical case of a group that would probably not desire to threaten 
use of WMD, the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army (PIRA), is 
examined to provide a balance to the study as an apparent disconfirming case. 
It has been serected because: (1) though religious overtones characterize the 
violence perpetrated by the PIRA, there are significant constraints that argue 
against this non-state group pursuing the use of WMD; (2) the PIRA has been 
subjected to the same technological advancements and global power changes 
4 Purver, 2. 
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as the other three cases analyzed. 
B. PERSPECTIVE: THE POST -MODERN TERRORIST 
To date most informed opinions about non-state group political violence 
have held that the terrorist of the future will neither seek to develop nor threaten 
to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Arguments supporting this position 
are typically presented through a framework of assumptions used since the days 
of the late nineteenth century Russian Nihilist movement. These assumptions 
suggest that: (1) terrorist groups represent a collection of frustrated, political 
actors bent on correcting a perceived flaw in the socio-political order of the state. 
The reason to take up terrorism derives from their failure or inability to influence 
political, economic and/or social conditions that define their environment;5 (2) 
these frustrated actors adopt terrorism as a means to force their political agenda 
through the use of directed and modulated violence. This violence is designed 
to communicate a complex message that draws public attention to the terrorist 
group's cause. Unmitigated destruction and violence is not the goal, as noted by 
Brian Jenkins, who suggests that "terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a 
lot of people dead;"6 (3) terrorists are "mirror-imaging" rational actors, e.g., their 
behavior is normative. 7 As such they are subsumed to understand that 
5 Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism," in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of 
Terrorism, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 17-24. 
6 Brian Jenkins, The Potential for Nuclear Terrorism, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 
1977), 8. 
7 Discussions with Dr. Jerrold Post, M.D., Washington D.C., October 25, 1996. 
5 
exceeding a certain violence threshold may result in a major effort to eradicate 
them. 8 Finally it is assumed that the technology and associated costs involved 
in the development and production of WMD are beyond the reach of the non-
state group.9 For these reasons the image of the classical terrorist of the 
twentieth century has generally not included WMD. However, these traditional 
arguments have weakened during the last decade due to the changing nature of 
the terrorist phenomenon. Specifically these changes are emerging in areas 
related to supply and demand variables, variables that influence a non-state 
group's decision to develop and use WMD. 
Supply issues suggest that: ( 1) the availability of materials and technical 
requirements to produce an elementary WMD capability are well within the reach 
of contemporary non-state groups; (2) that many groups have the financial 
capacity to fund such programs; (3) that individuals knowledgeable of WMD 
technologies are involved with groups that might threaten the use of WMD. 
Demand issues revolve around the notion that ownership and use of 
WMD by a non-state group provides a negotiating tool of great status, and 
power. Thomas Schelling notes that a terrorist organization which achieves a 
8 Ted Robert Gurr, "Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases," 
in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism, ( New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 94. 
9 Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Nuclear Terrorism-Hysterical Concern or Real Risk?," 
German Foreign Affairs Review, v. 46, n. 3, (1995). 
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WMD capability ascends to a higher position of relative power and prestige.10 
Additionally, the absence of territorial boundaries in the case of the non-state 
group serves to make state retaliation more difficult as the terrorist becomes 
hard to target, a problem that Marrs suggests serves to .. vitiate the retaliatory 
threats of the state.''11 
It is noteworthy that Schelling's and Marrs' aforementioned arguments 
may have strong appeal to non-state groups that embrace a religious ideology 
affiliated with apocalyptic millennialism, redemptive fanaticism or racist/ethnic 
hate. Where traditional terrorists typically operate within certain violence 
thresholds, those operating under the aforementioned belief systems are 
probably not subject to the same constraints as they conduct their violent acts to 
satisfy (in their belief) a higher authority, God. These groups may be attracted 
to the power ownership of WMD affords precisely because WMD use can result 
in mass casualties and mass disruption against an .. enemy .. defined by their 
religious beliefs. 
1. The "Post-Modem Terrorist" 
Much as scientific, technological, and social changes continually 
influence the art and science of warfare, so to have these things influenced the 
behavior and enhanced the capabilities of the terrorist. Recent studies suggest 
10 Thomas Schelling, .. Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism," International Security, 
v.6, n.4, (Spring 1982), 68-85. 
11 Robert W. Marrs, "Nuclear Terrorism: Rethinking The Unthinkable," Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, (December, 1994), 3. 
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that terrorists are becoming increasingly more lethal and violent. 12 The days of 
constrained or modulated violence in some cases may be over. Drawing on the 
work of Mark Juergensmeyer an "ultra-violent" act is defined as one which 
involves killing or planning to kill others en-masse. This killing is conducted 
outside the boundaries of warfare and punishment in such a horrific manner as 
to elicit total revulsion and anger from those who witness or become aware of 
the act. 13 
The divergence from traditional "means to ends" in recent terrorist acts is 
evident in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103; the 1993 World Trade Center 
complex bombing; the 1995 Oklahoma Federal Building bombing, and the Tokyo 
nerve gas attack; the 1996 Hamas bombings in Israel, IRA bombings in London, 
and the Islamic radical bombing of Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 
New twists on old ideological imperatives, coupled with the availability of more 
lethal weapons and weapon related technologies, are rapidly enabling the 
terrorists to cause large scale death and destruction. 14 Again, for the terrorist 
empowered by an underpinning of religion, the ability to please God by killing his 
12 Jeffry D. Simon, ''Terrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons: A 
Discussion of Possibilities," R-3771-AFMIC, (Santa Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 
1989), 5. 
13 Mark Juergensmeyer, "The Logic of Religious Violence," in D. Rapaport, ed., 
Inside Terrorist Organizations, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 177. 
14 Simon., 5. Also see Bruce Hoffman,"Recent Trends and Future Prospects of 
Terrorism in the United States,"R-3618, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1988), 
10. 
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enemies en-masse with WMD, becomes an end unto itself. 
The ultra-violent terrorist act followed by silence is increasingly frequent. 
Many times in recent years terrorist acts have been committed without a group 
stepping forward to claim credit for the event. Events such as the downing of 
Pan Am flight 103, the Air India flight that crashed off the Irish coast in 1988, the 
recent terroristic bombing at the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta, all suggest a shift in 
terms of the message the terrorist act is supposed to send. Where traditional 
terrorists use the event to gain access to a "bullypulpit" to air their grievances, 
these "silent terrorists" desire to send a message that creates a superordinary 
sense of overwhelming fear, and vulnerability amongst their "enemies." 
Additionally, non-state, religiously oriented groups arguably haye no great need 
for media assistance to articulate their cause as the intended audience is their 
own closed cell-constituency and God. 
By not claiming responsibility for the event, non-state groups may actually 
be able to do more damage to the selected target and, at the same time, escape 
retaliation. The fact that no one group has stepped forward to claim 
responsibility for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing and the downing of TWA 
flight 800 has, at a minimum, caused difficulties between the U.S. and her 
economic allies and heightened tensions between the Islamic countries of Libya, 
Iran, Sudan and Syria vis-a-vis the U.S.15 This might represent part of a non-
15 
"French Minister/No Lesson To Learn From U.S. On Terrorism," Xinhua, 
August 7, 1996; also "U.S. House Report Sees Terror Drive Launched," Reuters, 
August 1, 1996. As of this writing the cause behind the crash of TWA 800 has not 
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state strategy to polarize the Islamic community against the West, while causing 
divisiveness among Western allies. The change in the characterization of 
terrorism may be indicative of a new era, one in which the traditional, 
"constrained" terrorist of the twentieth century is supplanted by the ultra-violent 
"post-modern terrorist" of the twenty-first century. These terrorists are post-
modern because of the manner in which they employ advanced technology, and 
anonymity, to conduct destructive acts traditionally viewed as disproportionate 
to their goals e.g., to compel the state to adopt policies consistent with their 
societal objectives. 
2. Genesis of the Post Modem Terrorist 
The emergence of the post-modern terrorist appears to have two causes. 
One may be religious revivalism. Religion has played a part in legitimizing ultra-
violent acts throughout history, acts which have generally been constrained in 
traditional, secularly oriented non-state groups. Ultra-violent terrorist acts rooted 
in religious imperatives can be seen in Sri Lanka, where Tamil Hindus are 
waging a bloody terrorist campaign against the Sinhalese Buddhists; in India 
and Pakistan where Hindus, Sikhs and Muslim extremist groups are engaging in 
violent struggles; in Israel where both radical Palestinian and Israeli movements 
have caused great injury and death in the name of God. 16 The success of 
been determined. 
16 Jeffrey A. Builta, Extremist Groups: An International Compilation of Terrorist 
Organizations Violent Political Groups and Issue Oriented Militant Movements, 
(Chicago, Ill: The Office of International Criminal Justice, 1996), 663-675, 725-823, 
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Khomeini's 1979 Islamic Revolution and his calls to propagate Islam through the 
use of "holy-terror" have also been viewed as enhancing extremes of radical 
Islamic violence in many locations.17 
The second cause is arguably related to the removal of constraints 
imposed by the Cold War, and the subsequent disintegration of-a bipolar world 
order. As a result of this devolution, a new world disorder seems to be emerging 
in which the legitimacy of many states is being challenged by increasing non-
state calls for self-determination. Huntington affirms this trend in a recent essay 
whereby he argues that the cause of future conflict will be rooted in a clash of 
non-state, transnational cultures. 18 He suggests that ethnic and religious 
underpinnings will play key roles in supplanting traditional polit!cal ideologies 
with cultural ones. Where these movements cross each other, bloody conflict 
will erupt. Prime examples of this phenomenon can already be seen in Algeria, 
Somalia, Egypt, Sudan, Rwanda, Chechnya, the Balkans, Indonesia, Japan -
and even here in the United States. 
These movements often prey on the insecurities of the population, 
offering to fill psychological, sociological, political or religious security needs of 
those who would join them. Examples of such groups have emerged in the form 
1 039-1115. Since 1983 over 50,000 people have been killed by political violence in Sri 
Lanka. 
17 Amir Tahari, Holy Terror, (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1987), 1-20. 
18 Samuel P. Huntington, ''The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs, v. 72, n. 
3, (Summer, 1993). 
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of the Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo, the Identity movement in the U.S., 
and the radical Islamic revivalist movements that exist in a variety of countries. 19 
These religiously oriented groups appear to share a common ideological thread 
that rejects existing societal structures and demands a structural revision of the 
world in a manner that will ensure their own dominance. Capitalizing on the 
highly cultivated fear WMD use engenders may convince these groups that they 
possess a power great enough to compel the state to concede to their demands. 
To this end, the threat or actual use of WMD may be the method by which these 
non-state groups believe they can attack the state and achieve their objectives. 20 
If the state is not prepared to effectively respond to multiple WMD crises, and 
manage the consequence of such attacks, non-state groups m~y arguably be 
able to achieve their desired goals. Armed with WMD, the non-state group may 
achieve its objectives and circumvent the need to engage in a protracted 
19 The case of Aum is by now assumed to be the first time in which WMD has 
been employed in a contemporary terrorist attack. However, there is information to 
suggest that the Islamic terrorists that bombed the World Trade Center may have 
incorporated cyanide as part of the package. See "Doomsday Cults: Only the 
Beginning," Newsweek, April 3, 1995, 40. Additionally, in a 1986 Justice Department 
raid of the Identity oriented group known as the Covenant, Sword, Arm of the Lord, 
federal agents seized approximately thirty gallons of cyanide and plans to poison the 
water supplies of several unidentified U.S. cities. Also see J.Coats, Armed and 
Dangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist Right. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1987), 140; 
Also see Purver, 86. 
20 The devastation wrought by the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
in 1945; the Nazi use of poison gas to annihilate six million Jews during World War II, 
and the use of chemical weapons by both Iran and Iraq during their war in the 1980's, 
are all incidents that have served to create a superordinary sense of fear of such 
weapons in many people. 
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terrorist campaign . 21 
WMD use can cause mass casualties and substantial infrastructure 
disruption, far more than that caused by traditional terrorist methods. Since the 
threat to use WMD affords the non-state group a powerful tool (to compel, deter, 
or destroy) that heretofore has not been available to them, non;.state group 
proliferation presents a serious security dilemma to the global community. 
Recognizing the WMD threat in general terms, President Clinton signed 
Executive Order No. 12938 on November 14, 1994. This order declared a 
national emergency with respect to the unusual and extraordinary threat that 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses to the national security, 
foreign interests, and economy of the United States. On November 9, 1995 a 
continuation of this order was declared by Executive notice. This declared state 
of a national emergency has continued. Despite the existence of a robust, 
widely supported international regime to control the spread of WMD, 22 the 
consensus of various scholars and policy makers identifies WMD proliferation as 
21 This concept is similar to one referred to by Tarrow as the "the window of 
opportunity." See Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 81-99. 
22 This regime includes codified efforts consisting of, but not limited to those 
involving the International Atomic Energy Agency, Non Proliferation Treaty, Chemical 
Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention, export controls through the 
Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Note that though the United 
States has yet to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (problems related to private 
industrial concerns that inspections will result in industrial espionage) the DoD is 
actively engaged in destroying existing stockpiles of chemical agents and their delivery 
systems. 
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a top security threat to our Nation. Senator Sam Nunn's address concerning 
proliferation echoes these sentiments: 
The number one security challenge in the United States now and 
probably for years ahead is to prevent these weapons of mass 
destruction, whether chemical, biological or nuclear, and the scientific 
knowledge of how to make them, from going all over the world to rogue 
groups, to terrorist groups, to rogue nations. 23 · 
Raising the specter of this concern in March of 1995, members of the 
Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo released nerve gas in a Tokyo subway, resulting in 
the death of 12 people and the injury of 5000.24 Following this horrendous 
event, Congressional hearings on the potential for continued non-state group 
employment of WMD concluded with the assertion that non-state proliferation 
poses a difficult challenge to our National security primarily because these 
groups are exceptionally hard to target, and much harder to deter, more so than 
an identifiable rogue state. 
C. DEFINITIONS 
·Is it truly important to define the concept of "terrorists" or "terrorism?" Or 
perhaps is this a significant point because government policies are developed as 
an adjunct to agreed upon definitions. This can be a true dilemma for the policy-
maker, for it is definitional concepts that establish the parameters by which 
counter-terrorist strategies, at both the national and international level, are 
23 Senator Sam Nunn's comments made during November, 1995 Congressional 
hearings on issues related to Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
24 
"Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study of Aum 
Shinrikyo," Congressional Testimony Hearing, October 31, 1995, 1. 
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developed. 25 Unfortunately the ability to build a consensus relative to these 
terms is an elusive proposition since there seems to be no precise or widely 
accepted definition beyond the premise that "terrorism is what the bad guys 
do."26 Much of the difficulty here stems from the fact that people tasked with 
defining terrorism often have a vested interest in either countering it or granting 
it an aura of legitimacy. "Some governments label as terrorism all violent acts 
committed by their political opponents," writes Brian Jenkins, "while anti-
government extremists frequently claim to be the victims of government terror."27 
For the purpose of this study the following definitions apply: 
o Terrorism: A purposeful use of politically, socially, economically or 
religiously motivated violence, conducted by a non-state group. 
The violence is symbolic in that the Proximate Target (the target of 
violence) can be separate from the Ultimate Target (the target of 
influence).28 Terrorism is thus an alternative form of coercive 
diplomacy whereby the primary mechanism to influence the 
Ultimate target is through the inducement of fear and anxiety. 
o Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Weapons that include 
nuclear explosives or radiological contaminants; lethal chemicals; 
25 Ambassador Anthony C. E. Quainton, "Moral and Ethical Considerations in 
Defining a Counter-Terrorist Policy," in David Rapaport and Yonah Alexander, eds.,The 
Rationalization of Terrorism, (Maryland: University Publications of America Inc, 1982), 
40. 
26 Brian M. Jenkins, ''The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems," in Yonah 
Alexander and John M. Gleason, eds., Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on 
Terrorism, (NewYork: Pergamon Press, 1981). 
27 Brian M. Jenkins, "Statements About Terrorism," Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. xiii (September, 1982), 12. 
28 This concept is drawn from a definition of terrorism developed by Professor 
Gordon McCormick, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
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or lethal biological agents (toxins or pathogens). Terroristic use of 
WMD is designed to cause mass disruption or casualties in order 
to coerce, compel, or destroy the Ultimate Target. 
o Non-State Group: An autonomous organization devoid of any 
formal, overt connection to the state government. Non-State 
Groups may be "transnational," e.g., members may not see 
themselves as citizens of any one country, but instead enjoin with 
those who manifest common religious, ethnic, political, social, 
economic or personal objectives that transcend nation-state 
boundaries. These groups may be recognized as legitimate 
organizations by the state i.e., be granted legitimate status 
accorded to religious groups or social organizations. 
o Effective Demand for WMD: The condition that permits threatened 
use of WMD. Effective Demand for WMD exists when internal 
attributes referred to as WMD Demand Variables and WMD Supply 
Variables exist in the non-state group. Intervening Processes are 
external variables that are present within the sociopoliticoeconomic 
environment the non-state group resides in. They are situational in 
nature e.g., a transnational, non-state group operating in the 
Philippines would experience a different set of Intervening 
Processes if it moved its operations to the U.S. Intervening 
Processes, in this respect, can either enhance or degrade Effective 
Demand. 29 
o Cult: A group or sect bound together by devotion to or veneration 
of the same thing, person or ideal. The ideology of the cult maybe 
of a sacred or religious nature viewed as anti-societal by a state. 
o Mass Casualties: The number of injuries that begins to overwhelm 
an average metropolitan area's casualty management capability. 
Ten to fifteen casualties arriving at a hospital emergency room at 
the same time may jeopardize the ability of the ER staff to 
effectively and rapidly treat the injured in a timely fashion. This 
definition is extremely subjective and is dependent on the 
29 The basic definition of Effective Demand was developed by Dr. Gordon 
McCormick, Ph.D., Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. The concept of 
intervening processes is a modification of Babbie's intervening variable. See Earl 
Babbie, The Practice of Social Research: Seventh Edition, (Belmont: CA: 1995), 400. 
The importance and influence of intervening processes was added following 
discussions with John Arquilla Ph.D., Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
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consequence management infrastructure of the city or area 
affected.30 
D. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II offers a brief survey of theories and hypotheses regarding the 
phenomenon of terrorism. It is included to provide a summary of the terrorist 
phenomenon, and an understanding of the magnitude of this issue. Importantly, 
it also provides a basis for the development of one of the two frameworks used 
to analyze selected cases. This framework is derived from a synthesis of 
theories addressing realism, individual/group psychodynamics and 
organizational process. These are addressed further in Chapter Ill. 
Chapter Ill presents the methodology and frameworks used for case 
analysis. It begins by addressing the scope of the study and a brief historical 
account of non-state WMD use. This is followed with a review of the traditional 
constraints that have precluded non-state group use of WMD and why those 
constraints are weakening. The study's methodology, and the two competing 
frameworks used for case analysis are explained next. Each competing 
framework illustrates the logic for WMD use by a non-state group. One 
framework is founded on theories of structural realism; the other is based on a 
synthesis of theories addressing structural realism, individual and group 
30 Philadelphia hospitals were recently overwhelmed by heroin junkies ( 1 00 
plus) who had all acquired and used a lethal combination of heroin laced with cocaine, 
dextromethoraphan, thiamine, and scopolamine. As reported, some ER facilities 
apparently were too overwhelmed to accept all the casualties. See "Bad Batch of 
Heroin Sends Crazed Addicts to Hospitals," Salinas Californian, May 11, 1996, SA. 
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psychodynamics, and organizational process. Through both frameworks, 
specific key variables were identified that when aligned in a "nomothetic" model, 
seem to provide at least partial, probabilistic, explanation of why a non-state 
group would threaten to use WMD. 31 The comparative usefulness of each 
model (as a predictive tools to discern Effective Demand) is adc;fressed in case 
analysis. It is recognized that the true utility of these models would require their 
use in an in-depth statistical analysis of the universe of cases were WMD 
interest by non-state groups has been evident, an effort that is beyond the 
scope, time, and resources presently available for this study. Nevertheless they 
are presented as means by which non-state groups possessing Effective 
Demand for WMD might be identified. 
Chapters IV through VII provide case studies of the aforementioned non-
state groups. 
Chapter VIII concludes the study by addressing: (1) the main argument 
concerning religiously oriented terrorist groups and their "ripeness" to use WMD; 
and (2) the utility of the theoretical frameworks presented to assess Effective 
Demand in non-state groups. 
In a testimonial provided to the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, Donald Cobb and Walter Kirchner stated that: 
... there are over twenty countries suspected of some form of nuclear, 
31 A nomothetic model involves identifying those relatively few considerations 
that seem to provide at least a partial explanation for causation or why things occur. 
See Babbie, 67-69. 
18 
biological, or chemical proliferation. In addition, subnational, organized 
crime, and other terrorist groups that could gain access to these (WMD) 
materials are of growing concern ... The proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction is the most urgent and direct threat to national security. The 
threat to U.S. civilians and interests is real, and the political, societal, 
economic and psychological impacts are potentially devastating. The 
consequence of failure in countering the threat could be catastrophic. We 
cannot afford to be surprised, nor, as one senior government official put it, 
"exchange calling cards at the site of an NBC incident. "32 
It is clear that the window of opportunity for non-state groups to develop a 
WMD capability is open. Since it is difficult to preclude technologies with 
weapon potential from eventually diffusing to a broad audience, it is only 
reasonable to assume that the "WMD genie" is out of the bottle and in the hands 
of non-state groups of a diabolic nature. Minimizing the WMD threat posed by 
non-state groups requires the early identification of their capat:>ilities, motivations 
and intentions. This study is designed to do this by presenting hypothetical 
(exploratory) frameworks that possess both explanatory and predictive qualities 
necessary to address this issue. 
32 
"Reducing the Threat of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Proliferation and 
Terrorism," prepared testimony of Donald D. Cobb, Director Nonproliferation and 
International Security Programs and Walter l. Kirchner, Director of Defense Programs, 
March 13, 1996 to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate. 
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II. THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As noted by Walter Laqueur, terrorism has existed in many different 
forms, evolving out of religious protest movements, political revolts and social 
uprisings.S3 In its earliest noted form, terrorism was used by Sicarri Zealots in 
their struggle against Roman rule in Palestine (AD 66-73). 34 The Sicarri were a 
highly organized religious sect who employed murder, arson, and sabotage in 
their drive to ensure that God alone was considered Lord. To this end their 
devotion to Judaism was so complete that they refused to compromise for less 
than total religious and political autonomy. Unbelievers that attempted to impose 
any other sectarian or secular power over the Sicarii were deemed "targets" to 
be eliminated. This included both Romans and the Jewish moderates in 
Palestine and Egypt. Given the power of Rome and its hegemony in the East, 
the uncompromising attitude of the Zealots led to their destruction at Masada 
where they committed mass suicide rather than capitulate. 35 
33 Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism. (Massachusetts: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1977), 12. 
34 Ibid., 12. 
35 Ehud Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991 ), 24-25. 
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Rebellion and terrorism are described in historic myth and biblical 
writings. In Greek mythology, Prometheus rises as a political rebel to help 
others by rectifying a flawed social order that is viewed as still worth saving. 36 In 
this effort he provides humanity with the gift of fire and subsequently incurs the 
wrath of Zeus. From the Bible it is learned that Satan rebels as a function of 
resentment for having his true nature suppressed. As David Rapoport writes: 
To this end he accepts no responsibility for his action, viewing himself as 
a blameless victim of powerful, impersonal forces. Because he 
understands the existing order as totally corrupt, his rebellion aims at 
creating a new system, one that is global. He manipulates, debases, and 
destroys existing standards in the effort to create a wholly new life style 
based on an idea of perfect virtue. But in the end he cannot create, only 
mock old values by inverting them. 37 
This Manichean view places exclusive principals of organization in deadly 
conflict with each other, where no reconciliation or compromise is feasible and 
where evil ultimately is destined to be abolished. Martha Crenshaw seems to be 
in agreement with this as she notes that, for the terrorist, the world is divided by 
the "good" represented by the terrorist organization, and a much stronger and 
pervasive "evil," usually embodied in governmental authority and the social 
classes identified as supporting the state (Rapoport's powerful, impersonal 
forces). The terrorists see themselves as elites with superior consciousness and 
36 David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander, eds., The Morality of Terrorism: 
Religious and Secular Justification, (New York: Columbia University Press), 5. 
37 Ibid., 5. 
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perceptiveness. 38 
Both of these ideas manifest themselves to some degree in the actions 
and logic of the terrorist who uses violence to alter or destroy the standing social 
order as a means to pave the way to an ideal future, a way that more often than 
not leads directly through hell. This observation may be the only point that those 
who have examined the phenomena can agree upon. The general consensus 
holds that the search for a comprehensive model or theory to explain the 
phenomenon of terrorism is exceedingly difficult. For example, in his evaluation 
of terrorism studies Alex Schmid cautions that: 
The newcomer to the field of terrorism research has to find his way with 
little to guide him. There is no clear and generally accepted definition of 
what constitutes terrorism to begin with. Its relationship to other concepts 
like political violence, guerrilla warfare, political assassination, etc., is 
insufficiently clarified. The theories which attempt to explain the 
occurrence of state terrorism or the rise of insurgent terrorism are widely 
dispersed in the psychology, historical, sociological, criminological and 
political science literature and the newcomer to the field is likely to waste 
much time before he gains an overview of the state of thinking. 39 
38 Martha Crenshaw, "The Subjective Reality of the Terrorist," 20. 
39 Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts Theories 
Data Bases and Literature 1; also see The Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies 
Idealogies Theologies States of Mind, Walter Reich, ed., (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 1. 
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As addressed by terrorism experts, attempts to pinpoint causes and 
develop theories on terrorism have yet to reveal conclusive results.40 Under the 
broad rubric of causes for terrorism Schmid qualifies his survey of current 
theories: 
It has to be stressed from the beginning that the term theory is taken more 
in the sense of "current thinking" and interpretation than in terms of formal 
proposition which have been operationalized and tested empirically. 
Theories in the more rigorous sense of that term, with prognostic power, 
are inexistent. 41 
At one level, locating the nominal cause of terrorism is a fairly simple and 
straightforward matter. If we are content to accept the rationales for terrorist 
acts furnished by the terrorist themselves, then the causes of terrorism are 
amply evident. But as Abraham Kaplan has remarked, "these ~hetorical 
justifications for terrorism are not necessarily identical to true causes."42 They 
could be rationalizations masking the true causes. In a discussion of causes of 
terrorism Martha Crenshaw writes that concrete grievances among an 
identifiable subgroup coupled with perceived deprivation, lack of political 
participation and dissatisfaction with ruling elites provide for preconditions that 
set the stage for terrorism to occur.43 In this regard, terrorist acts are conducted 
40 Martha Crenshaw, ''The Causes of Terrorism," 379. 
41 Schmid, Political Terrorism: Research Guide, 161. 
42 Abraham Kaplan, "The Psychodynamics of Terrorism," Terrorism, vol. i, nos. 
3-4 ( 1978), 237. 
43 Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 381-384. Also John Dollard, 
Frustration and Aggression, (New Haven: Yale University, 1939), 1., and Ted R. Gurr, 
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to achieve instrumental objectives. Several other scholars suggest that the 
search for a unified causal model of terrorism is a wasted effort and the 
phenomena should be examined from the perspectiv.e of the beholder. One 
who holds this view is Austin Turk. He writes that: 
How one approaches the problem of explaining terrorism depends on 
one's postulate about the nature of the social order. One view is that the 
basic social reality comprises durable, complementary relationships 
sustained by cooperative interaction. Disputes are resolved by 
consensual methods, violence is an aberration, and social change occurs 
by evolution. The contrary view is that the basic social reality comprises 
tenuous, antagonistic relationships sustained by explosive interaction. 
Conflicts are suppressed by deception and force, violence is normal and 
social change occurs by revolution. 44 
According to Turk's assertions, those who oppose terrorism, including 
target governments, hold the first view of society, while those vmo are 
sympathetic to terrorist causes, including the terrorists themselves, hold the 
second. This of course can lead to the notion that one man's terrorist is another 
man's freedom fighter, an argument that says little about the cause of the 
terrorist phenomenon. However, when used as an analytic framework Turk's 
assertion might help to organize what is known about terrorism. Along similar 
lines are two essays published in a volume of works entitled Multidimensional 
Terrorism. One addresses "The Rationality of Terrorism, "45 and the other 
Why Men Rebel, (Princeton: Princeton University), 1970. 
44 Austin T. Turk, "Social Dynamics of Terrorism," Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. cdlxiii (September, 1982), 122-123. 
45 Robert Maranto, "The Rationality of Terrorism," in Martin Stann and Bernard 
Schechterman, eds, Multidimensional Terrorism (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reiner, 
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"Irrational Terrorism."46 Schecterman elucidates the basic partition between 
these two ways of looking at terrorism as he writes: 
Efforts at defining and classifying recent international terrorism 
overwhelmingly focus on politically motivated behavior as both the causal 
factor and goal for such activities ... the clear implications is that politically 
motivated behavior is viewed as both rationally understandable and 
discernable (even if disapproved) ... As vital as the inquiry into these more 
obvious forms of terrorism may be, investigations usually overlooks or 
inadequately confronts another variation, irrational terrorism, which is 
more disturbing by its very nature .... 47 
By "more disturbing," Schecterman means that "irrational terrorism" is 
rooted in the individual, psychological motives of the terrorist taken apart from 
the political cause or goal which is assumed to be only loosely connected to the 
real cause of terrorism. From these two perspectives a framework based on an 
assumption that all forms of terrorism may stem from both types of causes 
emerges. 
The best explanation of the phenomenon of terrorism may be found in 
Laqueur's description of how the West German government approached the 
study of the subject. Between 1977-1983 a team of political scientists, 
sociologists, philosophers, psychologists, criminologists and jurists engaged in a 
1987), 11-18. 
46 Bernard Schecterman, "Irrational Terrorism," in Martin Slann, and Bernard 
Schecterman, eds., Multidimensional Terrorism,, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reiner, 
1987), 19-30. 
47 Ibid., 19. 
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comprehensive examination of terrorist ideologies, and strategies. 48 What the 
Germans realized is that terrorism can not be monocausally explained. 
In an examination of terrorism, maybe it is more important to target and 
identify the moment at which terrorism occurs vice why it takes place. Does 
terrorism begin when members of a radical organization decide as a "group" to 
conduct terrorist acts; or when individuals actually cross the line to engage in 
terrorist acts? How this question is answered plays a part in determining which 
theoretical framework is most useful to explain the phenomenon e.g., those 
grounded in the works of political, sociological, or psychological sciences. 
What the review of literature regarding the phenomenon of terrorism 
clearly shows is that no one academic discipline can be said to have exclusive 
claim over explaining the causes of terrorism. It is therefore exceedingly 
important that individuals engaged in the development of counter-terrorist 
strategies be sensitive to the fact that terrorist acts may be committed as a 
synergetic explosion of political, psychological, and sociological forces, an 
explosion that could very well include the use of weapons of mass destruction. 
The following sections examine some, but not all, of the explanatory 
theories representing four disciplinary orientations used to address the 
phenomenon of terrorism. These orientations include political science, 
sociology, psychology, and organizational theory. 
48 Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 163-164. 
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28. 
B. POLITICAL THEORIES OF TERRORISM 
The premises of political theories regarding the cause of terrorism are 
based on the supposition that terrorists are committed ideologues advancing 
their vision of a better world.49 From this perspective, terrorism is a rational 
means by which non-state actors deal with objectionable political, economic 
and/or social conditions that define their perceived reality. The use of terrorism 
is a calculated choice by the non-state actor who finds access to democratic 
processes to be unavailable, ineffective, or too time consuming. 50 Since the 
terrorist group is militarily weaker than the state in terms of war-fighting 
capability, the use of "random violence" becomes the only way they can gain 
attention to "voice" their cause. 
One then asks what objectionable social conditions drive terrorists to 
"react?" The typical response suggests that terrorists react to intolerable 
conditions imposed or maintained by the government structure or the social 
status quo. The "cause" to take up terrorism is done to correct the disparity in 
the distribution of resources between the ultimate target (regime in power) and 
the group the terrorist organization claims to represent. Philip Karber and R. 
William Mengel contend that terrorism is a political response to external 
49 Richard Clutterbuck, Living With Terrorism (London: Faber &Faber, 1975), 
50 Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism," 17-24. 
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circumstances imposed by the terrorist's political enemies. 51 Further, they assert 
that terrorist groups normally arise as offshoots of broadly based protest 
movements: 
The extent of success achieved by the (protest) movement is, in the main, 
the measure for the likelihood of a splinter element evolving into a 
terrorist groups. The greater the degree of success the tess likely 
members will be inclined to resort to violence. Conversely, as frustration 
builds because of the lack of success or because of actual repression, the 
more probable a terrorist group will result. 52 
In this respect the terrorist group might be construed as the radicalized 
membership which splinters off from an egalitarian "social movement" that is 
deemed by them as "ineffective." Political theories of violence thus focus to 
some degree on the argument that terrorism is used as a weapon of the 
"impatient, would be political players," or those who are denied access to the 
political contestation processes. 
This argument has the greatest potential validity when applied to 
authoritarian regimes that inspire terrorist violence because of: oppression, 
denial of other forms of political-social protest and change. Further, there are 
regimes that are too inept to eradicate or contain terrorist groups. 53 Arguably, 
this assumption suggests that since terrorist groups are politically weak, they 
51 Philip A Karber and R. William Mengel, "Political and Economic Forces 
Affecting Terrorism," in Patrick Montana and GeorgeS. Roukis, eds., Managing 
Terrorism (Connecticut: Quorum Books, 1983), 24. 
52 Ibid., 25. 
53 Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 383-384. 
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balance this weakness through the use of terrorism. Minimally, this assures 
their cause will be elevated to the public conscience, a conscience deemed 
critical to the pursuit of the policy changes they seek. On balance the objection 
usually made to this last resort or weakness thesis is that terrorism frequently 
takes place or is directed against regimes that do offer other avenues of political 
and social change, notably the liberal western democracies. The rejoinder to 
this observation is made by noting the existence of the blocked society or 
political immobility thesis advanced respectively by L. Bonante and Franco 
Ferracuti. The former has written: 
A society that knows terrorism is a blocked society, incapable of 
answering the citizens' requests for change, but nevertheless capable of 
preserving and reproducing itself. ... 
In reference to Italy in the 1980s, .he says: 
When a Communist party collaborates with a middle class government or 
actually agrees to share governmental responsibilities with the latter, how 
much room is there for an autonomous initiative by a revolutionary. 54 
Franco Ferracutti has stated that terrorism can, ironically, be 
consequence of an overabundance of political stability in that nation. 55 Despite 
the rise and fall of cabinet and coalition governments, the same classes remain 
in control to maintain the status quo. In support of Ferracutti's argument, 
54 Luigi Bonante, "Some Unanticipated Consequences of Terrorism," Journai of 
Peace Research vol. xvi, no. 3 (1979), 205-207. 
55 Franco Ferracutti, "A Sociopsychiatric Interpretation of Terrorism," Annal of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. cdlxiii (September, 1982), 
138. 
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Crenshaw asserts that in a blocked society where the elite (potential terrorists) 
are dissatisfied and the masses are indifferent, preconditions for the emergence 
of terrorism exist: 
Perhaps terrorism is most likely to occur precisely where mass passivity 
and elite dissatisfaction coincide. Discontent is not generalized enough 
to provoke the majority of the populace to action against-the regime, yet a 
small minority, without access to the bases of power that would permit 
overthrow of the government through coup d'etat or subversion seeks 
radical change. Terrorism may thus be a sign of a stable society rather 
than a symptom of fragility and impending collapse. 56 
In such circumstances, terrorism is used by a non-state group unknown or 
unpopular with a society, as a means by which they can force radical social 
changes they see as essential. 57 This unpopularity leads them to dismiss 
possibilities for change through standard political means e.g., the electoral 
campaign. Consequently they adopt the use of terrorism to improve access to 
the political process. 
Though political conflict theory provides strong causal arguments for 
explaining the phenomenon of terrorism, several objections which can be made. 
Political conflict theories characterize terrorists as rational individuals committed 
to a specific ideological or political cause. As noted by Laqueur, the 
political/ideological "cause" espoused by many terrorist groups often seems to 
be more of a pretext for committing acts of violence than an authentic causal 
56 Crenshaw, ''The Causes of Terrorism," 384. 
57 Ibid., 88. A contemporary example of this is Sinn Fein and the PIRA who 
suggest that they represent the will of the Catholic majority desiring a united Ireland. 
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factor.58 Laqueur further criticizes the arguments that terrorist are political actors 
responding to widespread oppression or injustice by noting that if such 
oppression exists, why are the ranks of terrorist organizations not overflowing? 
Richard Clutterbuck notes this point in his examination of West German terrorist 
groups as he writes: 
In West Germany in 1968-1970 there were, perhaps some 10,000 radical 
students who sympathized with the aims of the Baader Meinhof group, but 
only about 50-100 of these graduated to the hard core of killers in the Red 
Army Faction (RAF) in 1975-1977.59 
On balance, terrorist groups are small for many reasons, least of which relate to 
security considerations. When masses do fill the ranks of non-state groups the 
situation becomes better characterized as social revolution vice terrorism. 
The phenomenon of terrorism may not be totally explicable by 
underpinning theories found in political science. Valuable insights and 
contributions may be provided through analytic frameworks afforded by other 
disciplines. Within the relevant literature on terrorism the work of various 
psychoanalysts who focus on individual "drive derivatives," seem to overcome 
some of the problems found in political violence approaches. Drive derivatives 
are defined as aspirations to satisfy deep psychological needs related to libido 
58 Walter Laqueur, "Interpretations of Terrorism: Fact Fiction and Political 
Science," Journal of Contemporary History. vol. xii, no. 1 (January, 1977), 14. 
59 Richard Clutterbuck, The Future of Political Violence: Destabilization 
Disorder and Terrorism, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 22. 
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and aggression. 50 A person's "drive" is the synergistic composite of these "drive 
derivatives." 61 
Psychoanalytic theories of terrorism also provide a bridge to discussions 
of terrorism based on sociological interpretations of the causal behind the 
phenomenon. The following section is presented as a synthes-is of theories put 
forth by noted "experts" in the field of terrorism and psychopathy. 
C. PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS OF TERRORISM 
Introducing his readers to psychological theories of the causes of 
terrorism, Schmid contends: 
If it is assumed that nonviolent behavior in society is normal, those who 
engage in violence, criminal or other, are necessarily 'abnormal' 
deviating from the rules of society. An outflow of this assumption are the 
many theories which regard the terrorist as a peculiar personality with 
clear identifiable character traits. 62 
This assumption arguably contends that many, if not all, terrorists are 
subject to psychopathologies of various kinds and that they are in essence 
"crazy." Referring to elaborate initiation rites common to Western-based 
terrorist groups and their satanic symbolism, Kaplan continues along these lines, 
arguing that "the Baader-Meinhoff group is not very different in the causes and 
consequences of their actions whatever their reasons, from the Manson 
6° Charles Brenner, M.D., "The Mind as Conflict and Compromise Formation," 
article. New York Psychiatric Institute, (http://plaza.interport.net/nypsan/egoid.html, 
September 2, 1996), 7. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Schmid, Political Terrorism: Research Guide, 142. 
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family."63 
Terrorists engage in violent acts that result in indiscriminate killing of 
innocent victims, acts typically referred to as unconscionable, or immoral. In 
spite of this disposition towards the use of violence, no single psychological 
model has been developed to explain the "terrorist. "64 
Discussions with several psychodynamic {Freudian) analysts, suggest 
that terrorists may represent a violent manifestation of personalities that range 
from those that possess a superordinate sense of self-righteous conviction, to 
the sociopath who functions without the benefit of conscience or morality. This 
is not to be confused with the psychotic individual, who is completely out of 
touch with the external world and would be hard pressed to function as part of a 
terrorist group. 65 
The development of such personalities is blamed on the less-than-
complete development of the "superego," which is that part of the psychic 
structure where individual conscience and morality reside. Since superego 
formation occurs in the early stages of childhood development, the choice to 
participate in terrorist acts (subsumed to be unconscionable, illegal and immoral, 
63 Abraham Kaplan, ''The Psychodynamics of Terrorism," 244. 
64 Jerrold M. Post, ''Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of 
Psychological Forces," in Origins of Terrorism 25. 
65 Discussion with Don Silver, M.D. and B.K. Campbell Ph.D., September 2, 
1996. Drs. Silver and Campbell are psychodynamic analysts whose research and 
practice focus on infant-child psycho-social development. 
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regardless of personal conviction) is partially explained as a function of 
childhood calamities, e.g., the calamity of parental disapproval and punishment 
wherein the child, during a critical phase of personality development referred to 
as the "oedipal phase of development" experiences tremendous parental 
disapproval or rejection. Dr. Charles Brenner suggests that: · 
... when a child believes a parent disapproves (thinks the child is bad, 
naughty, doing wrong) the consequence is believed to be one or more of 
the other calamities, namely, object loss, loss of love, or castration. In our 
society, at least, the idea of a parent judging one or more of a child's 
wishes to be (morally wrong) plays a very important role in every child's 
mental life and development. Shame and guilt are closely related 
dynamically because both are consequences of parental disapproval at 
an early stage of development. 66 
Providing a slightly different perspective Richard Clutterbuck mentions 
guilt as a motivation for affluent, middle class youth to join terrorist 
organizations, writing of them that "part of the explanation may lie in a feeling of 
guilt about their sheltered childhood and the privileges they enjoy."67 Feelings of 
guilt have been identified not only as a factor pushing individuals to join terrorist 
organizations, they also play a part in explanations of why terrorist acts are 
committed once its ranks are complete. In this context Kaplan refers to a self-
reinforcing mechanism inherent in terrorist activity: 
On a deeper level, self destruction may be an explanation of guilt. Terror 
thereby becomes a self-sustaining process: each act of terror imposes a 
66 Charles Brenner, M.D., "The Mind as Conflict and Compromise Formation," 7. 
67 Richard Clutterbuck, Living with Terrorism, 131-132 
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burden of guilt, to be expiated by self-destruction in a subsequent act. 68 
This might explain in part why young men belonging to militant Islamic 
organizations are so readily able to kill themselves in suicide bombings against 
perceived enemies. Survivor guilt may play a part in this particular dynamic, as 
comrades that have not experienced a similar fate despair about being alive and 
thus engage in suicide attacks or other such operations to show the depth of 
their commitment to the cause. For the Islamic radical, the promise of paradise 
for martyrs is also entwined with this hypothesis. Brenner calls this type of 
symbolic gratification a masochistic tendency, where the atonement e.g., the 
suicide attack, is done to gain or regain approval of the parent figure, in this 
case God, and to avoid disapproval or a worse unpleasure. 
Dr. Jerrold Post, another psychodynamic psychiatrist and well known 
authority on the subject, believes that the terrorists are motivated by more than 
one form of psychological affliction and that they can be categorized to some 
instances as self-centered narcissists and paranoid delusionist. 69 He agrees 
with Brenner concerning the importance the role child-parent relations play in 
the personality development of the individual and suggests the root causes for 
terrorist behavior resides in experiences of growing up, the influence of parental 
upbringing and childhood experiences which lay the foundation for an individual 
68 Kaplan, "Psychodynamics of Terrorism," 251. 
69 Jerrold M. Post, "Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior," 
Terrorism, vol. vii, no. 3 (1984), 245. 
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to become a terrorist. 70 Post cites in his work studies of terrorist conducted by 
the Ministry of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany.71 These studies 
suggest that many terrorists suffer from incomplete psychosocial identities, 
resulting from early psychic woundings. These woundings predispose such 
individuals to: (1) seek affiliations with like-minded individuals; (2) to externalize 
the blame for their inadequacies back on society. This strong need to belong to 
an idealized group, coupled with a predisposition to externalize provides the 
foundation for powerful group dynamics, dynamics that may result in the 
commission of the violent terrorist act. 
In an analysis of leaders and followers in terrorist groups, Post notes that 
narcissism and charismatic leadership play key influential roles. Charismatic 
leadership is described as a relationship between leaders and followers 
characterized by the following: 
o The leader is perceived by the followers as somehow superhuman. 
o The followers blindly believe the leader's statements. 
o The followers unconditionally comply with the leader's directives 
for action. 
o The followers give the leader unqualified emotional support. 
According to Post's research, charismatic leadership is essentially a 
function of the individuals who need and chose to follow a leader. 
70 Jerrold M. Post, "Its Us Against Them: The Group Dynamics of Political 
Terrorism," Terrorism, val. x, no. 1 (1987), 24. . 
71 Jerrold M. Post, "Prospects for Nuclear Terrorism: Psychological Motivations 
and Constraints," in Paul Levanthal.and Yonah Alexander, eds., Preventing Nuclear 
Terrorism, eds., (lexington, MA: lexington Books, 1987), 93. 
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Metaphorically, Post describes this as a lock (the follower) and key (the leader) 
relationship. Drawing on the work of Kernberg's examination of the pathological 
narcissist, Post suggest that narcissistic personality disorders carry great 
implications for explaining the powerful forces that emerge in terrorist groups as 
a result of such relationships. 72 
The development of an unhealthy narcissistic personality results from 
suffered psychologically damaging childhood self-esteem. From this damage an 
individual can develop into either a "mirror-hungry" or "mirror-ideal" personality.73 
The "mirror-hungry" personality strives to make up for a sense of worthlessness 
and they "hunger for confirming and admiring responses to counteract.. .their 
lack of self esteem."74 The "ideal-hungry" personality feels a s_ense of worth only 
when they can relate to individuals whom they can admire for their prestige, 
power, and intelligence. Post provides elucidating insight on what transpires in 
a group when the forces of charisma, narcissism and paranoia merge. Writing 
on the psychodynamics within which a religiously oriented terrorist cult may 
emerge, Post suggests that: 
... the paranoid belief system has a restitutive function for the individual on 
the edge of (the) psychological apocalypse. Examination of some 
religious conversion experiences suggest that they too have this sense 
72 0. Kernberg, Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism, (New York: 
Jacob Aronson, 1975). 
73 Jerrold M. Post, "Narcissism and the Charismatic Leader-Follower 
Relationship," Political Psychology, v.7, n. 4 (1986), 678-679. 
74 Ibid., 679. 
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making function. On the verge of psychological collapse, some find 
comfort and meaning and become intensely committed to a highly 
structured religious belief system. On the edge of meaninglessness, to 
find a faith which restores a sense of meaning and purpose, to become a 
true believer, can bring immense relief. Some ... become convinced of their 
own divinity, and see themselves fighting the forces of darkness. If the 
paranoid with messianic delusions possesses leadership abilities, and 
can identify a vulnerable populations, the ingredients are present for a 
(violent) charismatic, apocalyptic religious cult. .. (such as) Jim Jones and 
the Peoples Temple of Guyana and David Koresh and the Branch 
Davidians. 75 
In a final argument for the explanatory power of psychological theories 
addressing the terrorist phenomenon, Post discusses the influence of low self-
esteem. He finds that individuals who come to young adulthood with a deficient 
sense of self-esteem and inadequately integrated personalities "project" their 
inadequacies back on society ... so that society becomes the evil entity to 
destroy.76 In this regard terrorism becomes a response to a lack of self-esteem 
and the "cause" terrorists fight for ultimately winds up "fighting" for them, e.g., 
participating in a special group with a special mission boosts their sense of self-
worth .. 77 On a more systemic level, Kaplan suggests that the issue of esteem 
provides a causal explanation for why various Arab groups engaged in terrorism 
following the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 war with Israel e.g., it was a 
75 Interview with Dr. Jerrold M. Post conducted February 9, 1996, in San 
Francisco, CA. Quotes were taken from the draft notes of a book Dr. Post is presently 
writing which concerns cults. 
76 Post, "Psychodynamic Theory," 246. 
77 Gordon McCormick, Ph.D., lecture on terrorism in which he discussed at 
length the issue of the "cause" not being the "cause" of the terrorists' motivation., Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Spring 1995. 
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way of boosting their sense of self following a tremendous loss. 
These theories all appear to play a role in explaining the phenomenon 
however, in a short critique of those that would try to explain terrorism wholly 
through psychological theories Crenshaw notes that an evaluation of the typical 
terrorist: 
... suggests that the common outstanding characteristic of terrorists is their 
normality. Terrorism often seems to be the connecting link among widely 
varying personality types. 78 
In summation, psychological theories of terrorism provide an 
understanding of individual behavior, beliefs, and motivations. When 
psychological analysis is incorporated as one part of an analytic framework that 
includes socio-cultural (structural), organizational process, and political theories 
of violence, a composite explanation for why terrorism occurs emerges. This 
composite framework might better serve those trying to understand the 
occurrence of the terrorism phenomenon. The next section will address several 
prevailing thoughts concerning terrorist demographics and permissive 
(structural) factors that enable or enhance opportunities for terrorist acts. This 
will be followed by a review of group dynamic and organizational processes 
theories of terrorism as presented by Post and Crenshaw, theories that draw 
from political and psychological interpretations but add other concept areas such 
as group interactions, institution and social structure. 
78 Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 390. 
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D. PROFILES AND PERMISSIVE FACTORS 
Brian Jenkins notes that "terrorists share a common demographic 
profile. "79 In a widely -cited demographic profile study of terrorism published by 
Charles Russell and Bowman Miller they observe that: 
The typical urban terrorist is a young male adult (22-24 years of age), 
unmarried with some post-secondary school education or training. In 
many cases they come from middle or upper middle class families with 
parents holding professional jobs such as lawyers, doctors etc.,. Though 
many hold conventional jobs most are perpetual students. This accords 
with a notion that terrorists are generally members of an idle elite, their 
education placing them above those they claim to represent; their lack of 
full time careers affording them the time to engage in terrorist activities. 
Although most West European terrorists tended to specialize in 
humanities and social science, those from Middle Eastern groups tended 
to be educated in technical fields such as engineering. Further that most 
West European and Latin American terrorists were recruited at college 
campuses where they were exposed to radical ideologies. In fact they 
note that there is a strong correlation between rapid extension of college 
education to the Latin American middle class in the 1960s and the 
increase in terrorist groups in the late 1960s and 1970s. The exception to 
this pattern involves those groups founded on nationalist or separatist 
ideologies such as the IRA and some Palestinian groups, were the most 
common place of recruitment has been prison.80 
In a contemporary example supportive of Brown and Miller's demographic 
study, note that members of Hamas who committed the March '96 suicide 
bombings throughout Israel were noted to be young, male students of 
79 Jenkins, "Statements About Terrorism," 11. 
80 Charles A. Russell and Bowman H. Miller, "Profile of a Terrorist," Terrorism, 
vol i, no 1 (1977), 17-30. Note that in this study Bowman and Miller use statistics 
compiled from over 350 known terrorist representing eighteen Middle Eastern, Latin 
American, West European and Japanese groups. 
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engineering studying at Bir Zeit University. 81 
Permissive factors that enable and enhance terrorist activities are 
addressed at length by Martha Crenshaw in a discussion of societal 
preconditions and precipitants which emerge as a reaction to modernity. 
Preconditions, the factors that set the stage for terrorism to occur over the long 
run, include such things as concrete grievances among an identifiable group 
such as an ethnic minority being discriminated against by the majority.82 
Contemporary examples of this are evident today in Ireland, the Balkans, Israel, 
Egypt, Algeria, and Sri Lanka. In support of Crenshaw's observation, 
Schecterman has suggested that terrorism may be an outgrowth of rapid 
change in socio-political conditions. He contends that: 
Revolutionary dynamics in innovative technology and economic systems 
have produced great dislocation and anomie among vast populace, and 
especially so among the elite of such societies. The universal challenge 
to older belief systems and institutions, the inability to comprehend 
changes, and the growing impersonalism involved has led, as in other 
moments in history, to severe resistance as part of the reaction. Major 
juncture points in civilization development or undoing produce severe and 
intense forms of response. Terrorism has been a reaction pattern for 
many people under such duress. 83 
These rapid changes leave the population feeling disassociated from the familiar 
81 
"Deadly Israeli Bus Blast Rocks Mideast Peace," Reuters News Media, 
(http://www.excite.com/Bulletin/Reuters/96.3.3.7.NEWS-BOMBING.html.) 
82 Crenshaw, "Causes of Terrorism," 383. 
83 Schecterman, "Irrational Terrorism," 22. 
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and highly agitated. 84 Examples of this are found in a close examination of 
events that have followed the disintegration of the Former Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia into separate states. Conflict and terrorist activities continue to 
occur in Bosnia as various state and non-state groups within attempt to adjust to 
changes brought on by the dissolution of the latter. The Former Soviet Union 
has it's hands full in Chechnya, were devolution of the Soviet Republic has led 
to a re-emergence of Chechen desires for their own state, a desire that has 
prompted the use of terrorist tactics to force their agenda. 
A subset of preconditions are permissive factors that, as a function of 
modernity, enable the terrorist group to conduct significant violent acts that 
affect societal structure. Relevant examples include urbanization-
industrialization, which offers the terrorist group a multitude of random targets 
such as airliners, power grids, computer networks, public utilities and 
transportation. Diffusion of technology through the media, educational 
institutions, and the internet, provide the terrorist group with access to 
knowledge that enhance their ability to develop strategy, tactics, arsenals, 
communications and transportation networks.85 The end of the Cold War and 
the need for the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union to 
84 Damian Thompson, "As The Millennium Approaches, The Armageddon 
Business Is Booming," London Daily Telegraph, August 8, 1996. 
85 For examples of this see David Harber, Assorted Nasties (Arizona, Desert 
Publications, 1993); also see William Powell, The Anarchist Cookbook, (New Jersey: 
Barricade Books, lnc 1989). 
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generate capital has resulted in a robust trade in small arms and light weaponry, 
which includes such items as SA~? shoulder launched surface to air missiles. 
The availability of hi~tech weapons through the black-market further enhances 
the lethality of a terrorist group.86 
Modern education plays a role as a permissive factor in that it has helped 
to generate an intellectual climate that nurtures pre-terrorist. Here Schecterman 
provides the observation that "intellectual life has made some followers 
thoroughly critical of their societies. "87 
E. GROUP DYNAMICS 
Post's psychological theories of terrorism present some of the motivations 
that draw in and hold terrorist groups together. He believes that individuals who 
have experienced a degree of psychically damaging "childhood calamities" are 
particularly vulnerable to the powerful influence of group and organizational 
dynamics. For these "wounded individuals," joining a terrorist group: 
... serves more than one goal; one is the espoused goal of the group ... and 
there is the goal of belonging so that sustaining the group and one's 
acceptance by it assume major ... indeed preeminent. .. importance. 88 
Post suggests that the strong need to belong gives strength to the 
argument concerning the power of group dynamics. So while it is ideology that 
86 S.D. Mundi, Pangs of Proximity: India and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis, 
(California: Sage Publications Inc, 1993), 71, 91, 125. 
87 Schecterman, "Irrational Terrorism," 21. This is not meant to be taken as an 
anti-intellectual statement as education also cultivates values antithetical to terrorism. 
88 Post, "Psychodynamic Theory," 248-49. 
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holds the group together and serves as the overt rationale for the conduct of 
violent acts, terrorists, do not commit these acts only for ideological reasons. 
They also commit them as part of a process to maintain group identity and more 
importantly, group existence. 89 Post explains that terrorism is caused by a 
combination of psychological needs and an individual's perception that the 
group can fill those needs. This is not a static model since the ability of the 
group to meet individual expectations plays a part in how much the group will 
influence the individual's behavior, particularly when it comes time to commit a 
terrorist act. 90 
In an application of Wilfered Bion's contribution in this area Post cites that 
groups normally work under one or more of three basic assumptions: (a) the 
dependency group devoted to a charismatic leader, (b) a pairing group 
dominated by messianic, and apocalyptic projections, and (c) the fight-flight 
group. In the dependency group the followers turn to the "omnipotent, 
charismatic, leader" for security. Typical of this association is the blind, 
unquestioned following of the leader's order as he/she is placed on an 
ideological pedestal. When the leader fails to meet expectations of the 
followers, followers may get angry and defect from the group. In the pairing 
89 Post, "Group Dynamics," 23. In religious groups, it is the religion that serves 
as the rallying point. In politically oriented groups, the political cause is the rallying 
point. In single issue groups is the issue offocus that serves as the rallying point.. .ad 
infinitum. 
90 Ibid., 25-26. 
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group members conduct actions they believe will result in the emergence of a 
messiah, someone who will save them. 
Usually it is the "fight-flight" basic assumption which especially dominates 
terrorist group life. The fight-flight group acts oppositional to the outside world, 
a world that threatens and justifies the group's existence. The-only way for the 
fight-flight group to preserve itself is by fighting against or fleeing the enemy.91 
To support this proposition, Post refers to the language of absolution that 
dominates terrorist rhetoric, which promotes a message that outsiders are either 
for or against the group, that if a person is not part of the solution he/she is part 
of the problem and therefore fair game for victimization. There is a very close fit 
between the personality types attracted to terrorist groups and the assumption of 
the fight-flight psychology that comes to dominate group behavior. Post writes 
that even heqlthy individuals can come under the influence of these three 
assumptions. He states , ''for alienated and marginal individuals, who tend to 
externalize the source of their own failures, the psychological attractiveness of 
these states is over whelming. "92 Belonging to a terrorist group may become the 
linChpin of psychosocial identity, Post believes, filling a psychic split or gap in 
the individual member, "so that the only way the member feels reasonably 
complete is in relationship to the group."93 
91 Ibid., 31. 
92 Post, "Psychodynamic Theory," 250. 
93 Post, "Group Dynamics," 26. 
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Group processes tend to reinforce the new member's need to belong. 
New members are likely to be subjected to comprehensive and consciously-
planned programs of indoctrination. Questioning of group decisions or of the 
group's legitimacy is met with negative sanctions.94 Members are cut off from 
any competing messages about social reality or the nature of the group by the 
characteristic isolation of terrorist groups from society. To further "burn bridges" 
between the nascent terrorist and society the "new guy" is required to commit 
illegal acts thus furthering dependence on the group.95 Other effective forces 
that create the perception that members must depend upon the group for their 
survival may be that group cadre assert that counter-terrorist forces have 
standing orders to "shoot to kill" terrorists on sight, that no surrender is possible. 
Post comments 
in their intense commitment, separation from the outside world and 
intolerance of internal dissent, terrorist groups resemble religious sects or 
cults.96 
He argues that group belonging heals psychic splits. This enables individual 
members to cross the line of normal conduct and embrace violent activities of 
terror, acts done primarily tore-entrench their commitment to the group which 
supplants the family that never sufficiently existed. 
Post posits that the skillful charismatic leader shapes attitudes and 
94 Post, "Psychodynamic Theory," 250. 
95 Crenshaw, "Causes of Terrorism," 393. 
96 Post," Group Dynamics," 26-27. 
47 
induces dependency states in his followers, particularly those that are 
overwhelmed with fear and doubt. In such individuals it is extremely attractive 
for them to suspend individual judgement and repose their faith in the leadership 
of the charismatic who convey's conviction and certainty. Examples of such 
leader-follower interactions can be seen in the behavior of those that follow(ed) 
Hitler, Reverend Sun Yung Moon, and the Ayatollah Khomeini. 
The last section of this discussion focuses on Crenshaw's Theory of 
Terrorism and Organizational Process. In her theory, she focuses on individual 
behavior, moderated by group dynamics, all of which are constantly exposed to 
change from internal and external forces. Thus her approach integrates 
political, psychological and structural theories that attempt to explain terrorism 
and appears to provide a balanced though not final explanation for the terrorist 
phenomenon. 
F. CRENSHAW'S ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS THEORY 
Crenshaw's Organizational Process Theory of Terrorism focuses on the 
internal politics of the organization. She suggests that the keys to 
understanding how terrorism emerges lies in: (1), understanding the conditions 
that cause a group to come together and (2), understanding how groups attempt 
to sustain their terrorist organization. She writes that: 
... terrorism can become a self-sustaining process regardless of its 
political consequences, it assumes that the fundamental purpose of any 
political organization is to maintain itself. Terrorist behavior represents 
the outcome of the internal dynamics of the organization rather than 
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strategic action. The minimal goal of any organization transcends mere 
survival. Leaders, in particular wish to enhance and promote the 
organization. Their personal ambitions are tied to the organization's 
viability and political position.97 
Crenshaw places great emphasis on the role played by leaders in a 
terrorist organization. Since the beliefs held by the group leader are 
determinants of action preferences for the group, it is important to understand 
the dynamics that shape the personality of such leaders. Empirical evidence 
suggests that individual motivations and intentions can be discerned based on 
an understanding of the environmental, social, and economic, forces that shape 
a leader's personality and thus the group's belief system.98 Predicting the 
behavior of terrorist leadership is key to countering the terrorist group's 
destructive intentions. For the authoritarian leader, the driving force is the fear 
of being weak, a fear derived from the occurrence of psychic wound occurring in 
childhood. For example, a child who had been subject to an overly strict, 
perhaps even brutal, authoritarian parental system might develop, as part of his 
character, an unbridled hostility toward the state, which he experiences as 
unjust and dangerous to him and those like him. At the same trme he also 
identifies with the hated parent, becoming himself the sadistic monster, who can 
97 Crenshaw, ''Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational 
Approaches," in David C. Rapoport, ed., Inside Terrorist Organizations, (New York: 
Columbia University, 1988), 19. 
98 T.W. Adorno, Else Frankel-Brunswick, Daniel J. Levinson, R.Nevitt Sanford, 
The Authoritarian Personality: Studies in Prejudice, (New York: Harpers and Row 
Publisher, 1950), 1-27. 
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justify to himself his brutal acts. Such a person might experience himself as 
reaching the helpless victims of the state he opposes, just as he might have 
imagined in his childhood rescuing his passive mother or helpless siblings. 99 
The following attributes have been noted in the authoritarian 
personality: 100 
D Extreme narcissism, emptiness or shallowness. 
o Inordinate longing for status and power. 
D Readiness for aggression against the weak or defenseless, primed 
to externalize against "out-group" others. 
o Demands for immediate recognition. 
D Uses religious ideas in order to gain advantage or aid in 
manipulating people. 
Leaders are distinguished from rank membership as a function of their 
perceived authority, commitment to the cause and by their control over 
organizational resources and incentives that can be provided to organization 
membership. Leaders in terrorist groups thus hold tenuous and at times 
paradoxical positions in that they are authoritarian amongst a group that typically 
rebels against authority. 
At the same time, the leader's qualifications and policies may be 
questioned by the group membership: 
There are no written rules for the election or appointment of a leader: he 
emerges because he was one of the founders or because his authority 
was generally recognized. But his position is bound to be questioned 
99 Concept developed adjunct to a discussion with Linn A. Campbell, M.D., 
November 11 , 1996. 
100 Adorno, et al., 727-781. 
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sooner or later by others for a variety of reasons. 101 
The leader prevents the success of these challenges through his ability to 
control a range of incentives that can be offered or withheld to individual 
members. The terrorist group leader is thus in a precarious situation: he must 
balance his interests with those necessary to ensure the survival of the 
organization. This includes those interests related to maintaining his group's 
position relative to rival terrorist organizations. Incentives are rather complex 
and include those addressing the groups formal objectives (usually couched 
within a political aspiration to gain control of some aspect of society), and those 
that include rewards to members for participating in terrorist activities: 
... however, the relationship between the actual rewards for membership 
and the organization's stated objective is not straightforward, since 
recruits often join an organization for reasons other than ideological 
commitment. Leaders maintain their position by supplying various 
tangible incentives to members, rewards that may enhance or diminish 
the pursuit of the organization's public ends. 102 
Crenshaw lists four types of interpersonal incentives that leaders of 
terrorist groups apportion to members; the opportunity for action, the need to 
belong, the desire for social status and the acquisition of material "reward." 
With reference to action Crenshaw notes that leaders make the decisions 
regarding which members will participate in a terrorist attack. The operation 
proper can thus serve as a "reward" particularly for the member who sees his 
101 Laqueur, Age of Terrorism, 95. 
102 Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Causes of Terrorism," Orbis, 
vol. xxix, no. 3. (Fall, 1985), 47 4. 
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actions as a professional craft. 103 The incentive of "belonging to a group" was 
addressed in the discussion on Post's observations. Belonging to a group 
maybe considered one type of incentive. Crenshaw notes that there are also 
powerful disincentives to oppose leaders and their policies, specifically the 
threat of disenfranchisement, which might even mean "death." · Leaders can 
wield this incentive to coerce members to "toe the line," as they strive to 
accomplish their multiple objectives. The third incentive concerns social status 
e.g., joining a terrorist organization may bring recognition as a freedom fighter or 
hero from those the group claims to represent. There is also a status eJement 
within the group: individuals may want to conduct terrorist acts to improve their 
reputation amongst their peers. In support of this idea, Crenshaw notes that 
during a Congressional hearing on terrorism H. H.A. Cooper stated that "the 
terrorist, above alf, craves respect."104 
Lastly, Crenshaw writes: 
terrorist organizations offer material incentives, although these are 
. probably less important than the (other) three described. 105 
leaders can directly or indirectly allocate these rewards to different members or 
at least influence their chances of obtaining them. Leaders must therefore use a 
certain amount of skill and tact in doling out incentives which may still not have 
103 Ibid., 476. 
104 Ibid., 478-479. 
105 Ibid. 
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their intended effect. In trying to keep his/her leadership position, use of 
interpersonal incentives provide leaders with some control over the behavior of 
rank and file members Personal incentives aside Crenshaw emphasizes that: 
... purposive incentives remain strong for a number of reasons. Collective 
goals appeal to the individual's sense of satisfaction at contributing to a 
worthy political cause. Many members sincerely identify with the 
organizations purpose .... 106 
Despite purposive and personal incentives, Crenshaw states that there is 
a point in the evolution of the organization where the leader's perceived need to 
maintain the group intact comes to dominate the group's nominal cause as a 
determining factor. Here Crenshaw draws on James Q. Wilson as she writes: 
Wilson concludes that conspiratorial organizations tend over time to 
substitute group solidarity for political purpose ... as the dominant 
incentive. This development seems likely to be characteristic of tightly 
compartmentalized underground organizations. Progressive isolation 
from the environment reduces the amount and quality of the information 
members receive about external events. They become less concerned 
with the achievement of political goals and more concerned with 
maintaining the group.107 
The longer a terrorist group is in existence, "the more likely that group 
solidarity will replace political purpose as the dominant incentive for 
members."108 The group leader plays the key role in this largely unconscious 
shift from political to non-political variables that determine group actions, 
particularly those which focus on terrorist acts. Paradoxically, as the importance 
106 Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism," 20. 
107 Ibid., 21. 
108 Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach," 473. 
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of non-purposive incentives grows in close parallel to the substitution of group 
solidarity for political goals, the tendency to engage in terrorist acts rises. In 
order to enlarge the group's pool of incentives and satisfy rank and file wants, 
terrorist leaders must plan and execute terrorist events so that in time, terrorism 
becomes self-reinforcing. In this regard "victory " for the terrorist group becomes 
a threat because it takes away the group's raison d'etre. This provides an 
explanation for why so often the demands of terrorist groups escalate and 
become outlandish. It is not that they are acting irrationally in setting demands 
that they cannot hope to realize, it is that these demands must be kept beyond 
the ultimate target's ability to yield to them so that they cannot be met. 
According to Crenshaw's model, individual acts of terror are thus a result 
of decisions made by group leaders to further a range of purposive, personal 
and organizational objectives by manipulating incentives offered to group 
members. This leaves open the question of how these groups come into being 
on the first place. She writes: 
Organizational analysis explains not only why terrorism continues 
regardless of political results but why it starts. It implies that structural 
explanations of civil violence are of limited use. The objective conditions 
likely to inspire grievances and hence incite violence are permanent, 
whereas violence is not continuous or universal. The formation of 
organizations, not environmental conditions, is the critical variable. 109 
Crenshaw asserts that terrorist groups come into existence as a function 
of their collective instrumental desires. Members will likely come to occupy 
109 Crenshaw, "Inside Terrorist Organizations," 21. 
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leadership slots within the group as they engage in entrepreneurial methods to 
attract members.110 Eventually these instrumental desires are replaced by 
organizational goals related to the survival of the group. 
In a second dimension of terrorist organizational motivations Crenshaw 
discusses at length how groups try to prevent their decline. Crenshaw writes 
that: 
Organizations are dedicated to survival. They do not voluntarily go out of 
business. Right now, the immediate objective of many hard pressed 
terrorist groups is the same as the immediate objective of many of the 
world's hard pressed corporations ... that is, to continue operations. 111 
One area that causes terrorist groups to go into decline is that of 
competition. In an elucidating example of this Crenshaw writes: 
Rival groups have competed in a vicious game, where the victims are 
Israeli citizens or anonymous airline passengers, but where the 
immediate goal is influence within the resistance movement rather than 
the intimidation of the Israeli populace or international recognition of the 
Palestinian Cause. 112 
A prime example of this is evident in the hijacking of the Achille Lauro 
orchestrated by Abbu Abbas. Here Abbas engaged in actions to upstage the 
PLO in an attempt to be viewed as the legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian cause. 113 Terrorist leaders are arguably challenged by the need to 
110 Ibid., 21. This phenomenon is "classically" observable in the examination of 
the terror cult Aum Shinrikyo. 
111 Ibid., 22. 
112 Crenshaw, "Causes of Terrorism," 387. 
113 Crenshaw, "Inside Terrorist Organizations," 22. 
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keep control of their group's position. They do this by providing recruitment an 
other incentives to attract new membership and to keep existing members for 
defecting to other groups. This leads too two other areas Crenshaw addresses 
which explain how members leave a group or voice their discontent. 
Given the powerful disincentives followers experience When questioning 
(voice) the authority of terrorist group leaders, Crenshaw finds "exit" the most 
frequent recourse for dissatisfied member. She notes that 
the exercise of this option apparently occurs when the most extremist 
members chafe under the restrictions imposed by the relatively moderate 
and demand escalation of 
violence. 114 
The goal of preventing exit by group members to other organizations helps to 
explain why terrorist groups undertake acts when a more prudent strategy would 
be to temporarily refrain from action. On this point Post writes that: 
even if the prudent course were to lie low for security reasons, after a 
time the tensions (between intragroup cliques) become unbearable.115 
Both Crenshaw and Post indicate that a terrorist group must act even when the 
external situation indicates a high degree of risk, the alternative being an intra-
group implosion of defections or splintering. 
The concept of exit also plays a part in those bridge-burning initiation 
rites mentioned earlier. Such acts create a barrier to the terrorist's return to a 
non-terrorist life because his illegal activities have made him dependent upon 
114 Ibid. 
115 Post," Group Dynamics," 31. 
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the resources and good will of his brother terrorist. Thus the terrorist may 
hesitate to leave a group unless there is a support network he can move into, 
such as a rival group. 
When group leaders realize the organization is in decline, they may 
engage in last ditch attempts to keep members from defecting by indulging in 
frenetic activism. This activism often manifests itself in the form of increased 
terrorist operations. Terrorist organizations can, therefore, be most dangerous 
when they are on the verge of falling apart. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Crenshaw admits that the use of her model has both merits and 
drawbacks: 
Organizational theory permits us to disaggregate the complexity of 
opponents values and to differentiate among different types of 
organizations according not only to purpose but to incentive structures 
and competitiveness. This theory is, however, less coherent and more 
complex. It may be less satisfying because the act of terrorism appears to 
be the random result of unpredictable interactions. This interpretation 
makes violence less politically meaningful to the observer because its 
intentions are obscured. 116 
Despite Crenshaw's self critical evaluation, the power of her model to 
explain the phenomenon of terrorism is magnified by the simple observation that 
it incorporates key components of the other three theories discussed. To 
recapitulate, these are: 
o Political theories that suggest terrorist groups emerge in response 
to objectionable inequities that can be of a political, social, 
116 Crenshaw,"lnside Terrorist Organizations," 28. 
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economic, or religious nature. 
o Theories of individual psychology that address the etiology of 
personality disturbances, which facilitate individual decisions to 
join terrorist groups and engage in unconcienable (sic) acts of 
violence. 
o Theories of group psychology, suggesting that while instrumental 
reasons may bring an individual to a group, it is the desire to 
"belong" with like minded individuals who have suffered similar 
psychic wounds that causes them to stay. Identification with the 
group and its' articulated ideals supplants individual judgement. 
The group determines the "good and the bad" thus paving the way 
for the commission of terrorist acts against "evil-outgroup others." 
In essence Crenshaw's organizational process theory of terrorism with its 
insightful discussion of the importance of leadership and organizational survival, 
might be appropriately referred to as a synthetic composite of theories of 
political conflict and psychology, a "systems approach" to the analysis of 
terrorism. So how does this help us to understand the "post-modern terrorist" 
and those non-state groups that would threaten use of WMD? 
Based on Crenshaw's theory, the terrorist group maintains multiple 
agenda, including the n~ed to control political, economic, social or religious 
resources and the need to survive. Which agenda receives the most energy is 
situational, dependent on the group's perceptions of its health as an 
organization, and security posture vis-a vis "out-group" others. In order to 
achieve these multiple objectives, the terrorist group must fuse inputs (leaders 
and followers with "like orientations,"capital, technology) with a managerial 
processes (planning, organizing, staffing, leading, and controlling) to produce 
58 
actions that provide the group: 
o The power to force or coerce others to respond in a desired 
fashion 
o Security/survival 
o Satisfaction to members 
o More inputs 
The issue of non-state group survival and the use of weapons of mass 
destruction is an interesting one. Discussed in the following chapter, traditional 
opinions suggest that non-state groups will not use WMD precisely because it 
will hasten their demise. This opinion is predicated on a belief that forces of the 
state will react in an extraordinary fashion to eradicate the group. As such, no 
group would seriously engage in the use of WMD to cause mass casualties or 
disruption. This supposition fails to understand that non-state.actors, certainly 
religiously oriented non-state actors, may at times view the use of extraordinary 
methods as their only bid to maintain an acceptable existence, or achieve 
redemption, even if that bid results in their destruction.117 
Drawing on Scott Sagan's analysis in his essay entitled ''The Origins of 
the Pacific War" he recounts that the prevailing view suggested that the 
bombing of Pearl Harbor was an irrational decision, indicating the Japanese had 
" ... gone stark, raving, mad."118 In fact, as Sagan notes, the Japanese decision 
117 This hypothesis is exemplified by the old testament story of Samson, who, in 
his atonement for sinning against the word of God, destroys himself and his Philistine 
enemies. 
118 Scott D. Sagan, "The Origins of the Pacific War," in The Origin and 
Prevention of Major Wars eds Robiert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 324-325. 
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for war was a function of choosing between the lessor of two sub-optimal 
alternatives. One was to capitulate to U.S. demands, withdraw from China and 
accept defeat of their plans for conquering Southeast Asia. The other was to 
strike at the U.S. through a campaign that might allow them a negotiated 
settlement (hopefully favorable to their end-state desires in Southeast Asia), 
even if that meant that U.S. reaction could result in the annihilation of the 
Japanese regime. In fact many Japanese naval and army leaders felt that 
conflict was inevitable and that it was better to go to war sooner than later, while 
Japan maintained a slim chance of achieving a settlement that would leave them 
with their pride and power intact. 119 Sicarii Zealots must have had similar 
thoughts when they decided to engage the Roman Legions through a campaign 
of terrorism and insurgency, a campaign they surely knew possessed only a slim 
chance of success. In the end, they committed mass suicide at the fortress of 
Masada rather than capitulate to the power of Rome. Analogously, though use 
of WMD by a non-state group might result in their annihilation, the slim chance 
that such use could help to ensure group survival, on their terms, may be all that 
is needed to rationalize WMD use. 
Survival, security, and success demand that the terrorist group 
incorporate a doctrine of flexibility, adopting and adjusting to the changing 
nature of the environment. The actions that characterize the post-modern 
terrorist might be explained as part of this adaptive process. Old ideas and 
119 Sagan, 342. 
60 
methods are replaced by new ones involving ideology, technologically advanced 
equipment and weapons, disproportionate violence, and "silence." The use of 
WMD by non-state groups may represent part of this "shift." Based on what is 
understood about terrorist groups (systems), non-state groups that would 
credibly threaten use of WMD would have to possess certain key attributes. 
These attributes are addressed in the next chapter and form the basis for a 
framework by which such groups might be identified. 
To explain the phenomenon of terrorism is a complex, convoluted maze of 
theories and ideas that transcend the spectrum of political, psychological and 
sociological disciplines. Examining the phenomenon through a the multi-
disciplinary framework of organizational process theory may be the only method 
by which terrorism can ultimately be understood and thus countered. Whether 
this is an acceptable proposition or not, it is essential for those engaged in the 
development of counter-terrorist policies to understand the phenomenon from a 
multi-layered perspective. For as Post notes, if actions are taken based on 
restricted assumptions and analysis, catastrophes can result. 120 
120 An example of this is discussed by Dr. Post wherein he states in his 
forthcoming book concerning, among other cases, the Waco standoff " ... The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation profoundly misread the nature of the social system within the 
compound and the nature of Koresh's personality. They defined the circumstances as 
a hostage and barricade situation, where police rescue doctrine indicates a two track 
strategy, negotiating while increasing pressure. They misdiagnosed Koresh as a 
psychopath, a manipulative con man. As the foregoing makes evident, Koresh's 
followers were by no means hostages but committed followers of the charismatic leader 
of a closed apocalyptic religious cult. Koresh, while possessing many manipulative and 
sociopathic characteristics, was also paranoid, grandiose, delusional, and moving in 
and out of reality, traits consistent with the so-called "borderline disorder." Such 
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individuals can function quite normally, but when under pressure can slip beneath the 
border of rationality into psychosis. When an individual is hanging from the edge of the 
cliff of sanity by the skin of his teeth, you do not subject his teeth to merciless pounding 
with a high frequency drill ... " Dr. Post suggests that the FBI's misdiagnoses and 
assault did nothing more than provide a powerful legitimacy to Koresh in the eyes of his 
followers as he had prophesied a "grand apocalyptic event" and it occurred (and as 
martyrs, they keep the movement alive and fresh in the minds of surviving constituents 
and sympathizers). 
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Ill. SCOPE, THEORY, HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
A. SCOPE AND THEORY 
The scope of this chapter focuses on developing a typology of non-state 
groups that might seek to acquire and threaten use of WMD. The theory argues 
that under certain conditions, non-state groups that follow radical, religious 
ideologies exhibit a ripeness to threaten use of WMD. 121 Studies examining 
religiously oriented violence arguably suggest that non-state groups maintaining 
religious ideologies affiliated with: (1) apocalyptic millennialism; (2) messianic 
redemptiveness; (3) racism and ethnic are prejudice, are prone to commit 
unconstrained, ultra-violent acts, acts that may include the threatened use of 
WMD. 122 This is not to say that terrorist groups manifesting a traditional political 
based ideology or those that are state sponsored are to be discounted as 
proliferators of WMD. Indeed, politically oriented groups may also pose a WMD 
threat, though arguably not as severe as those groups who claim a direct conduit 
121 Ripeness is a concept that suggests an orientation towards accomplishing a 
desired event. See Richard N. Haass, "Conflicts Unending: The United States and 
Regional Disputes," (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1990), 27-28. 
122 
"Recent Trends in Domestic and International Terrorism," report, Center for 
National Security Studies, Washington DC, April 26, 1995. Also see Bruce Hoffman, 
"Holy Terror": The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative, 
(Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1993); "U.S. House Report Sees Terror Drive 
Launched," Reuters, August 1, 1996; "U.S. Expert Sees Growing Extremist Use of 
Chemicals," Reuters, August 1, 1996; Juergensmeyer, 177; and Simon, 5. 
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to God.123 
Before discussing development of the theory, hypothesis, and 
methodology used to support this position, it is important understand why non-
state groups have been traditionally constrained from using WMD, and why 
those constraints are weakening. 
B. BACKGROUND ON NON-STATE USE OF WMD 
The use of chemical and toxic agents by non-state terrorist groups is not 
a new phenomenon. Revisiting the historical account of Moses forcing Ramses 
of Egypt to release the Hebrew slaves, one notices that, through the power of 
God, Moses poisoned the Nile, brought a pestilence to the land, destroyed the 
Egyptian livestock, caused boils to break out amongst the Egyptian populace, 
and killed the first born of the House of Egypt. 124 As events are described, it 
appears that the Almighty may have engaged in the use of WMD including the 
employment of a sophisticated bio-genetic agent designed to kill a specific 
population. In another ancient account, Sicarii Zealots poisoned Jerusalem's 
water supply (circa 70 A.D.) as part of their terrorist campaign against Roman 
123 In an analogous argument, Zeev Chafets comments on the ease at which 
Israeli citizens can acquire permits to carry hand guns stating that ..... this is very bad 
from the point of view of keeping guns out of the hands of people who talk to God." 
Inherent in his statement is a subtle implication that people who claim legitimacy for 
their acts through an association with the Almighty are extremely dangerous. See 
Marjorie Miller, .. A Gun-Toting Society Confronts its Ambivalence Over Easing 
Controls," Los Angeles Times, November 14, 1996. 
124 
.. Exodus 8-11 , .. The Holy Bible, (Salt Lake City, Utah: The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter Day Saints, 1979), 89-94. 
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occupation.125 In a more contemporary account, Bruce Hoffman cites the 
occurrence of fifty-two incidents involving non-state terrorist threats or actual 
uses of WMD between 1968 and 1994.126 Though incidents of WMD use by 
non-state terrorist groups pale in comparison to the number of events involving 
the use of bombings, hijackings and the like, 127 recent use of a· nerve agent 
weapon in the Tokyo subway in March of 1995, and a radiological weapon 
deposited in Moscow's lzmailovsky Park in November of 1995, provide a horrific 
example of the potential threat WMD pose in the hands of the non-state terrorist 
group.12s 
As documented by a recent report published by the Center for National 
Security Studies in Washington D.C., the occurrence of terrori$t incidents (in 
quantitative terms) seems to be on the decline, however the lethality of the 
incidents has risen. 129 This. note on the "qualitative rise" in terms of the 
casualties and damage produced by terrorist attacks provides an indication that 
125 Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 12. 
126 Bruce Hoffman, Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological 
Spectrum, 3. 
127 Ibid., 3. Between 1968 and 1994 the Rand study catalogued 8000 terrorist 
incidents of which fifty-two involved WMD related chemical or biological agents. 
128 The Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo was responsible for releasing nerve 
agent in a Tokyo subway that resulted in 12 deaths an 5,500 casualties. Chechen 
separatists buried thirty pounds of cesium-137 in a Moscow park to demonstrate their 
ability to cause mass damage to Russia. See "Five Russian Troops Killed in Chechnya: 
Federal Command," Agence France Presse, November 23, 1995. 
129 
"Recent Trends in Domestic and International Terrorism," 1. 
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terrorist may very well engage in more spectacular and sophisticated events that 
include the use of WMD. The bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie 
Scotland, the World Trade Center Bombing, the gas attack in Tokyo and the 
radiological device placement in Moscow may hold related implications that 
arguably suggests non-state group adaptation of WMD as a primary weapon of 
choice. 
As noted, the Aum incident has clearly demonstrated that the use of WMD 
by terrorists poses a very different threat than conventional terrorism. For the 
United States in particular, and most western countries in general, individual 
acts of conventional terrorism do not constitute a serious threat to national 
interests or security. Even Israel, the target of more terrorism than perhaps any 
other country in the world, is not threatened with annihilation by conventional 
terrorism. 
Modern terrorism, with its ideology grounded in instrumental purpose, has 
been the tool of the weak employed against the strong; a poor man's coercive 
diplomacy. As discussed earlier, WMD significantly alters that context. 
Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons give terrorist organizations a strength 
that they could never hope to achieve through conventional means allowing 
them to seriously threaten the security of a national population with a single 
blow. 
It is therefore more important than ever to explore those dynamics that 
may constrain or motivate terrorists to use WMD. Consequently, the following 
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two fundamental questions are addressed: 
o What constraints inhibit the use of WMD? 
o What factors may weaken or remove these constraints?130 
C. CONSTRAINTS AGAINST USING WMD 
Weapons of mass destruction, in the modern form of chemical and 
biological weapons at least, have existed since the turn of the century. So, too, 
has modern terrorism. Yet until the spring of 1995, the two had never mixed as 
the latter had not truly utilized the former's deadly potentia1. 131 Nominally well 
suited to terrorism, use of WMD is constrained by several factors. 
The first constraint involves the technical complexities associated with 
developing and weaponizing WMD. These are most obvious in the case of 
nuclear weapons. The technology and resources to construct and use a 
nuclear device have, in the past at least, been out of the practical reach for the 
terrorist. This is true to a lesser extent for chemical and biological weapons as 
well. Yet, while not as difficult to manufacture or expensive as nuclear weapons, 
the employment of chemical and biological weapons has been eschewed by 
terrorists. Why? Generally because conventional tactics have historically 
provided the terrorist with the ability to command the desired attention or 
130 These questions and the framework for this analysis are slightly modified and 
expanded from a report published by Jeffry Simon. See Simon, 1-22. 
131 There have been numerous incidents involving the use of chemical and 
biological agents prior to 1995. However, from a global awareness perspective, none of 
these incidents were categorized as having caused mass casualties or mass disruption. 
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reaction from target audiences. 
Perhaps a much more compelling constraint to terrorist employment of 
WMD is the concept of "backlash."132 As addressed earlier, backlash manifests 
itself in two distinct forms e.g., government reaction and public reaction. 133 It 
occurs when an "act" of terrorism exceeds the acceptable violence threshold of 
the public. The result of this is twofold as first, a Joss of constituency (popular 
support and legitimacy) for the terrorist group may occur and second, an 
extraordinary effort on the part of the government to eliminate the terrorist group 
may ensue. Backlash therefore represents a significant constraint to the use of 
WMD. 134 Backlash is also applicable to state-sponsored terrorism. The sponsor 
of any WMD attack would undoubtedly elicit a response from the U.S. and other 
modern industrial states that would threaten its very existence. In both cases, 
WMD use is convincingly self-defeating. 
Finally, the continued utility of conventional tactics may deter terrorists 
from venturing into the politically risky world of WMD.135 While there has been 
a trend towards increased violence and more spectacular events over the past 
132 Ted Robert Gurr, "Terrorism in Democracies," 94. Also Simon, 11. 
133 Closely associated but differentiated according to legitimacy of the 
government, backlash can be uniform, e.g. a truly democratic government will reflect 
the popular will of the people in its action against a terrorist attack/group. Backlash 
manifests itself differently when an authoritative government reacts without the support 
of the people. 
134 Simon, 11. 
135 Ibid., 11. 
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decade, such typical terrorist acts as conventional bombings and hijackings still 
receive substantial worldwide attention. As long as terrorists can use such 
incidents to achieve the response they desire (from media, public, and 
government) they may feel little need, especially in the face of backlash, to use 
WMD. 
D. CONSTRAINTS ARE WEAKENING 
The aforementioned constraints may explain the lack of terrorist 
employment of WMD thus far, but they are increasingly less effective. 
Structural influences of a social, political, technical, and economic nature, 
combined with terrorism based on religious ideologies are gradually easing the 
"taboos" that have constrained the use of uncontrolled or disproportionate 
violence. 
1. Factors Increase the Potential for Non..State Terrorist Use of 
WMD 
Permissive factors, as explained by Crenshaw, are those associated with 
social and technical variables that enable and/or encourage a terrorist group to 
conduct violent acts.136 Things such as improved education, global 
communication, the media, industrialization, urbanization, all play a part in 
facilitating terrorist. A brief discussion of the more relevant variables follows. 
Terrorists use violence as a symbolic means of communication. Laqueur 
states that "Guerrilla warfare can exist without media coverage, but for terrorism 
136 Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 386. 
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publicity is absolutely essential." 137 For the terrorists in general, the need to be 
recognized encourages the use of destructive, violent acts. As mentioned, 
terrorist attacks have become more spectacular and sophisticated over time. 
This qualitative rise has two related implications for the use of WMD. First, "the 
tendency for a few spectacular events to capture world headlines and elicit 
dramatic government responses"138 has set in motion a potential escalation 
spiral that may lead terrorists to employ WMD. If conventional methods of 
hijacking and bombing become routine and accepted, it is much more difficult to 
capture the type of world-wide attention and government response that terrorists 
desire. Thus in order to capture the level of media and government attention 
they need, terrorists may be compelled to use WMD. Second, A global 
population desensitized to violence further weakens the constraints on WMD 
use. Violent acts that seemed excessive ten years ago may now be considered 
acceptable. This rise in tolerance may eventually allow terrorists to use WMD 
without that use being perceived as illegitimate. The advent of global 
communications network and a population desensitized to "run of the mill 
bombings and assassinations" provides encouragement for the use of WMD. 
Intense urbanization increases the. number and accessibility of targets. 
Terrorists using a radiological device, chemical or biological agents can easily 
cause mass casualties or infrastructure disruption. The multitude of potential 
137 Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 123. 
138 Simons, 6. 
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r-------------------------------------- ----
targets vulnerable to a WMD attack easily permits the terrorist to selectively 
destroy a critical piece of urban infrastructure or kill a significant number of 
people if they so chose. 
Concern for individual rights in Western democracies provides an 
environment where non-state groups can emerge and develop· their WMD 
potential. In the United States, the Constitution guarantees a multitude of 
personal freedoms and protection from state intrusiveness in areas of religion, 
speech, press, assemblage; the right to bear arms; and protection against 
unreasonable search and seizures (Amendments I, II, IV-VI). Rights such as 
these permit sub and transnational terrorist groups to establish networks that: 
(1) allow them to develop financial resources; (2) facilitate military or para-
military training for members; (3) provide advanced education opportunities for 
members; and facilitates the procurement of weapons, material and WMD 
related technologies. Steven Emerson addresses this particular issue at length 
as he describes how Hamas and other Islamic organizations that support 
terrorism operate here in the United States.139 
Diffusion of WMD-related technologies and production information is 
. 
occurring at an extremely rapid rate. Local book stores, libraries and the 
internet provide the reasonably educated individual enough information to 
construct a "low-tech" chemical weapon. A prime example of this is can be 
139 Steven Emerson, "The Other Fundamentalists," The New Republic, v. 212, 
(June 12, 1995), 21. 
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found at The Uttle Bookstore located within an internet website. From websites 
such as this, one can draw the necessary reference material needed to 
manufacture an assortment of lethal chemical agents and dispersal systems. 
The economic hardships experienced by the former Soviet Union has 
created a pool of knowledgeable individuals who's services are being sought by 
those with nefarious ideals. Former Soviet scientists, accustomed to a certain 
life style and governmental support now find themselves fortunate to be 
employed. As a result, they are extremely susceptible to offers of hard cash for 
their scientific services. With the creation of this "arms and minds" market, it is 
much easier for terrorist groups to obtain parts of the WMD production puzzle.140 
A resurgence of terrorism motivated by certain religious ideologies, ethnic 
traditions and race coupled with the growing sophistication of established, more 
"professional" groups is likely to lead to higher levels of lethality and 
destruction. 141 Religion and prejudice can provide the moral justification 
necessary to convince terrorists and supporters alike that using WMD is 
legitimate, particularly within groups that believe their crusade is sanctioned or 
demanded by God. For these groups WMD use can virtually create the 
"prophesied event," or annihilate the ultimate target with a combination of 
140 A. Cooperman and K. Belianinov, "Moonlighting by Modem from Russia," 
U.S. News and World Report April17, 1995, 45. Also see "Syria Builds Nerve Gas 
Arsenal," London Sunday Times, November 17, 1996. 
141 Bruce Hoffman, Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological 
Spectrum, 19. 
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simultaneous operations aimed at population centers and critical infrastructure. 
This strategy was actually going to be employed by the Japanese terrorist cult 
"Aum Shinrikyo." 
E. THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
A theory is a systematic grouping of inter-related principles. A principle is 
a fundamental truth that explains the relationship between two or more variables. 
Variables are constructs of concepts or "mental images" of things. 142 These 
mental images are formed through an understanding of theoretical frameworks 
developed by others (deductive reasoning), and through observation and 
experience (inductive analysis). In this study, two competing theoretical 
frameworks are each fused with inductive analysis in an effort to develop and 
test a new theory that examines whether religiously oriented groups are the most 
likely candidates to use WMD. 
1. Typological Theory For Non-State Group Use of WMD 
As mentioned, the theory this study seeks to test argues that non-state 
terrorist groups, following radical religiously oriented ideologies, represent a 
typology most likely to threaten use of weapons of mass destruction. 
The argument for this position is derived from a synthesis of deductive 
reasoning (based on a thorough review of that which has been written on the 
subject of terrorism; theories of international relations, political science, 
142 Harold Koontz, Cyril O'Donnel, Heinz Weihrich,, in John R. Meyer, Peggy 
Rehberger, eds., Management, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984), 6-10. Also see Babbie, 
112-115. 
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psychology and organizational process); and inductive observation of non-state 
groups known to have an expressed interest in the use of either nuclear, 
chemical or biological agents to cause mass casualties or disruption. 
To test this argument, two competing frameworks are used to analyze and 
compare four non-state groups that have, in some preliminary way , expressed 
an interest in weapons of mass destruction. The first approach is derived from 
international relations theory of Realism. This framework suggests that non-
state groups, like states, strive to develop a power base strong enough to 
manipulate or coerce their adversaries to behave in a desired fashion. Given 
that non-state groups are weaker than states (thus the reason for using terrorist 
tactics), the acquisition of WMD would seem to be a logical choice as it provides 
them power to coerce an adversary, power much greater than that afforded by 
conventional weapons. Though this framework provides a powerful argument for 
why non-state groups would want WMD, it does little to explain why such groups 
have eschewed the widespread use of such weapons. One answer may lie in 
the fact that prior to the end of the Cold War, such groups could rely on the 
assistance of one of the super-powers. Being able to "balance externally" 
against an adversary with the support of the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., may have 
obviated the need for such groups to acquire WMD. 
The second framework is synthesized from theories of Realism and 
Organizational Process. This framework recognizes that while non-state groups 
seek power to coerce, the decision to develop and threaten use of WMD is 
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contingent upon internal variables inherent to the group. This reductionist 
approach begins by positing that a non-state group would have to manifest 
certain key variables in order to credibly threaten use of WMD. These key 
variables or indicators are identified, defined and placed in a conceptual model 
which is used to analyze cases selected. 
F. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ONE: "THE REALIST ARGUMENT"" 
In a discussion of international relations theory, Hans Morgenthau 
suggests that from the "classical realist" perspective, power is viewed as an end 
unto itself. The struggle for power arises because first, men want things (scarce 
goods), and second, because men operate under "the animus dominandi, the 
desire for power."143 In this regard, the possession of weapons of mass 
destruction by a state (or non-state group) provides a currency of power that can 
be perceived as both a status symbol and as an instrument of political and 
military strength for the pursuit of hegemonic objectives. 144 
From a nee-Realist perspective, states (or non-state groups) are seen as 
unitary actors who wish to survive in the anarchic environment of international 
relations. Rather then attempting to acquire an "ultimate power" that may, in any 
event, be outside the reach of states (or non-state groups), such states (groups) 
143 Kenneth N. Waltz, "War In Neorealist Theory," in Robert I. Rotberg and 
Theodore K. Rabb eds., The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars, , (Massachusetts: 
Cambridge University Press), 41 . 
144 Robert G. Joseph, "WMD: A Proliferation Overview," in William H. Lewis and 
Stuart E. Johnson, eds., Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on 
Counterproliferatjon, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 5-6. 
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will "behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power. "145 This 
might include aligning with another sovereign state (or non-state group) 
sympathetic to their cause. This done, states (or groups) can then protect 
themselves and accomplish some, if not all, of their objectives. Waltz calls this 
external balancing. Another method states (or groups) adopt is that of internal 
balancing. Here the state (or group) will mobilize or create power from internal 
assets, such as that afforded by the organic development of WMD. 
In any event, if WMD afford the state an ability to balance internally 
against international competitors, they certainly afford this to the non-state group 
working against the state. From the perspective of the post-modern terrorist, 
WMD provide a powerful negotiating tool, a tool that can be used in a coercive 
diplomatic effort to accomplish instrumental objectives in a way that conventional 
weapons do not afford. This exploitation of coercive potential is a fundamental 
component of both state and terrorist behavior. Since the dynamics surrounding 
WMD facilitate power by generating the potential to inflict unacceptable damage, 
ownership of WMD becomes a "key'' ingredient in the contest for relative 
superiority between the non-state group and the state. 146 As mentioned earlier, 
the dissolution of the Cold War may have reduced the ability of many non-state 
groups to press home their agenda's through external balancing. This might 
145 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
Inc, 1979), 118. 
146 Marrs, 30. 
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force them to adopt internal balancing strategies that could include the 
development of a WMD capability. 
Arms control theory concerns the development of arms control strategies 
that enhance stability within the international system. For those states armed 
with WMD, the maintenance of global stability means managin·g the security 
dilemma posed by the strategic (and sometimes) conventional forces of each. In 
this context, the security dilemma is defined to mean that uneasy feeling a state 
gets when it perceives a contradiction between an adversary's declared 
defensive intentions, its threatening military capabilities, and the unresolvable 
uncertainty that develops as the former attempts to interpret the actions of the 
latter.147 Mutual vulnerability between states drives them to avoid engaging in 
WMD related conflict, despite feeling the "security dilemma." However, because 
non-state groups generally do not offer a visible target (such as the institutions 
and territory of the state) they are not susceptible to WMD deterrent strategies, 
strategies which are based on retaliation or mutual vulnerability. Marrs suggests 
that this creates an asymmetric situation in which the non-state group may 
exploit the offensive use of WMD: 
Since the state cannot retaliate against an unknown opponent, this 
dilemma can continue for as long as the terrorist desires, provided that 
invulnerability is maintained and the threat (of WMD use) remains 
credible. 148 
147 N.J. Wheeler and K. Booth, "The Security Dilemma," in J. Baylis and N.J. 
Rengger, eds., Dilemmas of World Politics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 31. 
148 Marrs, 53-54. 
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As a rejoinder, if a non-state group is externally balanced through a 
transparent alliance with a state, the state may exercise some control over the 
non-state group's decision to use WMD for fear that being visible they will be the 
focus of a retaliatory attack. This control might come in the form of withdrawing 
safe-haven, weapons, and financial support from the non-state group in 
question. 
In an analysis of risk, traditional threats posed by non-state terrorist 
groups are generally seen as causing some damage or suffering e.g., they are 
acts that can be absorbed by the ultimate target (state or regime) without truly 
threatening the survivability of the same. With the possible exception of the 
terrorist campaigns waged by the Israeli "lrgun and Stern gangs" (1939-1947); 
the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army against the British ( 1969-
1996); and the Palestinian lntifadeh against the Israel government (mid-1980s 
through early 1994); the coercive power of terrorists has historically not been 
great enough to force a shift in domestic power structures to favor the terrorist 
group. 149 The non-state terrorist's ability to employ WMD changes this equation 
by orders of magnitude. Now the risk assessment must be done from the 
perspective that mass casualties or major infrastructure disruption may occur. 
Under threat from the modern terrorist, the state's risk assessment regarding 
149 In an analogous example, Lewis Gann discusses success and failure in 
"small wars." In the preface to his book, he suggests that " ... guerrilla warfare is 
neither ... new ... nor has it always served a revolutionary cause ... (nor) is it a certain road 
to victory." See Lewis H. Gann, Guerrillas in History (Stanford, California: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1991 ), vii. 
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vulnerabilities focuses on the ability to absorb the attack without having to adjust 
to demands of the group. Under threat from the "post-modern" terrorist 
equipped with WMD, the focus of this assessment shifts. 150 Where conventional 
attacks can be "politically absorbed," those involving the use of WMD threaten 
entire population centers or worse. The ramifications for the state in this 
situation is tremendously different. 
From the "nee-Realist" argument a hypothesis is developed suggesting 
that: (1) non-state groups would certainly desire to have this "power;" and (2) 
groups that must internally balance against more powerful adversaries, may 
seek the power of WMD to balance against the superiority of the latter. This 
could result in an increase of non-state WMD proliferation and use. Key 
indicators to look for in such non-state groups would minimally include supply 
side indicators such as: (1) financial resources sufficient to fund a WMD 
program; (2) membership knowledgeable of the technical requirements to 
develop WMD; (3) access to WMD related materials and technology. 
Through this "Structural Realist" framework, a simple hypothesis (model) 
is created which argues that non-state groups exhibit a ripeness to threaten use 
of WMD when the three aforementioned indicators are present in the group, and 
the group is not constrained in its actions by any significant external influences. 
This model is referred to as the Structural Realist Model of Effective Demand. 
150 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 
(New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 1995), 7-8. 
79 
As defined in Chapter I, Effective Demand is a conceptualization of a non-state 
group's predisposition to cause mass casualties or disruption through a terrorist 
act using WMD. A simple illustration of this model is provided as Table 3-1. 
Structural Realist Model of Effective Demand 
Demand Indicators Supply Indicators 
(Desire for Power) x (Financial Resources x Knowledgeable Membership x 
Access to Materials)= Effective Demand- External Influences (Alliances) 
Table 3-1: Structural Realist Model 
The Realist Model of Effective Demand is thus a product of the non-state group's 
desire to internally balance (off-set political and military weakness) against the 
state. The development of a WMD capability provides such a power, delivering 
a tremendous coercive potential to the non-state terrorist group. In order to 
understand the meaning and importance of the indicators deemed sufficient to 
cause Effective Demand, each is identified through a brief explanation. 
1. Balancing Power (Demand Indicator) 
For the terrorist to be effective, their ultra-violent potential must raise the 
specter of a catastrophic event that the state cannot "politically absorb." In this 
regard Marrs writes on the concept of power: 
Hans Morgenthau defines power as man's control over the minds and 
actions of other men. By political power, we refer to the mutual relations 
of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter 
and the people at large. However, Harold Laswell and Abraham Kaplan 
insist that the analysis of power must also consider its scope and domain. 
Domain of power consists of the persons over which power is exercised 
and scope of power consists of the values whose shaping and enjoyment 
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are controlled ... power is really the possession of coercive potentia/. 151 
2. Membership that Includes Personnel Knowledgeable of WMD 
Technical Requirements (Supply Indicator) 
Jessica Stern cites a National Intelligence Estimate reportedly concluding 
that clandestine (non-state) production of crude chemical and biological 
weapons requires no greater technical expertise than does the production of 
narcotics or heroin.152 While it is true that manufacturing a radiological weapon 
or high quality "bugs and gas" is a difficult proposition and that further, 
manufacturing a delivery or dispersal system is equally difficult, one must 
remember that terrorist group membership can include individuals possessing 
degrees in everything from electrical engineering to nuclear physics. These 
individuals are more than capable of developing crude WMD given access to the 
appropriate materials. A key variable of concern is thus the non-state group that 
recruits members from the science and engineering fields. 
3. Financial Resources to Fund a WMD Capability 
(Supply Indicator) 
The ability of a non-state group to develop a WMD capability is also 
contingent upon the financial resources they possess. While it is readily 
acknowledged that the production of a crude nuclear explosive device would be 
quite costly for a non-state group operating without state sponsorship, on the 
151 Marrs, 28-29. 
152 Jessica Stern, "Contribution to Round Table Discussion on C/B Terrorism," 
manuscript for Politics and Life Sciences, May, 1996. 
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order of millions of dollars, the financial resources needed to develop a chemical 
or biological weapon is quite small. 153 On balance, many non-state groups 
certainly possess significant financial resources to pursue the development of 
nuclear weapons capability, their coffers filled by cash generated from 
enterprises that include such things as legitimate businesses, bank heists, 
contract assassination, drug dealing, counterfeiting, covert weapons trade, 
extortiory, and soliciting contributions from sympathetic supporters.154 As an 
elucidating example the investigation into the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo 
uncovered assets exceeding $1.4 billion dollars. 
4. Availability of Materials and Access to Technology {Supply 
Indicator) 
Access to material sources and technology to develop a WMD program is 
a key consideration for non-state groups desiring to develop a WMD capability. 
5. Lack of Externally Imposed Constraint 
This attribute is significant because it suggests that the non-state group, 
void of any negative external influences, is free to make decisions to use WMD 
unimpeded by threats of being cut off from a supporting state or group. Effective 
153 As noted in a discussions with Dr. Jessica Stern of Stanford University, and 
Dr. Kathleen Bailey of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, a non-state group 
with 2-3 knowledgeable personnel and about $25K can develop a chemical capability 
suitable for use in a terrorist attack. The dollar figure may be somewhat high as cyanide 
dispersal device can probably be put together for something less than the $25K figure. 
154 For a detailed account of how non-state groups generate cash reserves see 
CDR J.K. Campbell, "Arms for the Insurgency," unpublished research paper, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Fall1995, 7-10. 
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Demand may be modulated by the influence of this attribute. 
G. FRAMEWORK TWO: "SYNTHETIC THEORY OF STRUCTURAL 
REALISM AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS" 
Through a synthesis of theories related to realism, psychology, sociology 
and organizational process, a second framework is developed which argues that 
non-state groups make decisions based on: (1) a desire for power to balance 
against their adversaries; (2) the internal psycho-dynamics of individuals in 
leadership positions; (3) the psycho-dynamics of group-think; (4) and the 
ultimate desire to survive as a group. Therefore, the non-state group's decision 
to pursue the development of a WMD capability occurs as a fusion of inter-
relating variables (indicators). These indicators range from concepts discussed 
in the preceding framework, to those related to group leadership, ideology, and 
group behavior. This framework further argues that in order to discern whether 
or not a non-state group would threaten use of WMD, a detailed examination of 
the group must be done to disaggregate and determine which indicators are 
present. Once this is done, those indicators identified in the group can be 
compared to those needed to credibly threaten use of WMD. This leads to the 
second hypothesis of this study which argues that a non-state group reveals a 
ripeness to employ WMD when it possesses Effective Demand as a function of 
The Synthetic Theory of Structural Realism and Organizational Process. 
The Synthetic Theory of Structural Realism and Organizational Process 
Model of Effective Demand is also affected by Intervening Process. Intervening 
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Processes are situational influences that can affect the non-state group's 
decision making process or actions. These influences can either increase or 
decrease Effective Demand for WMD. An example of a negative Intervening 
Processes is seen in the authoritarian state that has effectively penetrated 
society with a robust security apparatus e.g., secret police. In-this example, non-
state terrorist groups would have a difficult time just trying to operate with 
traditional, conventional tactics and weapons. Attempting to develop a WMD 
capability would be extremely difficult under these circumstances. Key indicators 
determined to be necessary and sufficient to suggest a non-state group 
possesses Effective Demand for WMD under The Synthetic Theory of Structural 
Realism and Organizational Process are listed as Demand Indicators (01}, and 
Supply Indicators (SI). These indicators are identified in Tables 3-2 and 3-3. 
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DEMAND INDICATORS SUPPLY INDICATORS 
Group desires power to balance against A demonstration of a certain 
the state or regime degree of sophistication in 
weaponry and tactics. 
Leader manifests the "Authoritarian- Membership that includes 
Sociopathic Personality" personnel knowledgeable of the 
technical requirements to develop 
and weaponize WMD 
Ideology supportive of ultra-violent Financial resources to fund a WMD 
extremism program 
Behavior that includes use of ultra- Access to materials and 
violence technology needed to develop a 
WMD program 
lack of concern over public or 
government backlash 
Group cohesiveness and a closed cell 
constituency that includes total loyalty to 
cause 
Willingness to take risks 
Table 3-2: Key Indicators of Synthetic Theory 
EXAMPLES OF INTERVENING PROCESSES 
linkages with other terrorist groups or rogue states willing to assist in the 
development of WMD capability 
A permissive, democratic, sociopolitical environment. Such an environment 
facilitates a non-state group's ability to operate and do such things as penetrate 
the state apparatus and/or industries engaged in the development of dual use 
technologies 
Table 3-3: Intervening Processes 
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H. KEY VARIABLES: "SYNTHETIC THEORY OF STRUCTURAL REALISM 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS MODEL OF EFFECTIVE 
DEMAND" 
To understand the meaning of the relevant indicators used in the 
Synthetic Theory of Structural Realism and Organizational Process Model of 
Effective Demand, a brief explanation of each is provided. These nominal 
definitions are used solely to elucidate the essential nature of each indicator for 
purposes of this study. 
1. A Desire to Possess the Power to Compel (Demand Indicator) 
Mentioned earlier (refer to page 80}, for the terrorist to be effective, their 
ultra-violent potential must raise the specter of a catastrophic event that the 
state cannot "politically absorb." In this regard Marrs writes on the concept of 
power: 
Hans Morgenthau defines power as man's control over the minds and 
actions of other men. By political power, we refer to the mutual relations 
of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter 
and the people at large. However, Ha.rold Laswell and Abraham Kaplan 
insist that the analysis of power must also consider its scope and domain. 
Domain of power consists of the persons over which power is exercised 
and scope of power consists of the values whose shaping and enjoyment 
are controlled ... power is really the possession of coercive potentia/. 155 
2. Ideologies that Supports Extremist Violence is a Key 
Independent Variable (Demand Indicator) 
An ideology is a comprehensive system of concepts and beliefs held by 
an individual or group. It is an organization of opinions, attitudes and values 
155 Marrs, 28-29. 
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that determine how we think about ourselves and society. The term itself was 
coined by the French philosopher Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836}, who 
attempted to reform post-revolutionary French society according to a pragmatic 
"science of ideas. "156 Thus ideology becomes a primary variable as it is the 
raison of the non-state group's overt, purposive foundation. Oh balance, 
ideologies carry different levels of appeal at any given time and are subject to 
both historical process and contemporary social events.157 Additionally, non-
state groups motivations can be extremely multi-dimensional, ideology being 
only one aspect that influences behavior and actions. The ideologies of non-
state groups this study posits as arguably manifesting Effective Demand for 
WMD are of a religious nature, affiliated with apocalyptic millennialism, 
radicalized redemption, or racist/ethnic hate.158 
Destruction is part of the logic of religion. Every religious tradition carries 
with it images of chaos and terror. Some forms of religion seem to propel the 
faithful to militant confrontations. fn an essay on "The Logic of Religious 
Violence," Mark Juergensmeyer identifies several key points that elucidate why 
156 See Microsoft Encarta 1995 for a discussion regarding the nature of the term 
"ideology." 
157 T. W. Adorno, et al., 2. 
158 Religiously oriented redemption and racist/ethnic hate are sometimes fused 
together within an ideological framework providing a synergism that can make the non-
state group possessing this attribute all the more deadly. 
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religiously oriented ideologies can be dangerous to the extreme. 159 
o Religion domesticates violence. Most histories of religion focus on 
the struggle between good and evil. Through the ages this 
struggle has been associated with horrific slaughters conducted 
against, or on the behalf of, the faithful. Religious stories, myths 
and symbols (swords, crosses and the like) make religiously 
oriented killing palatable, even if those acts are ultra-violent. 
o Violence sanctioned by religion breaks the states monopoly on 
morally sanctioned killing and provides the perpetrators with a 
sense of political independence. It places them on the moral high 
ground above the state because God's judgement is giving them 
the "green light" to kill in his name. 
Religious beliefs of an apocalyptic, radical redemptive or racisUethnic hate 
orientation advocate the use of ultra-violence as a means to gain a desired end. 
The true danger occurs when they appeal to the most primitive and irrational 
wishes and fears e.g., the collective emotional needs, of the non-state group. 
When this happens, ultra-violent acts causing mass casualties or disruption are 
likely to follow. 
a. Ideology Based in Apocalyptic Millennia/ism 
The ideology of apocalyptic millennialism is rooted in a belief that 
the present age of the world is irredeemably evil, ruled by a Satanic figure 
personifying evil. Further this ideology professes a belief that the evil age is 
soon to be ended, destroyed by God (or God's servant), who is good. The 
subsequent age to follow this event is lauded as one of utopia, where everything 
is perfect and only those who were formerly oppressed or those who are "true 
159 Juergensmeyer, 172-190. 
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believers" will survive to enjoy it.160 
Norman Cohen writes that historical records documenting 
apocalyptic millennia! cults show a variance in attitude from the most violent 
aggressiveness to the mildest pacifism. and from the most ethereal spirituality to 
the most earthbound materialism.161 The concern of this study· is the cult that 
would engage in ultra violence, viewing their acts as part of the prophesied 
apocalyptic event. In a report addressing technology and terrorism, Ronfeldt and 
Sater suggest that the potential users of such weapons (WMD) will most likely be 
apocalyptic millennarian cults or terrorists operating under a religious 
imperative. 162 
b. Ideology based in a Redemptive Religious Imperative 
In Jewish history, from time immemorial, and in Jewish history 
today, that which will be is conditioned on one thing only: If you 
shall walk in My statutes, and If you shall disdain My statutes . 
. . . The former guarantees peace and tranquillity and bliss and 
160 Norman Cohen, The Pursuit of the Millennium, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1970), 19-61. Some interpretations of the concept of the millennium suggest 
that it is a time whereupon Christ returns to the earth and, with a chosen few, reigns 
over the earth for one thousand years. At the end of the thousand year reign, all the 
wicked are annihilated and the just live forever with Christ in a renewed heaven and 
earth. As noted by Cohen what has been seen historically in many of the cults 
manifesting an apocalyptic ideology is a leadership that claims to be either the 
"instrument" of God, the second Messiah, or even God himself. These leaders have 
engaged in inciting membership to engage in horrific slaughters legitimizing these 
events as part of the prophesied apocalyptic moment. 
161 Ibid. I 16. 
162 David Ronfeldt and William Sater, The Mindset of High Technology 
Terrorists: Future Implications From An Historical Analogy, (Santa Monica, California: 
Rand, 1981 ), 25-31. 
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redemption. The latter assures tragedy and catastrophe. There is 
no escape from this immutable law of creation. But if one does, 
indeed, walk in the footsteps of his Creator, then the Father of the 
Jewish people, the All-Mighty, has obligated Himself to give to His 
children the promised reward. This is the answer, this is the key to 
the Gate of redemption. One who understands it shall enter it. 
One who does not is doomed to be scattered as the chaff in the 
wind and, God forbid, to take many of his brothers and sisters with 
h. 163 . 1m. 
A redemptive religious imperative is based in a belief that God will 
reward his people only when certain prerequisites are fulfilled. The 
aforementioned quote taken from Rabbi Kahane's writings are cited to elucidate 
how his radical interpretation of rerigious scripture and Jewish theology is used 
to argue for the use of violence as a prerequisite to receiving God's promises 
and blessings. According to Rabbi Kahane, Israel and the Jewish people will 
never truly be "graced and protected" by the lord until they return to orthodox 
Judaism and recover at least that part of "Eretz Yisrael"164 that encompasses 
the occupied territories (West Bank and the Gaza strip). To effect such gains, 
Rabbi Kahane engaged in alleged terrorist acts culminating with his 1980 arrest 
by Israeli authorities for planning to blow up the Dome of the Rock on the 
Temple Mount in Jerusalem. He was subsequently tried and incarcerated in the 
163 Rabbi Meir Kahane, Forty Years, (Miami, Florida: Institute of the Jewish Idea, 
1983), 66. 
164 Eretz Yisrael is that land mass God promised to Abraham, which the Jewish 
people owned and gave up when they were forced into exile by the Babylonians. Eretz 
Yisrael incorporates Jordan and other areas occupied by Arab countries. That the Jews 
originally took this land away from the Canaanites is irrelevant to Kahane's 
interpretation as he says that God expropriated the land for his chosen people the 
Jews. 
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Ramla maximum-security prison for nine months. This planned terrorist act was 
seen by Rabbi Kahane as part of the redemptive process that would result in the 
Jewish people being favored and protected by the Lord. 165 
Religious beliefs penetrate to the core of human existence for 
many people. Religion manipulated to provide a legitimate rational for the use of 
violence by a non-state group is thus a very dangerous variable because it 
appears to unleash constraints that hold the use of ultra- violence in check. 
History has shown numerous occasions were this phenomenon is evident. The 
Sicarii Zealots who engaged in the wholesale slaughter of Romans occupying 
Palestine circa 66-73 A.D. is one example of how religion is used to justify 
horrific terrorist acts. Contemporary examples of extremely violent terrorist 
attacks motivated by religious belief, can be found in the actions of groups such 
as Hizbullah, Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad. A quote cited by Muhammad 
Selhami of the Lebanese Amal brings pointed clarity to the thought process 
behind such terrible acts. 
Child: "Mother dear! When will I be old enough to drive a truck? 
Mother: Why do you ask dear? 
Child: I long to fill a truck with explosives and drive it into one of the 
strongholds of the infidels in our country! 166 
Under a redemptive religious ideology the use of ultra-violent methods becomes 
a divine act, sanctioned by God. As Bruce Hoffman writes: 
165 Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right, 211-250. 
166 Amir Tahari, Holy Terror, (Maryland: Adler & Adler, 1987), 126. 
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The volatile combination of religion and terrorism has been cited as one 
of the main reasons for terrorism's increased lethality. The fact that for 
the religious terrorist violence inevitably assumes a transcendent purpose 
and therefore becomes a sacramental or divine duty arguably results in a 
significant loosening of the constraints on the commission of mass 
murder. Religion, moreover, functions as a legitimizing force, sanctioning 
if not encouraging wide scale violence against an almost open-ended 
category of opponents. 167 
Upon examination of the group held responsible for the bombing of New York's 
World Trade Center complex in 1993, Bruce Hoffman's comments appear to be 
prophetic. In this well publicized case a radical Islamic group, operating under 
the rationale of a religious imperative, used an extremely powerful explosive 
device alleged to have been augmented with the lethal chemical agent sodium 
cyanide in a terrorist attack against New York City's World Trade Center 
complex. 168 Discussed in various reports, the intent of the group was to cause 
the complete destruction of the World Trade Center's twin towers and the death 
of the thousands of people working in the building. This act was perpetrated as 
retribution for the corruption and decadence Western powers had introduced to 
the world in general and the Islamic states in particular. 
167 Bruce Hoffman, Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a 
Religious Imperative, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1993), 1, 12. 
168 The group responsible for the WTC bombing is alleged to have been an 
amalgamation of individuals loosely affiliated with Hamas, Hizbullah, Islamic Jihad, and 
Fuqra. Information was derived from a presentation given by Steven Emerson, a 
terrorism analyst specializing in Middle East terrorist groups and profiles. Mr. 
Emerson's comments were presented at the Chemical and Biological Arms Control 




c. Ideology Based in a Racist/Ethnic Hate Imperative 
To the faithful, toil-burdened masses the victory was so complete 
that no further effort seemed required. Germany had fallen, and 
with her the world combination that had crushed her. Authority was 
dispersed; the world unshackled; the weak became the strong; the 
sheltered became the aggressive; the contrast between victors and 
vanquished tended continually to diminish. A vast fatigue 
dominated collective action. Though every subversive element 
endeavored to assert itself, revolutionary rage like every form of 
psychic energy burnt low. Through all its five acts the drama has 
run its course; the light of history is switched off, the world stage 
dims, the actors shrivel. The chorus sinks. The war of the giants 
has ended; the quarrels of the pygmies have begun. 169 
What is meant by a racist or ethnic hate imperative? The definition 
of the word "racist" in its basic form means to discriminate based on the belief 
that some races are by nature supreme. The same could be said for the concept 
of "ethnic hate." Winston Churchill's statement voices a concern that with the 
downfall of several dynastic regimes following the conclusion of WWI, the world 
would see an eruption of inter- and intra-state conflict based in ethnic prejudices. 
With the devolution of the Soviet State, history seems to repeat itself. As 
addressed by Paul A. Goble, ethnicity and its political expression, ethno-
nationalism, provide some answers for analysts who seek to understand and 
explain many of the conflicts that have emerged following the end of the Cold-
War. 170 In its most radical state, race and ethnicity are used as a banner cry for 
169 Winston Churchill, 1929. 
170 Paul A. Goble, "Ethnicity as Explanation, Ethnicity as Excuse," in Robert L. 
Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., eds.,Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability, 
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prescriptions of terrorist violence and separatism. Witness the mass genocides 
in Rwanda and the Balkans in the early 1990's, and the ultimate travesty of the 
Holocaust wherein six million Jews were executed by Hitler's Nazi apparatus. 
History is filled with violence based in a racist/ethnic hate imperative. Here in 
the United States a growing movement of neo-Naziism and wh·ite supremacy 
operating under a loosely organized web of militia organizations and revisionist 
Christian movements may very well pose a threat that could result in the use of 
WMD. In 1985, members of a racist hate group known as The Covenant, 
Sword, Arm of the Lord" (CSAL) were arrested on charges of sedition. The U.S. 
Justice Department raid on their compound resulted in the discovery of a 
cyanide producing laboratory and massive quantities of cyanide stockpiled for 
the express purpose of poisoning the water supply of an unnamed city. 171 The 
CSAL will be the focus of the case study addressing the WMD threat posed by 
the non-state group operating under a religiously oriented, racist/ethnic hate 
imperative. 172 
(Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College, 1995}, 51. 
171 Coats, 140. 
172 Ruth Sheehan notes that today many hate groups no longer cling to the 
banner of racist rhetoric that typified the dogma of groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. 
Instead these groups claim to be patriots, protecting the memory and history of the 
great South. Membership in many of these groups, particularly those established to 
memorialize the Civil War, is used as a veneer to express white male dissatisfaction 
and anger at the social and economic problems the perceive as holding them back. 
Ruth Sheehan, "Roots or Racism," San Francisco Chronicle, May 5, 1996, 
A-10 
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3. Leadership involving the "Authoritarian-Sociopathic 
Personality" (Demand Indicator) 
Addressed in Chapter II of this study, the terrorist group leader with an 
authoritarian personality is primed to commit (and direct) aggressive acts against 
"out group others." In order to convince or manipulate group membership, such 
leaders frequently use emotionally evoking ideas such as race or religion as a 
main component of their rhetoric. The leader with the "authoritarian personality" 
may also exhibit other attributes such as charisma, narcissism, and paranoia, 
attributes that Post suggest can further enhance the potential for the conduct of 
ultra-violence. 
4. Extremist use of Unmitigated Violence (Demand Indicator) 
By examining ideology, rhetoric and terrorist attack profiles, this attribute 
can be assigned to the non-state group being analyzed. A review of statements 
made by various leaders of non-state groups that routinely employ terrorist 
attacks against the State of Israel indicate a desire and intent to destroy that 
Nation and all it stands for. Statements made to the press by Ramadan 
Abdullah Shallah, the new leader of Islamic Jihad (and former South Florida 
State University professor) exemplify the type of rhetoric that causes concem. 173 
... so many Islamic Jihad youths wanted to be human bombs, (to attack 
Israel), that...bombers have been chosen by lot.. .. 
. . .Israel ... will pay a heavy price for the deaths of Shakaki (former leader 
173 
"Islamic Jihad Vows More Bombings Against Israel," USA Today, April1, 
1996. 
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of Islamic Jihad) and Yehi Ayyash (chief bomb-maker for Hamas) .... 
Terrorist actions perpetrated by Islamic Jihad and Hamas demonstrate their 
willingness to commit disproportionate violence in the form of murder and injury. 
Thus rhetoric and intensity of violence associated with their terrorist attacks 
arguably supports the posit that they are "ultra-violent." In a s·econd example of 
this concept the leader of Aum Shinrikyo, Shako Asahara, was known to suggest 
that a guru's order to murder meant that it was time for the victim to be 
elevated to a higher spiritual level. To this end he stated that: 
... killing ... may appear simply as murder in the objective view of the human 
world, but when a wise person views it, the person who has killed and the 
person who killed both benefitted. 174 
Operating under the rationale of such rhetoric and ideas, Aum followers 
committed a variety of terrorist acts, ranging from simple kidnappings, 
assassination of dissident membership, and the infamous sarin attack against 
the Tokyo subway. Again, by examining rhetoric and action the assignment of 
this attribute to non-state group is possible. 
Often the concept of revenge is frequently seen as a rhetorical motive for 
engaging in ultra-violent behavior. Revenge, legitimized as an act of retaliation 
against others perceived as having wronged the group, provides a powerful 
motivational force to conduct acts of disproportionate violence. 
174 
"Prosecutors Detail Guru's Alleged Crimes," USA Today, Apri125, 1996. 
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5. The Closed Constituency And Group Cohesiveness (Demand 
Indicator) 
Non-state groups operating under a "secular-political" imperative conduct 
their violent acts as part of a strategy to correct perceived flaws in the socio-
political order of the state. As their goals are typically grounded in a belief that 
their actions will bring beneficial change to the masses they insist they 
represent, their violent acts will be tempered and focused at state symbols. This 
is done for several reasons. First, a non-state group's survival is contingent on 
membership appeal. If their violent acts become too distasteful recruitment 
suffers, defections occur and the group loses strength, or worse, internal power 
struggles result causing the same effect.175 However, in the non-state groups 
that operate under the religiously oriented imperative, the concern is not with 
benefitting the masses, but with benefitting the group and pleasing God. In the 
closed cell group, close cohesion or bonds amongst members is very important. 
In some cases members may be required to pass an initiation ritual to 
demonstrate their commitment to the group. In extremist groups this initiation 
ritual may include murder. Group member's dedication to their cause is an 
important part of maintaining cohesion. Members who are willing to commit 
suicide or be killed for their beliefs arguably support a means to ends philosophy 
that enables the use of disproportionate violence. 
175 Jeanne N. Knutson, "The Terrorists' Dilemmas: Some Implicit Rules of the 
Game," Terrorism. v.4., 1980, 206-211. 
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6. Lack of Concern over Public or Government Back! ash 
(Demand Indicator) 
The concept of "backlash" manifests itself in two distinct forms, 
government reaction and public reaction. Backlash occurs when an act of 
terrorism exceeds the acceptable violence threshold of the public or state. The 
result is twofold in that a loss of constituency and popular support may occur. 
C::of"nnd the stato m'!:l\1 onnano in oxtr-o:~ordinan/ moasr rr-OC! to elim"lno:~te tho ""'"'""'""' I ! \.1 I .. "'"' I ....,. 7 V ~ ~'-" I I "" t.l..... II I I J I .av ""'' VW "' II I I I ........ .. 1,_, 
terrnriC!t grn1 1p J:nr the nnn-C!to:~to grnun nnerat·lng 11ndor a roJiniouC!Iv orl·ontod "' - '""" I""""'"""" • • -· I I 1-f I _ ......... ...,. I- I""' -,..., I .. I ,.,.. I -· I- 1~1 -·J ...... ·-
imperative, backlash possesses little deterrent value as death holds its own 
reward for the martyred, \Aihile perpetuating the struggle for the living by giving 
them heroes to avenge and emulate. In fact, backlash may reinforce the resolve 
of these groups to use VVMD, viewing themselves as a closed cetl surrounded by 
forces of evil who ultimately desire to destroy them. Violence to these groups is 
thus seen as an end in itself whereby the corrupt system of "out-group others," 
must be totally destroyed or substantially damaged so as to allow, minimally, a 
negotiated settlement favorable to the group; even at the risk of their being 
............ ·ce'"" t""' ........ :neffe'"''l"''"" ~ .... r ... e :n '""'e o ........ es'"' 176 "''"' ...... e,..u1' ' 11 ' 11110 U'"'""' 1c;uu U V CUI I I vL vc; IV v I Ul , IVv ;). f"\;) C1 I ;) n, YVIVI ;:Joe; 
becomes a rationale choice for the closed eel! group. This indicator is closely 
associated with the following one, though the l'No are arguably unique enough to 
require separate explanation. 
176 Th:,.. :s ........ e·"" ...... P .... 1""'4o: .......... ~ t""'ou""h4o,.. and :dea" e--o .. e"se'"" bv B .. u .... e Ho""""'a"" 1111;)1 Clll AUCI VICIUVIIVI II ~JL;) I I ;) A,l;) U J I v IIIII II. 
See Bruce Hoffman, "Ho!y Terror": The implications of Terrorism Motivated Bv a 
Religious Imperative, 3. Also, refer back to the discussion of the Japanese decision to 
attack Pear! Harbor found in Chapter !! of this study. 
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7. A Willingness to Take Risks (Demand Indicator} 
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type of "special reward."177 For the group operating under the apocalyptic 
imn.::.rat·1,,.::. tn.::. r.::.\A,ard iC! the "n.::.•AI I if.:." follo,.,inn Armag.::.ddon· forth.::. red.::.mpti".::. II l"''W'I "li'W' If"'"",...., •• I IV II tt""'VY lfi'W' I iWt ::f I 1111 'W' I' t 'W' 'W" 11. lolii'W' 
religious fanatic the reward is the blessing of the Almighty; for the racisUethnic 
hate monger the reward is the destruction of the offending population. \A/hen the 
perceived pay-off is viewed as 'NOrth taking the risk, the group will do so. 
Of sn.::.f"i~l nnt.::. th.::. riC!k forth.::. r.::.tiginus r.::.d.::.mnti\1.::> nperat"lng llnd.::.r a I ,...,'W''W'I""" I'"' 'W' 'W' I lVI I I 'W' I""'' I'W' '-' ,.,, 'f"""' W"""' 'W" I .. ...... I ""' 
radicalized Islamic imperative are minima! for this individual is acting within a 
win-win paradigm. If the Islamic radical dies in a terrorist attack, he/she 
becomes a martyr and goes to paradise. !f the terrorist survives the attack, 
he/she walks away knowing that the Almighty is pleased with the "contribution" 
to the cause. In any event the perceived high-pay off overrides concerns of risks 
involved. 
177 See 11 ";C .... a"'l s~o .... l "S~at"S T""''"'"O'";"m an'"' Sta~e T ........ or";s ...... T .... e Ro1""' "f ~ ........ IYII I I v L I I : L v , vii I 1.;)11 U L I vii Ill. I I lv V ll lv 
Superpowers," in Robert 0. Siater and Michaei Stohl, eds., Current Perspectives on 
lntemational Terrorism, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 161. Also Mary Douglas, 
Risk Acceptability According to the Social Sciences, (New York: Russel Sage 
Foundation, 1985), 43-44. 
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8. Group Exhibits Sophisticated Use of \AJeapons or Tactics 
(Supply Indicator) 
Non-state groups that take advantage of advances in areas of 
communications, weapons development, and maintain a flexible posture to adopt 
new strategies and doctrine are arguably prime candidates to pursue 
development of a VVMD capability. 
9. Membership that Includes Personnel Knowledgeable of WMD 
Technical Requirements (Supply Indicator) 
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manufacturing a delivery or dispersal system is equa!!y difficult, one must 
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degrees in everything from electrical engineering to nuclear physics. These 
individuals are more than capable of developing crude WMD given access to the 
~pnrnpr·1a+e m~teri~r~ A Lrev "ariable nf ,.0 nr-ern 1·s +he non-~t~te group +nat ..... f""l ¥ llo '""" I I .... IW• I"""" J • I I ,.., ""' ,_, I IW._,.I t I Ill V I I I """ ... ""'"" "I I 
recruits members from science and engineering fields. 
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10. Financial Resources to Fund a \1\/MD Capability 
(Supp!y Indicator) 
The ability of a non-state group to develop a VVMD capability is also 
contingent upon the financial resources they possess. VVhile it is readily 
acknowledged that the production of a crude nuclear explosive device would be 
quit.::. f"'nC!tlv for a non-C!tatc. nroup nnc.rating \Aiitnol It st~tc. spnns" nrC!hin nn tne 
... ..., ...,..,..., ... J f I II tl -· - ::f1 -fW""""' ... I li•r II - ..... ..., ..... I -IW' .. ,.,., -· "'' 
order of millions of dollars, the financial resources needed to develop a chemical 
or biological weapon is quite small. 179 On balance, many non-state groups 
certainly possess significant financial resources to pursue the development of 
nuclear weapons capability, their coffers fi!fed by cash generated from 
enterprises that include such things as legitimate businesses, bank heists, 
contract assassination, drug dealing, counterfeiting, covert weapons trade, 
extort;on an"' S""'1·, .... ;t·tna ........... ,. .. ; ..... ut; ....... s f .. om S"moa~he~·,,.. ................ ~e .. s 180 A'"' ... .... l I I I: IU VIIJI I"' IJVIILIIIJ lVII I II Jl , l I li.J ;:IU!JfJVIl I . ;:1 Clll 
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uncovered assets exceeding $1.4 billion do!!ars. 
179 A'"' ""'Ote"' ;n a "';""CUS""J.O""''"' ",-,~ ..... n.. Je""s"tca s~e ...... '"'f Stan~or"' Un;"e ..... a .. , an"' ;:, II U II Ul;:l ;:, 11;:1 vY lll LJI. ;:, l Ill V I I U I lv I ;:lilY: IU 
Dr. Kath!een Bai!ey of Lawrence Livermore Nationa! Laboratories, a non-state group 
with 2-3 knowledgeable personnel and about $25K can develop a chemical capability 
suitable for use in a terrorist attack. The dollar figure may be somewhat high as cyanide 
dispersal device can probably be put together for something !ess than the $25K figure. 
180 For a detailed account of how non-state groups generate cash reserves see 
CDR J.K. Campbell, "Arms for the insurgency," unpublished research paper, Navai 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Fan 1995, 7-10. 
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11. Availability of Materials and Access to Technology (Supply 
•nd"lrator\ 
• • ,.... • • I 
Access to materia! sources and technology to develop a VVMD program is 
a key consideration for non-state groups desiring to develop a \1'/MD capability. 
12. Summar/ 
To recap what has been presented thus far, a non-state group possesses 
Effective Demand to threaten use of vvrv1D when Demand Indicators (those 
rt::of!:ltt::of"f to dccircs fnr po\A/Qr idt::onJng\1 fe!:!derchir\ bcha•fior conctJ"tuenl"\1 """'"""''"""' ._._ • ._. .....,. ii""IJ I ""'WI'I- .7, I- I._, llt'J W'lt W:t 7 I,., I-.~, 
backlash, and risk) and Supply Indicators {those related to sophistication of 
group weapons/tactics, knowledgeable membership, financial resources) are 
present in the group. Effective Demand is either enhanced or degraded by 
Intervening Processes. 
!. METHODOLOGY AND NOMOTHETIC MODEL 
1. Methodology 
To test whether religiously oriented non-state group use of \A/MD to cause 
mass casualties or mass disruption is best explained simply by Structural Realist 
Theory or by the more complex Synthetic Theor1 of Structural Realism and 
Ornani'"7ationa1 Drncess fc• •r cases arc. anai"Z0 d I 'SI."Q +he. 4-..A/n mode•~ l ~ I II~ I I I I I I¥ t I '-"1 '"" '-' I :J V '-" I 1., \, 1'-' ..... , II IW 
presented. Three of these cases invo!ve non-state religiously oriented groups 
that have manifested interest in the use of VVMD to cause mass casualties. 
Each mode! relies on the rationale of Mill's Method of Agreement which 
simply states that: 
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.. .if an investigator wants to know the cause of a certain phenomenon, he or she 
should first identify instances of the phenomenon and then attempt to determine 
'Nhich "'ir,..urnstan"'e in"!:Sr-i!:Sbly nre,..edeC! itt:! appe!:Sr-an"'e The c·I'~'"'Urnstance that I 'W'I V I I I .. I V I lJ ..... 1"-'1. I t' .....,....,..., '-'"" I 'W' '-'""""' I ,,_, • I I ,_, 1 ""' I I I I U I L 
satisfies this requirement is the cause .... researchers should !ook for a single 
cal •sal conrlt"tion J·n \Aihif"h !:SJI "tnC!t!:Snf"eC! agree fhoute\lel"' thiS single Cir"f"llmSt!:Snf"e "" I I t'W "' t I ••• IV I"""' I I IWt.""' IV"'V ....,...., \.'I 9\ii'W'V..,t J I I II II"'"" It "'"'""' ,...,.._, 
m:a~-.~ be ...... ec ...... e .... ~ ""amb:n .... t:o ... o~ """"nd·,t:o .... s 181 I I..,IIL a I 1..111 IlL v I I II a I II I vV I I II ..•. 
The weakness of using this method is rooted in the danger that it's 
simplicity can lead to faulty generalizations. In order to minimize this danger, 
Mill's Indirect Method of Difference is used to examine the case of the 
Provisional VVing of the Irish Republican Army, were interest in VVMD may exist 
but has yet to truly materialize. 
2. Nomothetic Model and Operat!onalizing Indicators 
A nornothet·,,. model ·ln"o'veC! .,rlentifying thoC!e r-elat"!\lely feu./ ... Ill ll_llo...., I I • I - ~-1 II I .. ...., 1 ...... 1 ·-· ...., .. , 
considerations or indicators that seem to provide at !east a partial explanation 
for the causation of an event. Exploratory research identified a total of four 
indicators that seem to be necessaf'/ and sufficient for a non-state group to 
possess Effective Demand under the Structural Realist Model, and eleven 
indicators under the Synthetic Theory of Realism and Organizational Process 
Mode!. Acknov·lledging the supposition that there may be other indicators of 
importance, these models are referred to as being of a "nomothetic nature." 
Each model contains indicators identified as either Supply or Demand. 
!n the Structural Realist Mode!, indicators are provided a numeric va!ue of 1.0 if 
the attribute is evident in the case being analyzed, or .0 if the attribute is absent. 
181 ~"'h"" .. les,.. R .... ,.,·, .... T'"'e ~"'a~Q..:r .... ~:.,,.. ""eth"'d ,,.....,1.Jf"" ...... ·,a· un·;"e .. s:~ .. of v1a1 v. a~11, Ill v Ill aaUV~IVI IV .1,va1 VIII. IY I ILJ 
California Press, 1987), 36-37. 
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Tht:~C!t:~ u!:~la 1.::.s !:~rt:~ th.::.n m11ltipl"r.::.t1 nrn"l.dr·nn !:~ prnduct nf .::.ither 1 0 inrlirating th.::. I I ._,..,""' 11' "-"11 .... ...., ,_,., .._, "''""'I l ......... I ....,..,. f'"'' """Y I :::J .... I,_, " '-'1 .._,,, I I I • 7 I '"""'"" •tl '""" 
PreC!.::.nre nf I=Her+1\'e r>eml:lnrl fnr \MMD or 0 indica+ inn !:In ah«:!.::.nc.::. of I=He,-.fi"e I W'"'-'l 11J '-'1 ~~'""''-'" • ..., ,_,"""'1 I~ I~ • ...., 11' 11' I 1 I • 1 II I I •11 1:;:11 ........ I ..,.,_,'-'1 I """' .._,,"""'...,I.IWY 
Demand for VVMD, see Table 3-4. 
In th.::. ~\/nth.::.t·,,.. Th.::.on' of R.::.ajiC!m l:lnd ()rnani?atinnal prncesC! Mnrlel Ill II'W'\J.,ttii'W"..., Ill""" I) I ,...., IW'III ...... I ""''::s' II.._"'""' I I ,...., ._, ••• ,.,,.,.I 
e!:~Ch "ariable ·,«:! nrn"it1.::.d a num.::.ric "alu.::. rgnninn frnm n 1 0 \/!:~lues !:~r.::. "-" I I 'ti' I I I W ,., • ...., Y ..... '"" I I 111'-"1 I 11' ..., """"' 1:::f11 I~ I ""Ill • .., ., I • • W ~I """' ~I._, 
assigned based on the the educated guess of the analyst examining the 
a ....... ·o 182 r::ach ;nd;· ........ ~o .. se~ ;·s th""'n m· ·lt; .... l;ed """'oar---~e'" _1 VU, • &... I II VCil I l II~ I I U 1!-' I ~~. C:U IJ. The products of each 
set are then multiplied together providing a numeric value between .0 and 1.0. 
ThiC! «:!COre repreC!.::.ntc:: !:1 rl:I\Af Vl:llr 1.::1 fnr EHectr"ve Demand Th.::. ra'"' "a'ue for 111VV I I V'-"lt.'W' ..... t'-'CW'I' .... , .... ""'""I IIV ""' If • Ill"" Wir 11' I I 
Effective Demand is then adjusted based upon the influence of any significant 
Intervening Processes, see Table 3-5. From this model, potentia! for a non-state 
nrn11n tn thr.::.a+.::.n '"'""D rl:ln thiiC! be na11n.::.d.::. g th.::. h·rgh.::.r th.::. "aru.::. ttak-inn ::f1\Jtt...olf"' ._.. '- .. ...., .. ....,II .!I,,;; "'"""'II"' ...... ..., ::t .... :::f..., ""'• "' ... ,.,II IV .. 1...., 'I' I ....... \_" 1'-llf~ 
into account any significant intervening processes), the greater the potentia! 
threat. An analysis of the four cases examined elucidates at a minimum, a value 
that minht he I l~erl tn irlentr"f\1 the nl"ln-~tat.::. grnun that iC! rine tn threaten I ISt::l nf ......... ~ .... ..,.....,,.,.....,....,'-'11 ....,.'-'~""''"j) ...., .......... ..., .. "'""" '""' ,., ..... ,.,,,,..,....., .. ,.,..... • .... ""''""' 
V'!MD. 
Though outside the scope of this study, using this mode! to analyze a!! 
nnn-C!tate caC!ec:: nf \J\/t.An in"OI".::.ment might p.:=.rmit th.::. ec::tab!ishment Of I 1""'1 I """' "'"' ""'""'V ""'' •• 111'1 ...... U I ij I 9 ........ I I ... I I II I • ....,, I I II ,. I"" 'W't.. I I II I I I .. 
threshold values for potential \1\l!\.~D users. These values might then be used to 
id.::.ntr·.n, non-C!tat.::. nrn•lpc:! that '"'OUid uc::.::. \J\IIIAO tn cause mac:!c:: 1 ""I lt. 11 11 1 """' ....., ::::fl.....,,_,.. 'W' 11 t. .... I """"" • !J'J\:'J "''-' Ill """" 
182 This meth""'"' ;s a"'""'pted ~ ............... S"S~'"'m "''"''''"'10P'"'"' b" '1\''"'nd" "'';co• .... ~~h .... I II II I V\.1 I \.IV II VIII Q J Lvl I \.lvY~I v\.1 J Y lv I J l'il I VI U v 
wnyl:li r.anl:lriian l'uinJJnt.::.ri Pn'tic.::. ·,,n·s Nirnl is a ~trat.:=.gt·,.. Anai\lc:!T in the rr·tmt"n!:~!' I'"""" - 'W' I·--· f I ="·-- .. .....,_ I - I """"• 'W • ... ....,.....,. I Vt.t ........ -I II IJ-.. II I 1'-' V I ·-
Extiemism Analysis Section of the Ciiminallntelligence DiiectOiate, RCMP. 
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casualty/disruption; those that wou!d use VVMD in constrained acts of terrorist 
".IQJenr-o· a·nrf thnC!o that \Ati"\trld pronablv nnt ttC!O \A/1\AQ v I I ...,,.,, I "" " '"'"""" "' I .... ....,,.. .., ., I'""" ,.."""' V\i .,tl . 
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Attribute Set for Structurai Reaiist Model of Effective Demand 
Demand Variables 
I 




1 1.0 or .0 
Suppiy Variabies 
~r""' ·o me""'be ..... a..; ... \.:l VU, I Ill I ~I lltJ 




Gmup possesses financial 
resources to fund WMD 
II prooram . I . -I I Group has access to 
I I materials and technology 
1
1 1 .. ""q' ,;,. .... d· ............ ""n· ,.,:ac•· ''"e lv Ullv LV IIIQ lUI U,U 
I 1 !VvMD 
I Structural Realist Model Equation 
I Score I 
1 1 n ....... C I I .v VI • 
I Desire for Power x (Knowledgeable Membership x Access to Materials and I To.r-hnotngy X J:'"lnanr-"1!:)' Ro.nuiremo.nt~\ = t=ffol"'filll::. nernanrl- t=vforna' J 'W'.....,I I I'W' '\.I I I '""'~I '"""""1 II II ...,. I'-'/ ._.JIVVI.IW'W' ,_, Ill IIW ......,, .. """' I I 
I Influences · 
Table 3-4: Structural Realist Model 
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Attribute Set for Synthetic Theory of Structurai Realism and Organizational 
Precess Model of Effective Demand 
Demand Indicator 
·~rnup nes1"reC! P"'\Aifer nr.oa+ "'""\J' ...... I W 'W'Y I ~~~ .. 
enough to balance against the 
nation-state 
Group leader manifests the 
''authoritarian-sociopathic 
personality" 
Ideology advocates use of 
uitra-vioience 
nro••p .onn~n.OC! ,·n trltra-
"'. ...... ""'' ~ ..... ::f'""""' I I ......... 
violence 
I Group is cohesive and closed 
I "eii ,-.fQ' '"' me'""'i-.ers are loya·l I v "· v '"'1-' I "'"" I I j to the cause 
I Group disregards backiash I . 
I Group wiilino to take hioh risks I . - -
Score 
1
j Supply Indicator 
.0-1.0 
L~roun .oxhihi+C! I ""' ,.., "" • .. ..., ... ..., 
I sophisticated use of 
I weapons or tactics 
Group includes 
membership 
knowledgeable of \NMD 
technology 
Group possesses financial 
resources to fund vVMD 
program 
Group has access to 
materials and technology 
Score 
.0 -1.0 
I Product of Demand indicators= Dl(r) 
jO . t" IP M . I . 
I Product of Supply indicators = Si(r) 
! rgamza 1ona rocess oae 
I Di(r) x Si(r)::: Effective Demand (r)- intervening Processes= Effective Demand 
1 forVVMD 
Tabie 3-5: Synthetic Theor; Model 
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IV. THE APOCALYPTIC MILLENNIAL GROUP: THE CASE OF AUM 
SHINRIKYO 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The most serious use of WMD by a non-state group occurred on March 
20, 1995, when members of Aum Shinrikyo released a nerve agent into a 
crowded Tokyo subway. The Aum attack represents the first widely known 
attempt by a non-state group to use WMD with the specific intent of causing 
mass casualties and mass disruption. 
This chapter opens with a narrative overview of Aum's activities and key 
members. Information for this overview was obtained from a review of open 
sources: relevant books, newspaper articles, the internet, and testimony 
presented to Congress through hearings conducted in November of 1995. 
These sources provide a detailed understanding of important elements of the 
cult specifically Aum leadership, organization, ideology, group behavior and key 
events. As such the review allows for concise understanding of the complexity, 
depth and capabilities of the Aum organization. Importantly, the discussion 
provides a glimpse of what may become a more familiar event, WMD use by 
non-state groups. The overview of Aum will be followed with a comparative 
analysis of the group using the two theoretical models presented. 
B. OVERVIEW OF AUM 
Aum was originally created as an amalgamation of Hindu/Buddhist/Yoga 
type beliefs that generally advocate an ascetic lifestyle and devotion to the 
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leader. Aum's leader, Chizuo Matsumoto aka "Shako Asahara," professes to 
have existed in a previous life as "lmhotep, the vizier of the Pharaoh Zoser," and 
thus responsible for building some of the Egyptian Pyramids. Asahara claims 
that he has attained the ability to levitate and he has openly praised Hitler as a 
prophet. The group believed that the world will come to an end in 1997 as a 
corrupt Japanese society is replaced by the ideal society of Aum, the only 
survivor of Armageddon. Not surprisingly, the cult's symbol is the Hindu god 
Shiva, the god of destruction and reproduction. Prior to the Tokyo subway 
attack, Aum membership claimed 10,000 followers in Japan and 30,000 
members in Russia. Aum also had established a presence in New York City, 
Bonn and Sri Lanka truly making them a "transnational-group/threat. "180 
Aum's emergence in Japan is explained in part as a function of several 
negative and underlying trends in Japan. For example, consider the stereotype 
that exists about Japan. Instead of a national interest there are corporate 
interests; instead of a cohesive vision enunciated by Japanese leaders, there is 
little or no leadership; instead of a strong foreign policy, there is only the 
negotiating of financial strength issues primarily vis a vis the United States; 
instead of looking to the future, Japan still struggles with the past. As a result, a 
cadre of college students, businessmen, and academics desiring more from life 
180 
"A Cloud of Terror-And Suspicion," Newsweek, April 3, 1995, 41. 
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than a fat bank balance and good career, fell into the quagmire of Aum. 181 
Given the doubts and searchings of Japanese society, Aum, through its 
recruitment and indoctrination, offered a life of meaning and a spiritual void 
filled. Thus, Aum was able to attract many intelligent, talented people who "once 
lured, pursue( d) their new faith with the stupendous energy of the lost. "182 
C. ORGANIZATION 
Shako Asahara was born on the island of Kyushu in 1955. Practically 
blind at birth, Shako received his primary education at a school for the blind. 
Shako's limited sight brought him prestige and power at the school as being 
able to see even a little gave him a great advantage over the other children. A 
former teacher recounted that: 
"Being able to see even a little is prestigious because blind children want 
to go out and have coffee in a tearoom but cannot go by themselves. The 
would say to Chizuo( aka Shako), 'I will buy you dinner. Why don't you 
take me out?"'183 · 
As he grew up he was known as a difficult individual prone to violent outbursts 
181 This situation is very similar to Germany in the 60's-80's e.g., an atmosphere 
ripe for the incipient phase of radicalization that led to development of the RAF. Also 
Schecterman's essay on Irrational Terrorism suggests that terrorism is an outgrowth of 
accelerated changes within a particular society. He contends that "revolutionary 
dynamics in innovative technology and economic systems have produce great 
dislocation and anomie among vast populace, and especially so among the elite of 
such societies ... Terrorism has been a reaction pattern for many people under such 
duress." The case of Aum's emergence and growth in both Japan and Russia seems 
to reflect Schecterman's postulation. 
182 David Van Biema, "Prophet of Poison," Time April 3, 1995, 26. 
183 James Walsh, "Shako Asahara: The Making of a Messiah," Time, April 3, 
1995, 30. 
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and temper tantrums. 
Shako's early ambitions were to become rich and famous. By the time he 
graduated from high school he had amassed some $30,000 dollars saved from 
government grants for the disabled and from "scamming his classmates."184 His 
first real failure came when he was turned down for admission to the prestigious 
Tokyo University. This event reportedly left him angry and bitter. In 1978 he 
married Tomoko Ishii, who eventually became a senior Aum official. In 1982, 
Shoko was arrested for selling fake medicine cures as part of an acupuncture 
health clinic he had established. Known as the Matsumoto Acupuncture Clinic, 
customers were treated through a regime of acupuncture, yoga and "herbal 
cures of a dubious nature. "185 In 1984 Shoko established Aum.lnc. and his first 
enterprise known as the Aum Association of Mountain Wizards. As written by 
Kaplan " .. .it was a fancy name for what was actually a one-room Tokyo yoga 
school with a profitable sideline in phony health drinks."186 As part of his 
ambitious agenda to become a man of religious and political importance, Shoko 
went to the Himalayas in search of enlightenment and returned claiming mystical 
powers and capabilities. As further reported by Kaplan, Shako's yoga schools 
became quite successful and he expanded by reinvesting profits in the open.ing 
184 David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, 
(New York: Crown Publishers, Inc, 1996), 8. 
185 Ibid., 9. 
186 Ibid., 11. 
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of new schools all over Japan. 187 Membership continued to increase and 
Shako's schools became a sort of sanctuary for students and businessman 
trying to get away from the stressful life inherent to contemporary Japanese 
society. As reported by Kaplan it was during a meditative state on a beach on 
Japan's Pacific Coast that Chizuo' rhetoric took on an apocalyptic tone. He was 
cited as saying that " ... a message from God ... (directs that) ... l have been chosen 
to lead (his) army. "188 Later that year Shako is alleged to have met a radical 
interpretivest historian who suggested that Armageddon would come at the end 
of the century and that a godly race emerging from Japan would survive. This 
revelation combined with Chizuo's own thoughts of grandeur led to the birth of 
his new identity as Shako Asahara, Guru extraordinaire. 189 
In a society primed to recover its spirituality and national identity, Shako 
Asahara preyed on the psychological and religious cravings of the Japanese 
people. As such his brand of snake-oil salesmanship, enveloped in a veneer of 
eclectic religious rhetoric and mysticism, was too much for the spiritually 
parched Japanese. Aum's message quickly attracted a significant following of 
Japanese intelligentsia, blue collar workers and young adults. Their recruitment 
strategy focused primarily on developing a cadre of bright professionals having 
expertise in area of physics, chemistry, and biology. As the organization grew, 
187 Ibid., 12. 
188 Ibid., 12. 
189 Ibid., 12. 
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so did Shoko's plans to create the Armageddon and conquer Japan. Shoko is 
reported to have said in a March, 1994 sermon that: 
... the law in an emergency is to kill one's opponent in a single blow, for 
instance the way research was conducted on soman (a gas developed by 
the Nazi's) and sarin during World War II. I come under a gas attack 
wherever I travel, and jet fighters from the U.S. forces fly for exercises 
around Mt. Fuji. 190 
Moreover, Asahara blamed the United States military for Japan's economic and 
social problems and his own declining health. He regularly boasted of predicting 
the Kobe earthquake and the rise of the yen against the dollar. 191 A former 
classmate of his said: 
I think Matsumoto is trying to create a closed society like the school for 
the blind he went to. He is trying to create a society separate from 
ordinary society in which he can become king of the castle. 192 
When he was arrested, police found Asahara in a secret room between 
the second and third floors of his Mt. Fuji commune meditating. Dr. Jerrold Post 
suggests that Aum is a prime example of a terrorist group that emerges from the 
efforts of a charismatic, narcissistic, deluded, paranoid leader who is able to 
develop and nurture a hard-core cadre possessing similar attributes. 193 
190 Ibid. See also Nick Cassway, "The Wit and Wisdom of Gas Attack Guru 
Shoko Asahara," (http:// www.webcom.com/-conspire/sayings.html). 
191 Teruaki Ueno, Reuters. April20, 1995. 
192 The Irish Times. April 1, 1995. Also, James Walsh, 'The Making of a 
Messiah", Time Magazine. April 3, 1995, 30. 
193 Discussion with Dr. Jerrold Post, George Washington University, May 1 , 
1996. 
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D. ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE 
As part of Shoko's plan to create Armageddon and lead the survivors of 
this cataclysmic event, he directed that the Aum organization be modeled after 
the Japanese government. This would ensure that an organizational structure 
familiar to the "surviving population" would be in place to govern the "new world 
of Aum." Table 4-1 illustrates the complexity of the Aum organization showing 
the key leadership/management positions established within the cult. This chart 
was developed through a review of several references sources that included the 
Japanese "Sunday Mainichi" news paper, Newsweek and the Internet. 
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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OFAUM SHINRIKYO 
Leader of Aum: Chizuo Matsumoto aka Shoko Asahara. 
Ministry of New Believers East: Eriko lido 
West: Kazuko Tozawa 
Ministry of Construction: Kiyode Hayakawa: the number two man in Aum. 
Ministry of Science and Technology: Hideo Murai: graduate of Osaka 
University. Holds a degree in space physics; reported to be the number 
three man in Aum. 
Ministry of Defense: Tetsuya Kibe: responsible for security; also Kiyohide 
Nakada, former Yakuza, assists with enforcement and commands the Action 
Squad. 
Ministry of Health: Seiichi Endo: studied genetic engineering at Graduate 
School of Kyoto University specializing in genetics and medicine. 
Ministry of Intelligence: Katsuhiro Inoue 
Ministry of Healing: lkuo Hayashi: Chief physician at Aum Hospital, graduate 
of Keio University department of Medicine. 
Ministry of Finance: Hisako Ishii 
Legal Affairs Ministry: Yoshinobu Aoyama: graduate of Kyoto University 
Department of Law. 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications: Kazuko Matsumoto: wife of 
Shoko Asahara. 
Ministry of Education: Shigeru Sugiura 
Ministry of Public Relations: Hirofumi Joyu: Waseda University graduate 
specializing in artificial intelligence. 
Chemical Arms Unit: Masami Tsuchiya: doctoral candidate of organic 
chemistry at Tsukuba University. 
Secretariat of Interior: Reika Matsumoto: daughter of Shoko Asahara. 
Table 4-1. Organizational Chart of the Aum Shinrikyo Cult 
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As Table 4-1 suggests there are a variety of ministries through which Aum 
leadership administrated and managed the Cult's membership, businesses and 
weapons manufacturing efforts. Key ministries behind Aum's power and 
enforcement efforts include: 
o The Health and Welfare Ministry. Headed by Seiichi Endo. 
Endo's ministry is apparently responsible for germ warfare 
research. Endo is a genetic engineer who studied genetic 
engineering and academic work at a virus institute.194 Subsequent 
raids of Aum's Satian-7 facilities located at the Kamikuishiki 
compound showed that the cult was set for botulinum toxin 
production in addition to having a robust sarin production 
capability. The raid uncovered 160 barrels of peptone used for 
cultivating bacteria and large quantities of glycerine and sodium 
cyanide. 
o The Science and Technology Ministry. Headed by Hideo 
Murao. Murao was stabbed and killed in front of Aum's Tokyo 
office. He was an astrophysicist by training. 195 
o Clandestine Activities: Headed by the No. 2 leader of the sect 
Kiyode Hayakawa. The Clandestine Activities section is reported 
to have been in control of the enforcement element of the sect 
called the Action Squad. The Clandestine Activities arm was also 
involved with developing the capability to manufacture a variety of 
weapons to include AK-47s and to procure military hardware which 
eventually included a Russian Ml-17 helicopter with chemical spray 
kit. 
o Chemical Arms Unit. Headed by Masami Tsuchiya who was 
reported to be working on a doctorate in organic chemistry at 
Tsukuba University. Interestingly, Tsuchiya wrote in 1991 that 
"Asahara will be imprisoned in the 1990s, but his trial will prove the 
existence of supernatural power and all 100 million Japanese will 
194 N.D. Kristof, "Japan Police Arrest 2 Found Beneath Sect Headquarters," NY 
Times. April27, 1995, A1. 
195 MacNeil/Lehrer News Report, May 4, 1995. 
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become followers of Aum." 196 
o Action Squad. Headed by Kiyohide Nakada, the Action Squad is 
Aum's enforcement element. It is the Action Squad that is 
allegedly behind the abductions and disciplinary actions taken 
internally against sect members. Nakada is formerly of the 
"Yamaguchi Gumi," an underworld organization affiliated with the 
''Yakuza" (the Japanese mob). 197 
E. AUM RECRUITMENT AND INDOCTRINATION 
Aum focused on a traditional resource e.g., bright university students, 
somehow alienated, who could contribute immediately to the cause. Students 
willing to join the cult were encouraged to pursue studies in the fields of physics, 
chemistry, and biology.198 Recruitment also focused on computer specialists, 
lawyers, doctors, members of the Japanese Defense Force and National Police. 
Asahara himself has been known to actively encourage recruiting by promising a 
decorative sword to any member who could bring in thirty new members in three 
months. Moreover, any member who did so would automatically be promoted. 199 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent release of constraints on 
196 Kevin Rafferty, "Japan Looks to Transvestite Actor to Save It From 
Doomsday Terror Cult," The Observer, April23, 1995, 19. 
197 The Dallas Morning News April14, 1995, 10A. 
198 Japanese Economic News wire, April 4, 1995. 
199 Yomiur Shimbun, "Aum Recruiters Given Decorative Swords," The Daily 
Yomiuri. April17, 1995, 2. The practices noted here provide a superb example of 
Crenshaw's discussion terrorist group leader's control of incentives. It is also evident 
that Aum recruitment programs were designed to attract members in the JDF, National 
Police and other professional areas to allow the organization to penetrate and gain 
access to sensitive information. 
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religious practices in the Newly Independent States (NIS) provided the 
missionaries of Aum with a fertile source of new membership. In fact, the 
spiritually starved Russians are alleged to have quickly swelled the ranks of 
Aum with a membership approximating 30,000 at the height of the cult's short 
lived popularity in Russia. 
Indoctrination into the cult began during the recruiting process. First, 
Asahara's writing and teachings were published for the open market. His books 
are as specific as prescribing how a new Aum member should handle a 
traditional father when explaining involvement in the cult. 200 They are also used 
to explain Shako Asahara as prophet and messiah. Once a member, the new 
recruit was further indoctrinated into the Aum lifestyle of self-sacrifice and 
asceticism. More importantly the hard core cadre of Aum used a variety of mind 
control techniques and terror tactics to control members and to discourage 
dissent and defections from the cult. These efforts included the use of isolation 
regimes, sensory deprivation techniques, use of mind altering drugs and 
stimulants, induced vomiting, colonic irrigation, unknown injections to the body, 
electrode stimulations to the brain, torture, and murder.201 When police forces 
raided the main Aum facility near Mt. Fuji on March 22nd, they found fifty 
members in an almost coma-like state. These individuals had been subjected to 
crude forms of electromagnetic shock and kept in tiny, windowless 
200 The Mainichi Daily News. April 25, 1995. 
201 The Irish Times, April 1, 1995. 
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cells.2°2 Members who objected to the cult's practices were severely beaten, 
isolated in tiny cells and in several cases, allegedly killed.203 Finally, members 
were forbidden to have sex and were encouraged to wear helmets equipped 
with electrodes, allegedly to put them on the same wavelength as Asahara. 204 
As written by Kaplan, Shako Asahara may have professed an ascetic life for his 
followers, however he and an inner-circle of Aum leaders lived a luxurious life 
that included Rolls Royces, sex, and eating binges. 
F. SUPPORT MECHANISM 
Aum recruitment attracted a wealthy and educated membership. 
Financial holdings exceeded a reported $1.4 billion dollars and included such 
assets as discount stores, coffee shops and a computer assembly factory. 
Members were encouraged to give all "personal assets" to Aum.205 In some 
cases if a member owned a substantial piece of property, Aum cadre would 
engage in techniques such as forgery to acquire and then sell the property. 206 
The organization incorporated in Japan, Moscow and New York under the trade 
company name Maha Posya Inc. Chizuo Matsumoto was listed as the director of 
202 Robert Guest, "Cult's Commune Of Torture: Harrowing Purification Rituals," 
The Daily Telegraph. March 24, 1995, 16. 
203 Kaplan, et al., 35-37. 
204 Van Biema, 26. 
205 Van Biema, 31. 
206 Kaplan, et al, 64. 
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the company. Maha Posya Inc. was licensed in the United States as a general 
trading company through which imports such as computers and agricultural 
products were to be exported. Aum was also involved in illegal drug production 
and sales to include LSD and stimulants. 207 It was through Maha Posya Inc. 
that Aum was able to acquire the equipment needed to develop and manufacture 
Aum's arsenal, an arsenal which included chemical and biological agents. 
G. MATERIALS AVAILABLE 
From the sources noted thus far, Aum is known to have possessed a 
large WMD manufacturing potential that included huge stockpiles of chemicals. 
This included sodium fluoride, phosphorus trichloride, isopropyl alcohol, and 
acetonitrile. All are components of various forms of nerve gas.- Once combined 
to make nerve agent, this stockpile of chemicals had the potential to kill 
approximately 4.2 million people.208 It is not known how many other caches 
might exist. Ensuing investigations also uncovered massive amounts of 
ergotamine used for LSD production, phenylacetonitrile used for producing 
stimulants, and massive amounts of other chemicals which could be used to 
manufacture explosives. 209 
As mentioned earlier Aum scientists were also in the process of 
developing biological weapons, having experimented with anthrax, Q fever, and 
207 Congressional Testimony on Aum, Oct 31, 1995. 
208 Van Biema, 27. 
209 Kaplan, et al, 98. 
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botulinum. It is alleged that Aum actually attempted to perfect and deploy a 
biological weapon several years prior to the attack on the Tokyo subway. 
Kaplan writes that in 1993, Shoko Asahara directed Seiichi Endo to develop a 
bio-weapon that could be used against the Japanese royal family on the day of 
the wedding between Prince Naruhito and Masako Owada. At Asahara's 
direction, Endo developed an anthrax agent and dispersal system. Fortunately, 
the system was not ready for use on the day of the wedding. However, when it 
was ready, Shoko directed that it be tried out against the population of Tokyo; he 
even accompanied the ~~assault party. 11 Fortune was on the side of the Japanese 
public as Endo had not perfected a viable anthrax bug and the "attack" did little 
more than pollute the air.21° Failure to create a viable biological weapons 
caused Aum scientists to focus on development of a less sophisticated 
weapons, organophosphate based nerve agent. 
Following the Tokyo subway attack, Japanese national police raids of 
Aum facilities led to confiscation of a Russian made helicopter and a nerve gas 
detection device. Chemical agent spraying equipment that could have been 
installed on the helicopter was also confiscated. Additionally, documents 
discovered by the raids revealed a keen interest in the procurement of new and 
used Russian tanks, fighter aircraft and nuclear weapons technology. By 
November of 1995 the U.S. Congressional testimony heard by the Permanent 
Sub-committee on Investigations indicated that Aum had been in the process of 
210 Ibid., 93-95. 
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developing a huge, deadly, arsenal. Aum weapons development activities 
elucidated by the investigation included: 
o Conventional arms cache and the necessary industrial machinery 
to manufacture a variant of the Russian AK-47. This equipment, 
which included computer-controlled lathes and steel fabrication 
equipment, was acquired when Aum bought out a failing steel 
manufacturing company (Okamura Ironworks). Blue prints for 
these weapons are alleged to have been smuggled out of 
Russia?11 
o Attempted to acquire weapons of mass destruction and technology 
from the Russia. Also attempted to steal technical documents from 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries on weapons such as tanks and 
artillery. Successfully penetrated a number of Japanese defense 
contractors to include Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to gain access to 
industrial technology to assist in the development of WMD 
program. 
o In addition to the Ml-17 Russian helicopter and spray kit, Aum was 
experimenting with the use of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) 
equipped with spray kits. The RPVs could have been used to 
release nerve agent. 
o Molecular modeling software from Cache Scientific of Beaverton, 
Oregon; also $400K worth of software and computer hardware 
used in biogenetic research from a U.S. firm located on the east 
coast 
o 400 gas masks from a firm in San Jose, CA (recalled from the 
freight forwarder by the trading company broker on 20 March 1995 
following media broadcasts of the Tokyo attack). 
o Attempted to acquire a sophisticated laser from a Northern 
California manufacture in March of 1995 and an interferometer 
from a Connecticut firm in 1993. Both systems have nuclear 
material enrichment applications. 
o At least twenty volumes of KGB manuals. 
211 Ibid., 88. Note that the sarin recipe used by Aum is of Russian origin. 
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D Purchased a tract of land (sheep ranch known as Banjawarn 
Station) in Western Australia and acquired uranium mining leases. 
It has been alleged that Aum was interested in mining Australian 
uranium which was to be exported back to their facilities in Japan. 
There it be enriched to bomb-grade quality using laser enrichment 
technology. It was also reported that Aum tested their sarin nerve 
agent on sheep kept at the Australian ranch. 
D Alleged to have been working a deal with the North Koreans 
wherein cult members would receive weapons and training in 
exchange for computers and lasers. These items were restricted 
export to North Korea. Aum easily purchased these things through 
its' trading company Maha Poysa lnc.212 
D Established a significant following in Russia with the assistance of 
top level Russian officials. This relationship allowed Aum 
scientists to penetrate various academic and technical institutions 
through which they allegedly received information helpful to their 
WMD and small arms production efforts. 
H. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 
A chronological history of Aum activities provides a concise summary of 
their activities and true nature: 
D February, 1984. Asahara establishes the cult in Tokyo after his 
spiritual awakening in the Himalayas. 
D 1988. Asahara predicts that Japan will rearm and that nuclear war 
will occur in 1997. 
D 1989. Asahara allegedly ordered the execution of follower Shuji 
Taguchi. Taguchi had the dubious honor of becoming Aum's first 
murder victim and was assassinated for trying to leave the cult. 
Later that year a human rights attorney, Tsutsumi Sakamoto along 
with his wife and son were abducted and also murdered by Aum 
operatives. Sakamoto was in the process of representing 23 
parents who wanted the cult to release their children. 
D February, 1990. Asahara and 24 other cult members run 
212 Ibid., 68. 
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unsuccessfully for parliament. Also in 1990 Aum begins to 
promote its organization in Russia. 
o April, 1990. Cult members disperse a botulinum toxin near the 
Japanese Diet in an unsuccessful attack against members of the 
Japanese government. 213 
o March, 1992. Asahara meets with Russian authorities to include 
Aleksandr Rutskoi, then vice president and eventual participant in 
the armed insurrection against Boris Yeltsin. He also meets with 
Oleg Lobov who at the time was the Russian Security Council 
Secretary. Aum eventually establishes a radio show and 
educational center in Moscow. The Russian connection was a 
fortuitous event for both Aum and certain Russian officials. Shako 
wanted to penetrate Russia for its membership potential and 
access to WMD technologies. Russian officials were anxious to 
entertain Asahara's desires as he spread money around like 
fertilizer, a virtual "cash cow." 
o June/July, 1993. Late June, cult members spray downtown Tokyo 
with botulin toxin with negative results. In Early July, residents 
near Aum's Tokyo office suffer from white fumes coming from the 
sect's building. Local authorities receive over 200 complaints but 
no investigation ensues. This event was actually an attempt by 
cult members to disperse anthrax throughout Tokyo City. 
o June, 1994. Under the direction of Masami Tsuchiya, head of the 
Aum chemical unit, two members of Aum release sarin gas near 
the judicial building in Matsumoto. The attack was allegedly 
ordered by Asahara to preclude a negative judgement being levied 
against the cult in a land dispute matter. Seven people were killed 
and 150 injured to include three judges involved with the case. 
o July 1994. Villagers in Kamikuishiki complain about a strong odor 
coming from the Aum compound at the base of Mt. Fuji. Police 
later find evidence of sarin use in the soil near the compound. 
o December, 1994. An Aum lieutenant attempts to assassinate 83-
year old car park manager Noburo Mizuno using VX. Mizuno is 
hospitalized but recovers. Between September and November of 
1994 Asahara has at least two members who left the organization 
213 Ibid., 58. 
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killed by VX injection. A member belonging to the Japanese 
Defense force is charged. In addition a Yokohama journalist who 
wrote a story connecting Aum with the Sakamoto family, is the 
victim of a phosgene gas attack in her residence. 
o January, 1995. Fear that a police investigation of the Matsumoto 
gassing was leading to an investigation of the Aum facilities at 
Kamikuishiki causes cult members to destroy sarin stockpiles and 
camouflage equipment used to produce the nerve agent. 214 
o March 15, 1995. Police find attache cases (modified with vents 
and battery operated fans) at a subway station.215 
o March 20, 1995. Twelve die and 5,000 are injured in a Sarin gas 
attack on Tokyo subway. On this date, twelve Kamikuishiki 
residents claim they were threatened by Aum in December, 
1992.216 
o March 22, 1995. Almost 3,000 Japanese police raid Aum facilities 
at 25 separate locations in Tokyo, Shizuoka, and Yamanashi. At 
the main headquarters they find $7.9 million dollars and twenty-two 
pounds of gold. Enough chemicals are confiscated to kill an 
estimated 4.2 million people. Police also confiscate a Russian 
made helicopter and poison gas detector. 217 
o March 30, 1995. Takaji Kunimatsu, Japanese police chief heading 
the National investigation is shot. Perpetrator escapes on a 
bicycle. 
o April 1, 1995. Raids and searches of Aum compound result in 
discovery of library of biochemistry books, incubators and electron 
microscope. Speculation suggests that Aum was engaged in 
214 Ibid., 215-217. 
215 The Economist. March 25, 1995, 37. 
216 While these facts are confirmed by several accounts, this history is based on 
an article by Chiaki lshimura "Events surrounding Doomsday Sect Aum Supreme 
Truth", Agence France Presse, March 22, 1995. Also see Van Biema. 
217 Nicholas D. Kristof, "Poison Gas Targets Secret Cult; Japanese Raids Turns 
Up Chemicals," The International Herald Tribune. March 23, 1995. 
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research to make biological weapons. 
o April 8, 1995. Police raids of Aum facilities result in confiscation of 
equipment and machinery used to manufacture AK-47s. 
o April 28, 1995. Two members of Japanese Ground Self Defense 
Force arrested after being identified as Aum members and 
responsible for leaking information relative to preparations for 
police raids on Aum facilities. 218 · 
o May 5, 1995. Railway station employees find and douse a burning 
bag of sodium cyanide in men's room in Shinjuku Station. Next to 
the burning bag is a bag of diluted sulfuric acid entwined with the 
cyanide. Had the two bags had adequate time to "mix" this low 
tech device would have made a cloud of hydrogen cyanide gas 
capable of killing thousands in the crowded Tokyo subway. 
o May 16, 1995. Chizuo Matsumoto, aka Shoko Asahara is arrested 
by members of the National Police at the Kamikushiki compound. 
I. ANALYSIS OF AUM 
Determining the relative value of Structural Realist Theory or Synthetic 
Theory of Realism and Organizational Process for explaining Effective Demand 
in the case of Aum, is truly a complicated task. Fortunately the event has been 
extensively documented which facilitates the process of analysis. In this 
particular case it appears that both theories seem to emerge as plausible 
explanations for causation of Effective Demand. 
1. Structural Realist Model 
Shoko clearly desired to play an important role in Japanese politics. This 
was evident as early as 1990 when a cadre of Aum membership unsuccessfully 
218 Kaplan reports that JDF membership in Aum included approximately 40 
active duty and 60 former members of the JDF. Kaplan, et al., 188. 
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ran for various political positions during Japan's general elections. Following 
this unsuccessful bid for office Shoko Asahara, still desiring to be an "impact 
player," turned to the use of internal methods that would allow him to balance 
against the Japanese government and assume a leadership role in Japanese 
society, WMD terrorism. From a realist perspective, Shako's decision to 
internally balance through the development of a WMD capability was a logical 
choice, providing him with a coercive potential great enough to propel him into 
the seat of power in Japan. Further, Shako's membership recruitment and 
business strategies reflect a deliberate plan to do just that. 
From a structural perspective (as noted in the narrative), Aum cadre 
included those with the technical knowledge to develop, minimally, a nerve 
agent and rudimentary dispersal system. That the group made several glaring 
errors is irrelevant as evidenced by the mass casualties and disruption caused 
by their "amateurish" effort in the Tokyo subway. Aum also possessed a 
tremendous financial support base, arguably large enough to fund the 
development of a rudimentary nuclear device. Additionally, they had unfettered 
access to the necessary materials and chemicals to pursue a robust WMD 
program. 
A quick look at Aum through the framework of the Structural Realist Model 
of Effective Demand clearly supports the hypothesis of this study. Aum pursued 
the development and use of WMD in order to overcome (balance against) the 
military and political superiority of the Japanese state, see Table 4-1. On 
128 
balance, the Aum case raises an important question which is not easily 
answered by Structural Realism theory e.g., what key factors empowered this 
group to cross the traditional lines of modulated violence to use WMO. Maybe 
the logic employed by Shoko Asahara and his cadre manifests nothing more 
than a veneer of the rational choice assumption structural realist theory implies. 
If this is the case, a closer examination of the organization through a reductionist 
approach may provide answers regarding Aum's ability to transcend those 
"traditional constraints" and use WMD. 
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Attribute Set for Structural Realist Model of Effective Demand: Aum 
Shinrikyo 
Demand Score 1.0 or .0 Supply Indicator Score 1.0 or .0 
Indicator 
Desire for Group membership 
power great 1.0 knowledgeable of 1.0 
enough to WMD technological 




financial resources 1.0 
tofunda WMD 
program 
Group has access 





Structural Realist Model 
Desire for Power x (Knowledgeable Membership x Funding x Access to 
Materials)= Effective Demand: 1. x (1. x 1. x 1.) = 1.0- no constraining 
external influences 
Table 4-2: Analysis of Aum: Structural Realist Model 
2. Synthetic Theory of Structural Realism and Organizational 
Process Model 
By dis-aggregating Aum and examining the group through the framework 
of the Synthetic Theory of Realism and Organizational Process Model, a more 
"focused" explanation for why the group selected to develop and employ WMD 
emerges. 
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a. Power to Balance Against the State 
This attribute is self-evident. As Aum's membership, business, and 
financial holdings grew, so did Asahara's desire to become a dom•nant influence 
in Japanese society. Adopting a strategy that would eventually lead to an armed 
confrontation with the Japanese authorities, Asahara directed actions to 
internally balance Aum against the military superiority of the Japanese Defence 
Force and National Police. These included: (1) penetrating both the JDF and 
JNP with Aum members; by doing this, Asahara could stay in front of the 
counter-terrorism efforts of the Japanese government; (2) developed a small 
arms manufacturing capability to arm Aum members; (3) developed the WMD 
program that would ultimately be used in an effort to stave off the intrusiveness 
of the Japanese government into Aum affairs. Aum is ranked 1.0 for their efforts 
to pursue a balancing power through development of WMD. 
b. Leadership of the "Authoritarian-Sociopathic 
Personality" 
In this particular case I have had the good fortune of being able to 
access a significant amount of information concerning Shako Asahara. This 
includes having been able to discuss Shako's "personality" with several psycho-
dynamic psychiatrists, including Dr. Jerrold Post. 
In general, Dr. Post provides a revealing insight as he suggests 
that Shako Asahara provides an example of the "mirror-hungry personality" 
addressed in Chapter II. Add to this Shako's other attributes including his 
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charismatic, deluded, paranoid qualities; the use of religious ideas to legitimize 
his behavior and manipulate membership; an obvious desire for power to 
coerce; and grand assertions that those external to the Aum organization where 
they enemy to be destroyed. These attributes arguably suggest a profile of a 
leader who will, given the opportunity, manipulate his followers to commit ultra-
violent acts of terrorism. Place this type of leader over a "leader-hungry" 
membership with similar attributes and Dr. Post says the following will result: 
If the paranoid with messianic delusions possesses leadership abilities, 
and can identify a vulnerable population, the ingredients are present for a 
charismatic apocalyptic religious cult. His delusion is sense making not 
only for him but for other wounded individuals whose world is falling apart 
as well. He is a collective diagnostician. Initially alone against the 
paranoid psuedocommunity, now the paranoid with religious delusions 
has followers and is no longer alone. Moreover, his followers confirm the 
truth of his inspired religious conviction. For the followers, such an 
inspired leader has provided a diagnosis of the ills afflicting the world and 
they have a special role to play. He has made sense for them of the 
chaos surrounding them. Their sense of the outside danger has been 
confirmed, but they are no longer alone in facing the enemy. Rather they 
are united with their fellow true believers under the banner of a gifted 
leader. In this closed cult, he and his followers are in a closed system, in 
which each reinforces the beliefs of the other ... in the apocalyptic religious 
cults ... (this) can have important political consequence.219 
Shako Asahara undoubtedly manifests the traits of the authoritarian-sociopathic 
personality. For this indicator, Aum receives a score of 1.0. 
219 Interview with Dr. Jerrold M. Post, 9 February, 1996, San Francisco, CA. 




Despite the rhetoric of peace that permeated the teachings of Aum 
Shinrikyo, the heart of the group's ideology was based in an apocalyptic 
millennia! imperative that supported the use of extremist violence. Shoko 
Asahara created this belief system for the express purpose of recruiting and 
manipulating a membership that truly wanted to believe they could be part of 
something greater then their temporal existence could ever afford e.g., the 
chosen few who would survive the apocalypse and become part of a new world 
order ruled by Aum. As Shoko created his "church" he engaged in a variety of 
practices specifically designed to increase Aum stature, power and his own 
perceived importance. These efforts were highly visible to Japanese authorities 
and the public at large. Recalling the history of Shoko, one sees an 
entrepreneurial spirit that eventually adopts a pseudo-religious twist. His 
message was literally advertised through the media in Japan and other places. 
Rhetorical references to the apocalyptic nature of the group was also evident in 
the books the cult published wherein Shoko describes himself as the messiah. 
Further, Shoko claims to have had an epiphany in which God tells him he has 
been chosen to lead an army that will cleanse Japanese society of its social and 
political ills. 
Eventually Shoko "sells" his devoted cadre of zealots and aspiring 
gurus a vision of the future that includes not only spiritual enlightenment, but a 
guaranteed lead position in the new world order, an order that he prophesies will 
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come following the Armageddon. As documented in various public relations 
videos and writings produced by the cult, Shako is noted predicting that Japan 
and the U.S. would engage in a nuclear exchange between 1997 and 1998, and 
that Japan would suffer devastating blows to her economy and infrastructure. In 
addition, he frequently claimed to have been the victim of persecution and 
poison gas attacks perpetrated by the U.S. and Japanese government.220 He 
uses this "fiction" to convince the hard core Aum cadre that the group's 
existence is threatened and that Armageddon is near. Unfortunately as the time 
for this cataclysm to occur draws near, Shako's credibility is threatened. This 
forces him to stage events that could be lauded as the beginning of the 
Armageddon e.g., the Matsumoto and Tokyo gas attacks (journalist reporting on 
the case suggest that the attacks were also designed to dissuade the Japanese 
authorities from investigating the cult). It is clear that Aum exhibited an 
apocalyptic millennia! ideology that legitimized the use of extreme violence. For 
this indicator, Aum receives a score of 1.0. 
d. Lack of Constraint to Commit Ultra-Violence 
Aum's history of violence starts with the practice of assassinating 
dissenting and defecting members and those external to the group that were 
perceived to be a threat. They crossed the line of no return when Shako 
directed the murder of Shuji Taguchi and the Sakamoto family in 1989. 
220 Hajime Takano, "Aum Veiled in Nerve-Gas Attack Suspicion-Performing its 
Own Armageddon?," Insider, April1, 1995. 
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Japanese authorities investigating these incidents placed Aum under a wall of 
suspicion, however official inquiries into the events were lauded as 
inconclusive. Possibly emboldened by their acts and the lack of hard inquiry by 
Japanese authorities Aum members, as directed by Shako, indulged in a 
muttitude of violent behavior that included torture, kidnapping, attempted murder, 
murder and the capstone events in Matsumoto and the Tokyo subway. In fact, 
between 1991 and 1995 over 60 people escaped from Aum facilities in 
Yamanasi and informed the authorities of the abuses and isolation regimes cult 
cadre imposed on members. 
Prior to the gas attacks, many complaints regarding the Aum cult 
were registered with the Japanese authorities by concerned family members 
who's relatives and children had come under the spell of Shako's Aum, all prior 
to the gas attacks. Townsfolk living in proximity to the Aum compound in 
Kamikuishiki regularly brought their complaints concerning the intrusive, strange 
ways of the cult, to the attention of the authorities. Suffice to say the cult's 
penchant for committing unmitigated violence was evident prior to the gas 
attacks. In fact Shako was noted to talk about murder as if it was a means by 
which one could further spiritual enlightenment. 
I preached that it was one of the heavenly principles to terminate your life 
by using sarin, X and other kinds of gases developed during World War 
II. 221 
Many cults manifest the trait of unmitigated violence. Sometimes 
221 Cassway, "The Wit and Wisdom of Gas Attack Guru Shako Asahara." 
135 
this violence is focused strictly at cult membership as seen in the case of the 
"Order of the Solar Temple." On October 5, 1994, 53 members of this cult 
simultaneously committed suicide in a flaming ritual in two locations, one in 
France and the other in Canada. 222 According to media reports the suicides 
were conducted so that members might leave this world and entire a new 
dimension of paradise. Casualties of this event included several children who 
were alleged to have been shot in the head. Approximately one year later a 
second mass suicide occurred in which 16 members of the Solar Temple killed 
themselves. 
In a more notorious case 900 members of "The Peoples Temple" cult died 
in a mass murder suicide orchestrated and forcefully directed by their leader the 
Reverend Jim Jones.223 This catastrophic event occurred in Jonestown, 
Guyana November 18, 1978. Although some members died of gunshot wounds, 
most ·died as a result of ingesting koolaid laced with cyanide. The dead included 
Representative leo Ryan who went to Guyana to investigate allegations of 
human rights abuse of members (particularly children and teenagers) by cult 
leaders and security cadre. As an adjunct to this particular case The House 
Foreign Affairs Committee suggested that the subject of cults should be 
discussed with special reference to their mode of operation and the style and 
222 
"Killer Cults Hit list," article, (http://www.mayhem.net/Crime/cults1.html.) 
223 For a full account of the Jonestown· massacre see Kenneth Wooden, The 
Children of Jonestown, (San Francisco: McGraw-Hill, 1981 ). 
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tactics of their leaders.224 For this indicator, Aum receives a score of 1.0. 
e. The Closed Constituency and Group Cohesiveness 
Aum Shinrikyo represents a "closed cell-system" in which actions 
are accomplished for the benefit of the group, leadership, and God (though at 
times Aum suggested he was a "God"). Perhaps even more disturbing than 
Aum's alleged gas attacks was the structure and ruthless efficiency of the 
society they created. Aum preached that the only hope for survival was in 
isolation, groupism, and their own brand of self reliance. Members ceded not 
only their money, but their very identity to the group. In this sense they were 
cohesive to an extreme. 
Believers were taught that outsiders could not understand their 
unique and mystical religion and that further they sought only to destroy it. The 
danger posed by outsiders and outside ideas is a recurring theme in Aum's 
internal propaganda. A siege mentality was created and nurtured so that 
membership would buy into the myth that Aum had to defend it's very existence 
against a world bent on its eradication. As such Aum's dedicated cadre, led by 
Shoko Asahara, developed a rational motive (within their deluded irrationality) 
that the only way to protect themselves was to attack those they perceived to be 
their enemies. Brutality, abduction, confinement, flagrant violations of human 
rights seemed only natural under these circumstances. 
The hard corps cadre of Aum were all loyal to the ideals, vision, 
224 Ibid., 206. 
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and grand plans of Master Shoko. This attribute was evidenced through the 
behavior and actions of those engaged in executing Aum's grand strategy to 
create the Armageddon and lead those who survived in a new world order of 
Aum. 
The closed cell nature, cohesion and loyalty of this group was truly 
evident this case study. Aum receives a score of 1.0 for maintaining a closed 
cell, cohesive, loyal, group structure. 
f. Lack of Concern over Public or Government Backlash 
Aum leaders and followers, particularly those involved in the 
atrocities, were not concerned with public opinion or Japanese government 
reaction because the public at large and the Japanese (and U.S.) government 
were recognized as "the enemy." In an elucidating example of how thoroughly 
brainwashed hard core cadre became under Shako's tutelage, cult member 
Kensaku Nagano stated during Japanese court proceedings that: 
To meet the Rev. (Asahara) again would be my greatest joy ... even if I am 
reborn or die, I want to serve the guru forever ... (reference to the gas 
attack in the Tokyo subway) ... l think it was right.225 
In another recorded statement lkuo Hayashi, a doctor who admitted 
planting gas on one of the Tokyo trains, was quoted as saying the goal of the 
subway attack was to wipe out the Kasumigaseki section of Tokyo, where many 
225 
"Aum Member Says Deadly Sarin Gas Attack was 'Right,"' Kyodo News 
International, March 25, 1996. 
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government offices are located.226 Prior to the gas attack the cult was known to 
stand up vociferously to local government authorities. In their petition to be 
recognized as a religious group by Japanese authorities in 1989, Aum members 
harassed city officials, staged demonstrations, and filed a lawsuit against 
Tokyo's govemor.227 Operating under a rationale that suggested death was 
nothing more than moveme~t to a better existence, it was not hard for members 
to engage in the use of WMD, a use that would either perpetuate the survival of 
the group in this existence, or hasten them to "another." Aum receives a score 
of 1. 0 for their disregard of backlash. 
g. A Willingness to Take Risks 
Ultimately Shako Asahara was the consummate con-man, more 
than willing to take risks in order to gain a high payoff. This behavior begins to 
manifest itself in 1982 when he was arrested for selling fake medicinal cures. 
Shako's risk taking nature matured and grew as he facilitated the cult's financial 
growth through the use of strong arm tactics, forgery and the like to acquire the 
personal assets of cult members. Of particular interest was the fact that cult 
members were operating globally in their attempts develop a WMD program. As 
noted in the case narrative, Aum members pursued WMD related knowledge 
and equipment in Russia and the United States. They even bought a sheep 
ranch in Australia were they tested their sarin nerve agent on sheep, having 
226 Irene M. Kunii "Engineer of Doom," Time, June 12, 1995. 
227 Kaplan, et al, 24. 
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smuggled in chemicals and equipment to whip up the sarin agent locally. 228 In 
fact Australian customs officials actually caught Aum members attempting to 
smuggle hydrochloric acid and other chemicals into Australia from Japan in April 
of 1993. Cult members were subsequently fined $1800.00 and banned from 
returning to Australia for six months.229 Well before the Matsumoto and Tokyo 
attacks Aum members exhibited a willingness to take extreme risks. Aum 
receives a score of 1.0 for risk taking. 
h. A Demonstration of a Certain Degree of Sophistication 
in Weaponry or Tactics 
Aum leaders certainly exhibited a high degree of sophistication in 
terms of recruitment methods and endeavors to develop capital resources. They 
were also adept at negotiating the purchase and delivery of a variety of 
restricted substances, high tech computer hardware and software and the Ml-17 
helicopter which was brought into Japan through a rather circuitous routing via 
Austria, Slovakia, the Netherlands and finally Japan.230 During Aum's 
engagement and enlargement efforts in Russia during 1994, fifteen cult 
members attended a ten-day weapons training course in which they learned 
survival and shooting skills including the use of rocket launchers. Even a soft 
investigation into Aurn activities in Russia would have uncovered enough 
228 Ibid, 126-133. 
229 Ibid., 126. 
230 Ibid., 193. 
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information to suggest that the group possessed a sophisticated nature and 
interest in nuclear weapons. Aum receives a score of 0.8 for exhibiting 
sophistication in their attempt to develop a WMD program. 
I. Membership that Includes Personnel Knowledgeable of 
WMD Technical Requirements 
Though not part of the original plan, Aum recruitment practices 
eventually focused on individuals who possessed education and professional 
expertise in nuclear physics, biogenetics, chemistry, medicine and higher 
mathematics. A cursory review of Aum membership prior to the Matsumoto 
attack would have revealed an extremely robust "braintrust" of individuals who 
more than understood the basic requirements to produce and weaponize lethal 
chemical agents. Aum receives a score of .8 for knowledgeable membership. 
j. Financial Resources to Fund a WMD Capability 
This attribute may truly be of limited importance as the costs to 
develop a low tech nerve agent and dispersal system (cyanide and sulfuric acid) 
are minimal. Regardless, Aum financial holdings exceeded any amount needed 
to produce even a nuclear device. Aum receives a 1.0 for financial resources. 
k. Availability and Access to Materials 
Acquiring chemicals and various pathogens was not difficult for 
Aum. As discussed in congressional testimony, everything Aum cadre needed 
to develop a WMD potential was available and purchased locally in Japan. Aum 
receives a score of 1.0 for access and availability of materials. 
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I. Intervening Processes and Summary of the Analysis 
The primary Intervening Processes seen as enhancing Effective 
Demand for Aum is the fact that Japan is an open, democratic society. The 
nature of this democratic structure heavily influences judicial and legislative 
practices relative to the investigative license of the state. It is suggested that 
this, plus the ultra-sensitive attitude Japanese culture manifests towards 
religious institutions, gave Aum plenty of room to develop their WMD potential 
under the nose of the Japanese state. This ultra-sensitive attitude toward 
religious institutions is said to be an outgrowth of those that remember the 
restrictions and atrocities imposed on the Japanese population under the fascist 
regime ofTojo in the 1930's through 1945. Since that time religious groups are 
generally lauded as "untouchable" in Japan. This might explain to some degree 
why there was no hard inquiry into the many complaints lodged against Aum. 
The general availability of WMD related technology and assistance Aum 
was able to gain from sources in Russia is also seen as enhancing Aum's 
Effective Demand. Cult penetration of industries engaged in the development of 
dual use technologies also helped. Of related importance was the cults ability 
to penetrate various government offices, police, and defense forces. Through 
this penetration Aum cadre developed an early warning network that enabled 
them to monitor the plans of the authorities relative to the cult. This network 
assisted Shoko to avoid arrest for almost two months following the attack on the 
Tokyo subway. Table 4-2 provides a visual summary of the Aum case analysis. 
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Using the Attribute Set for The Synthetic Theory of Structural Realism and 
Organizational Process Model of Effective Demand, Aum received an overall 
score of . 64. 
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Attribute Set for Synthetic Theory oi Structural Realism and 
Organizational Process Model of Effective Demand: Case of Aum 
Shinrikyo 
Demand Indicator Score 
n"'n 
.v-r.v 
j Gmup desires power great 1.0 
1 enough to baiance against j the nation-state 
I Group leader manifests the 1.0 I "authoritarian personality'' 
Ideology advocates use of 1.0 
uitra-vioience 
1.0 
I Grouo is cohesive and 1. 0 I l"lnC!C0rl cell Grnr rn 




I Group disregards backlash I 1. 0 




I Product of Demand Indicators= 1.0 
I 
Supply Indicator 
j Gmup exhibits I sophisticated use of . 
I 
weapons or tactic · 
I Group includes I I membership knowledgeable I 
of VVMD technology 
j Group possesses financial 
1 resources to fund WMD 
program 
1 Group has access to WMD 1 










Product of Supply Indicators= 
0.64 
j Dl{r) x Sl(r) =Effective Demand(r) ..... Intervening Processes 
I = Effective Demand for WMD 1.0 x .64 = 1.0- enhancing Intervening Processes= .64 (Indicative that I Aum possessed Effective Demand for WMD) 




J. SUMMARY OF THE AUM CASE 
Both theoretical frameworks used in the analysis of this case show that 
Aum did indeed possess a high level of Effective Demand. Though the TheoiY 
of Structural Realism suggests greater strength for potential V.JMD use in this 
case, ft fails to account for important nuances that influence a group's decision 
to develop a VVMD capability. Recall that there exists a series of traditional 
constraints that have typically precluded non-state groups from moving towards 
the use of \NMD. If these constraints did not exist, \NMD use would arguably be 
the terrorist's primary weapon of choice. To date, non-state group use of 
WMD is still the exception vice the rule. This suggests that the Synthetic 
Theory of Structural Realism and Organizational Process may indeed 
provide a stronger argument for causation despite its apparent weakness 
in this case. Specifically, this model elucidates Aum's ability to transcend the 
traditional barriers to commit ultra-violent acts using WMD, barriers that many 
theorists of terrorism have argued would keep non-state groups from venturing 
down the VVMD path. The synergistic combination of the desire for power, 
"authoritarian-sociopathic'' leader, religious ideology, the closed cell nature of 
the group, etc., provided powerful forces that certainly overcame these barriers. 
In order to determine a non-state group's motivations and intentions, maybe it is 
more important to place emptlasis on some of the psycho-social aspects of 
such groups. In any event, had the intelligence apparatus in Japan been 
equipped to analyze Aum through either of the theoretical models, it might have 
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become readily evident that the cult exhibited a ripeness to develop and employ 
WMD. At a minimum, this might have identified Aum as a group predisposed to 
violent exiremism. 
In conclusion, Kaplan pmvides an excellent summation of the man and 
the cult Wilting that: 
In 1986, Shoko Asahara walked into the Himalayan mountains as a con 
artist, and emerged as a self-proclaimed messiah. In 1995, he came 
down from tr,e mountains again, this time as one of the century's most 
notorious mass murders - as the prophet of hi-tech terrorism. 231 
The horrific accounts of what transpired during the brief history of Aum 
are just now coming to light as a result of the writings of Kaplan and others. 
However, Shoko Asahara, with his twisted cadre of scientists, thugs and 
followers are certainly not the first group of apocalyptic millennialists to engage 
in unmitigated violence. In 591 A.D. historical records provide an account of a 
man of Bourges France who goes into the forest, loses his mind over the course 
of two years, and emerges claiming to be Christ. Discussed in the course of a 
larger work on millennia! cults, Norman Cohn writes that this individual claimed 
great healing powers, mystical insights and the like. People were alleged to 
have given large sums of gold and silver to this "Christ" and his followers (which 
inciuded femaie acoiytes). 232 In approximateiy 1148 A.D. another "messiah" 
emerges in Brittany following a period of "self-imposed exile" in the forest and is 
231 ibid., 282. 
232 Cohn, 41-43. 
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reported to have led a mass following of peasants that raided churches and 
delighted in violence. 233 Shoko is certainly not the first milienniaiiapocalyptic 
prophet as evidenced by the likes of the Reverend Jim Jones and David 
Koresh. 234 He wiii certainly not be the last. 
In response to a growing concern over threats cults pose France, 
Germany, and Switzerland have instituted watch-dog bodies to monitor cult 
activities in their respective countries. In a non-binding resolution the European 
Parliament enjoined in an agreement whereby police and investigative bodies 
such as Interpol and Europol would work together to monitor cults for illegal or 
unsavory activities. 235 The case of Aum is surely a wake up cali and represents 
what may be an emerging trend; that of non-state proliferation of WMD. 
233 Ibid., 46. 
234 Rev. jim jones was the leader of a cult known as the "Peoples Temple." in 
1978, 900 members died in a mass suicide at the cult's facilities in Jonestown, Guyana, 
at the direction of Jim Jones. David Koresh, leader of the Branch Davidians, and his 
apocalyptic followers perished in a blaze adjunct to an assault of their compound by 
Federal authorities in spring of 1993. 
1996. 
235 
"MEPs plead for EU Action Against Dangerous Cuits," Reuters, February 29, 
1 A""1 "'tl 
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V. RELIGIOUS REDEMPTIVE GROUP: THE JIHAD ORGANIZATION AND 
THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Non-state groups operating under a redemptive religious imperative have 
been known to use chemicals in their terrorist attacks. As documented in open 
source literature there have been several incidents in recent years that have 
involved the use of chemical agents. In summary they include: 
o A May 1983 Israeli government report that it had uncovered a plot 
by Israeli Arabs to poison the water in Galilee with "an unidentified 
powder. "236 
D A report that proposals were made at an early February 1993 
meeting of fundamentalists groups in Tehran, under the auspices 
of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, to poison the water supplies of 
major cities in the West as a possible response to Western 
offensives against Islamic organizations and states.237 
o A 1975 incident where German entrepreneurs were apprehended 
in Vienna attempting to sell Tabun (nerve agent) to Palestinian 
terrorists. 238 
o A report stating that "Force 17," a special cell within Yasir Arafat's 
236 Joseph D. Douglass Jr., and Neil C. Livingston, America the Vulnerable: The 
Threat of Chemical and Biological Warfare, (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1987), 
186. 
237 Safa Haeri, "Iran: Vehement Reaction," Middle East International, 19 
March, 1993, 8. 
238 Robert H. Kupperman and Jeff Kamen, Final Warning: Averting Disaster in 
the New Age of Terrorism, (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 101. 
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Fatah, had received training in chemical weapons.239 
D A report whereby Europeans in at least three countries became ill 
from eating citrus products that had been contaminated with 
mercury, which presumable had been injected under the skins of 
the citrus products with a syringe. A group identifying jtself as the 
Arab Revolutionary Army Palestinian Commandos in a Jetter sent 
to the Dutch government, announced that its goal was to sabotage 
the Israeli economy. In this case no one died however the incident 
severely affected Israeli citrus exports.240 
o A reference made concerning a "still secret" 1984 chemical warfare 
incident in which the nerve agent carbamate was added to the 
coffee of an Israeli military mess. 241 
o Reports indicating that cyanide may have been incorporated in the 
bomb used to attack the World Trade Center in New York in 
January of 1993. 
As noted by Senator Nunn, the Islamic terrorist that bombed the World 
Trade Center may very well represent the first non-state attempt to employ WMD 
against the United States. Investigations into this attack concluded that the goal 
of the terrorists was to bring down both towers of New York City's World Trade 
Center complex in a lethal cloud of cyanide. This toxic, chemical agent was 
specifically incorporated into the explosive device to increase the casualty count 
by orders of magnitude. 
Radical Islamic notions suggesting the U.S. is predominantly responsible 
239 Yonah Alexander, "Will Terrorists Use Chemical Weapons?," JINSA Security 
Affairs (June-July, 1990), 10. 
240 Douglass and Livingston, America the Vulnerable, 30. Also see Alexander, 
"Will Terrorists Use Chemical Weapons?," 10. 
241 Ibid., 29. 
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for many of the ills being suffered in the Islamic community word wide is 
provided as the rationale behind this terrible deed. Further, some Islamic 
fundamentalist leaders believe that attacks against the West (the U.S. in 
particular) are justified as a legitimate course of action to protect the Islamic 
world from becoming increasingly influenced, diluted, and fractured by the 
enticements and temptations offered by the secular, democratic, and capitalistic 
West. 242 Unfortunately acts such as the World Trade Center bombing result in 
the unfair stereotyping of Islam as a religion of terrorism. Philip C. Wilcox puts 
this in context as he states: 
The United States does not equate Islam and terrorism ... lt's a calumny on 
the name of Islam to equate it with terrorism. 243 
On balance, Islamic non-state terrorist groups seem to be extremely 
volatile and prone to "splinter," particularly when the leadership of a mainstream 
group chooses to adopt a more moderate approach to negotiating the desires or 
objectives of the group. In these cases it is not uncommon to see members 
defect and regroup into new, more violent organizations. 244 
242 Atlantic Monthly, (September, 1990) 2; also see Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic 
Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 1994), 102, 130; Taheri, 1-5. 
243 Statement made by Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., State Department Coordinator for 
Counter terrorism, 25 June, 1996. 
244 An example of this is readily evident upon analysis of Arafat's Fatah and the 
PLO. Former members of Arafat's mainstream group, not happy with his moderate 
approach to resolving difficulties with the State of Israel, stood up the Abu Nidal 
Organization, and fill the ranks of Hamas. 
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In this next case study the analysis focuses on a cadre of Islamic radicals 
that merged as a function of shared frustrations and anger at both Israel and the 
United States. Members of this group were indicted by the Federal Grand Jury 
for: ( 1) the assassination of the Israeli extremist rabbi Meir Kahane; (2) sedition; 
(3) the attack against the World Trade Center; (4) planning to-destroy various 
Federal buildings and traffic tunnels in the New York City area. Reports from 
court records and news journal articles provide detailed insight into this group 
and suggest that they had ties to known Islamic terrorists. 245 
The redemptive religious imperative that "fuels" radical Islam is a complex 
issue. Understanding the genesis of this phenomenon is key to appreciating 
how acts such as the World Trade Center bombing can occur .. In this particular 
case study I find it beneficial to proceed by addressing the underpinning roots of 
radical Islam, and a concept referred to as "Holy Terror." Following will be the 
case study of the group responsible for the World Trade Center bombing. 
B. THE ROOTS OF RADICAL ISLAM 
There are presently forty-five countries in the world where the Muslim 
religion dominates the population. The world-wide population of Muslims total 
some 900 million people or approximately one-fifth of the human race. Within 
this population of Muslims resides great cultural, ethnic, and regional variances. 
Unfortunately, there exists an uninformed impression of Islam that suggests the 
religion stands for fanaticism, violence, and holy war. This view totally negates 
245Steve Emerson, "The Other Fundamentalists." 
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the rich contributions Islam provided to the European culture as it emerged from 
the Dark Ages and into the Renaissance. Those that would typecast Islam in 
this negative light seem to ignore the fact that Christianity has a history of 
violence as well. Documented in the Crusades, and followed by centuries of 
Euro-Christian efforts to dominate the world through colonial imperial rule, 
Christianity has often shown its violent and repressive nature. Other religions 
share in this spotlight as evidenced by a bloody civil war being fought in Sri 
Lanka between Tamil Hindu's and Sinhalese Buddhists, and the Phalangist 
attacks against the Palestinian refugee camps at Sabra and Shatila in Lebanon. 
Despite this argument, contemporary events occurring in Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Israel, India, the Philippines, lr:tdonesia, and the 
U.S. lead some observers to believe that Islam is synonymous with religious 
based violence. In fact, traditional Muslim teachings abhor violence, do they 
not? As a rejoinder, these countries do experience a high degree violence, 
much of which is carried out by Islamic radicals. 
Islam is not just a religion, but a complete system, one that fuses religion 
with the social, political, economic and legal aspects and entities of the Muslim 
community. There is truly no separation between church and state, church and 
economy, church and the judiciary, or church and social behavior. The meaning 
of the word Islam is "submission or surrender to Allah's (God's) will" and it 
penetrates all aspects of the Muslim society. Therefore, any violence occurring 
as an adjunct to social, economic, or political issues, can rarely escape being 
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grounded in an Islamic religious imperative by virtue of this socio-religious 
fusion. Unfortunately terrorist violence conducted as part of a religious ideology 
seems to result in tremendous loss of life and injury, often times to the innocent. 
1. History of Radical Islam 
The origins of the Muslim community dates back to the seventh century 
wherein God revealed himself to Muhammad through the Angel Gabriel, circa 
610 A.D .. Muhammad was forty years old at the time. The essence of 
Muhammad's epiphany revealed that God first sent his revelation to the Jews, 
and then to the Christians. Both times this revelation became distorted and 
corrupted by man. Gabriel's appearance to Muhammad represented God's last 
attempt to send down his word to mankind, this time through Muhammad.246 
This revelation commanded the people to turn away from polytheistic cults and 
practices and to worship the one true God, the God of Abraham.2470ver the 
course of the next twenty years, Muhammad transcribed the word of God into 
Islam's sacred scripture. Known as the Quran, this work was not compiled until 
sometime following Muhammad's death in 632 A.D.. The Quran brought not 
just a religious message but prescribed behavior for leaders, merchants and 
individuals. It condemned the exploitation of the poor, orphans, and women, 
forbade corruption, cheating, the flaunting of wealth and arrogance; and it 
246 John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth of Reality?, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 26-27. 
247 Note that the God of Abraham is also worshipped by Jews and Christians. 
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prescribed strict punishments for slander, stealing, murder, the use of 
intoxicants, gambling, and adultery. 248 
In time, Muhammad consolidated his position as both leader and Prophet 
(in the city of Medina) primarily by fusing together religion and politics. Guided 
by divine revelation he oversaw domestic and foreign affairs, the military, and 
such things as tax collection. Eventually he returned to Mecca where he 
brought together the various tribes of Arabia. In the words of Esposito, 
Muhammad: 
.. .fashioned a new order and community, a religious and political (more 
accurately, a religiopolitical) community rooted in and united by a 
religious vision or bond.249 
Muhammad's death in 632 A.D. resulted in a split in the_ Muslim 
community by those that felt the mantle of the Prophet should go to his eldest 
surviving male kin, Ali, (who was not only his first cousin but his son-in-law) and 
those who believed that Muhammad had left this decision up to a quorum of his 
senior companions. This led to the eventual emergence of two separate Muslim 
sects, the Sunni and the Shii. The Sunni's desired to follow a caliph or political 
leader who made no claim to the position of Prophet, but who would be guided 
by senior Islamic clerics. The Shii desired to follow a religiopolitical leader who's 
selection was based on lineage to the house of the Prophet. The majority Sunni 
position prevailed over Shii desires, and the Islamic community was organized 
248 Esposito, 28. 
249 Ibid., 30. 
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and governed under a caliphal state.250 In short order the Shii broke with the 
Sunni, a break that to this day results in terrorism and in-fighting between these 
sects. 251 Through subsequent centuries, the armies and merchants of Islam 
spread Muhammad's message to the world through Jihad. Eventually Islamic 
influence permeated a geographic region exceeding that of Rome. 
Jihad has many meanings attached to it. In its basic form it means to 
strive in the path of God. It also means to engage in efforts to lead the good life 
by making society more moral and just through proselytizing, teaching and 
armed struggle against the evil of Satan. Thus Jihad comes to mean the 
struggle to spread and defend Islam. In fact Islamic law stipulates that it is a 
Muslim's duty to wage war against: 
... polytheists, apostates and People of the Book (Jews and Christians) 
who refuse Muslim rule and those who attack Muslim territory. 252 
This stipulation alone carries important connotations for the radical Islamic 
terrorist, for it is frequently used to legitimize the use of violence in support of 
radical Islamic agendas. 
250 Ibid., 31. 
251 The Shii disputed the decision regarding succession to Muhammad. The 
Shiites claimed that rule over the community should be a divine right of the Prophet's 
descendants, starting with those of his daughter Fatima and her husband Ali. Shii 
theology suggests that, beginning with Imam Ali, there existed twelve infallible 
religious leaders, the last one disappearing in 880 A.D .. In this theology, when the 
12th Imam returns, the world will be filled with justice. Until that time even the best 
ruler is viewed as only half legitimate. 
252 Ibid., 33. 
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The Islamic empire spread, encroaching on the Christian West and 
eventually absorbing the Persian empire, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, North Africa, most of 
Spain, and the Mediterranean from Sicily to Anatolia. For many of the 
subjugated non-Muslim populations, Islamic rule meant more flexible, tolerant 
conditions, conditions that included lower taxes and religious freedom. Under 
Muslim rule non-Muslims were afforded three alternatives: ( 1) they could convert 
to Islam; (2) they could pay a religious tax and keep their religious faith; (3) they 
could fight and presumably, die. 
In response to Muslim encroachment and the pleas of the Christian 
Emperor Alexius, leader of the besieged imperial capital at Constantinople ( 
1095 A.D.), Pope Urban II called for a holy crusade to defend the faith and 
liberate Jerusalem. The Christian world responded to Pope Urban's call with a 
series of eight military expeditions. These expeditions known as the Crusades, 
occurred between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries and challenged the 
hegemonic intentions of Islam. This protracted conflict eventually culminated 
with the fall of Constantinople in 1453 A.D .. Victory went to Islam and 
Constantinople was renamed Istanbul. Istanbul subsequently became the seat 
of the Ottoman Empire. By the mid fifteenth century three great imperial Muslim 
sultanates existed, each known individually as the Ottoman, the Safavid in Iran, 
and Mogul in India. Indeed, it was the Ottoman Turks that "struck terror into the 
hearts of Christian Europe" because of their geographic proximity to Europe. 253 
253 Ibid., 42. 
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Through the centuries competing religious and political interests between Islam 
and Christianity created a tremendous rivalry as each fought for land, people 
and souls. 
With the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries came advancements 
afforded by the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, and Euro-Christian 
imperial colonial expansionism. This caused a shift in the balance of power, a 
shift that eventually left the Muslim world hard pressed to compete with the 
Europeans they had once dominated. This change produced a sense of loss 
and consternation among many Muslims, particularly following the end of World 
War One when much of the Muslim world was partitioned and parceled between 
France, and Great Britain. What had gone 'N!'"ong? Why had a. once powerful 
force been so marginalized and how were Muslims to respond? In these 
questions is found the genesis of Islamic revivalism, a revivalism through which 
radical Islam emerged. 
Esposito notes that during severe moments of decline in the Islamic 
community, Muslim spiritual leaders would rise up suggesting that this was 
God's punishment for not living his word.254 They would then encourage (incite) 
communities to lobby the ruling elites for a return to a fundamental way of life, 
one governed by the precepts of the Quran, hadiths, and Islamic (Sharia) law.255 
They would also insist that the enemies of God be destroyed, as they were part 
254 Ibid., 50. 
255 Hadiths are accounts of what the prophet Muhammad said and did. 
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of "the problem." Enemies of God are typically identified as Muslims and non-
Muslim that have refused to submit themselves. Following the accomplishment 
of these things, Allah would then bless and protect the faithful and give rise to 
their prosperity and position in the world order. These movements occurred 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries under the leadership of the 
Mahdi in the Sudan (1848-85); the Sansui in Libya (1787-1859); the Wahhabi in 
Saudi Arabia (1703-92); the Fulani in Nigeria (1748-1817); the Faraidiyyah of 
Halli ShariatAIIah in Bengal (1764-1840); Ahmad Brelwi in India (1786-1831) 
and the Padri in Indonesia (1803-37). 256 Responding to socio-political crisis 
caused in part by western colonialism, two Islamic organizations emerged in the 
mid twentieth century . One was the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, the other the 
Jamaat-1-lslami (Islamic Society) of India. Both were hostile to further 
penetration of Islam by western influences, Marxism and the secularization of 
Muslim societies along nationalist lines. Both supported a more "Islamic" 
existence, vvhereby Islamic states were to be ruled by the precepts outlined in 
the Quran and Sharia (Islamic) law. Though the original Muslim Brotherhood 
organization in Egypt was effectively dissolved by the Egyptian government in 
the late sixties, both these groups inspired the establishment of similar 
organizations in Sudan, Syria, Jordan, the Gulf States, Lebanon, and the 
Palestinian occupied territories of the Gaza and West Bank of Israel. Some of 
these organizations took on an extremely radical, violent nature in order to 
256 Ibid., 50. 
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further their Islamic goals and agendas. Violence intensified following Israeli 
victories over the secular Pan-Arab coalition, particularly following the 1973 war. 
Islamic revivalist rhetoric of the day suggested that these losses were caused by 
the less then Islamic, more secular nature of the governments making up the 
Arab coalition. 257 
The greatest boost to radical Islam occurred as a result of the 1979 
Islamic Revolution in Iran, wherein the Ayatollah Khomeini successfully led a 
revivalist Islamic movement to forcibly oust the Shah. This event is lauded as 
precipitating a subsequent resurgence of world wide Islamic radicalism, 
strengthening the position of existing groups, and encouraging the emergence of 
new ones. Examples include the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria; ai-Gama'a 
ai-Jslamiyya in Egypt; Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the occupied 
territories; Hizbollah in Lebanon; Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain in 
Bahrain; Muhammad's Army in Jordan; Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, ai-Fuqra 
in the U.S.; Islamic Revival Party in Tajikistan; Eritrean Islamic Jihad in Eritrea; 
Hizbollah-Gulf in Saudi Arabia.258 These groups universally support the 
establishment of an Islamic, theocratic, governance. That which stands in the 
way of this goal is to be forcible removed or destroyed. To this end governments 
and monarchies can either "capitulate" and let a new theocratic order take over; 
change the nature of their rule and govern according to the Quran and Sharia 
257 Esposito, 133-134. 
258 Jeffrey A Builta, 277-287, 463, 573, 599, 603, 687, 775, 800, 837. 
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(Islamic) law; or be destroyed through Jihad. In an effort to realize this broad 
scope objective, many of these groups have engaged in violent terrorist 
activities, killing and injuring thousand in their war against the perceived 
enemies of Allah, e.g., the secular regimes of Muslim states, Arab monarchies, 
Israel and the West. 
In conclusion, radical Islam roots are embedded in the periodic 
emergence of Islamic reformist movements which have attempted to address 
the ills of Muslim society. In the twentieth century these movements have 
typically occurred in Muslim countries experiencing poor economic growth, high 
unemployment, and minimal social-reform programs. In many cases no 
mechanism exists by which the aggrieved population can redress their problems 
to the power elites in government. Under the influence of radical lslamist, many 
turn to the use of "Holy Terror" as a method to force the changes they seek. 
Israel presents a unique problem to radical Islam, one that includes 
issues of Palestinian autonomy and the perceived threat Israel poses to their 
Muslim neighbors. The inability or unwillingness of various Muslim regimes and 
Israel to resolve these problems, coupled with the violent repressive measures 
all employ to eradicate reformist Islamic groups appears to perpetuate vice 
ameliorate the radicalized Islamic terrorist seen operating in the global 
environment. To date Iran is truly the only Islamic revivalist success story, 
presently ruled by a theocratic governance. Unfortunately there are many 
Islamic groups that aspire to have their "Iranian revolution," each more than 
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willing to use ultra-violent means to achieve their desired objectives. 
C. HOLY TERROR 
Bruce Hoffman writes: 
What is particularly striking about "holy terror" compared to purely 
"secular terror'' .. .is the radically different value systems, 
mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, 
and Manichean world view that the "holy terrorist" embraces. For 
the religious terrorist, violence first and foremost is a sacramental 
act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological 
demand or imperative ... indiscriminate violence ... (is) not only 
morally justified, but is a necessary expedient for the attainment of 
their goals. 259 
The relationship between terrorism and religion is neither new or unique. 
David C. Rapoport notes that through the nineteenth-century, the only 
acceptable justification for the use of terrorist violence was grounded in 
religion. 260 Eventually religious terrorism was overshadowed by acts emanating 
from notions of ethno-nationalism, and political based ideologies. Relevant 
examples include the Russian nihilists movement of the 1880's; the Irish 
nationalisUseparatist movement of this century; and the "left wing" urban 
terrorism found in Europe and the U.S. in the 1970's and 1980's. 
Though overshadowed by secular ideologies of the twentieth century, 
terrorism based in a religious imperative never truly disappeared. In fact acts of 
religious terrorism occurring daily in Egypt, Algeria, Pakistan, and India seem to 
259 Bruce Hoffman, Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated By A 
Religious Imperative, 2. 
260 David C. Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious 
Traditions," American Political Science Review, v. 78, n. 3, (September 1984), 659. 
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indicate that a "renaissance" of sorts is emerging whereby religious-political 
terrorism is once again taking the forefront, supplanting secular- political 
terrorism that has dominated the phenomenon since the mid-nineteenth century. 
This is especially evident to the observer who analyzes the radical Islamic 
revivalist's view of the world and the role Allah commands them to play in it. 
1. Holy Terror and the Islamic Revivalist 
Esposito argues that, in the strict sense, an Islamic Fundamentalist 
includes all those practicing Muslims who accept the Quran as the literal word of 
God and who attempt to emulate the examples set by the Prophet Muhammad. 
In fact all Muslims are encouraged to do this. 261 He notes that the word 
''fundamentalist" is actually a twentieth-century creation used to describe those 
Christians that advocate a literal interpretation of the Bible. These "literal 
interpretivest" are further type cast as static, retrogressive or in some cases 
extremists. Often this concept is mis-used by a Western world trying to explain 
the behavior of various Islamic oriented states such as Libya, Syria, Sudan, Iraq, 
and Iran. These states all differ sharply in how they incorporate and apply Islam 
to their respective religiopoliticalsocial order and are far from being religious 
fundamentalists. A more befitting label would be that of Islamic revivalists, 
particularly in the case of the Iranian Revolution wherein a close analysis of its 
leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini, reveals a man pressing home socioeconomic 
grievances, and radical wealth redistribution plans that smack more of theocratic 
261 Esposito, 7. 
163 
dominated socialism rather than a religious fundamentalism. 262 Truly this is not 
surprising as Islam is a synergistic combination of religious, politicat and social 
systems. The problematic issue that emerges from the Islamic revivalist world 
starts with a notion described by Shaikh Hassan ai-Banna. Shaikh Hassan, 
lauded as the founder and Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
circa 1930, said: 
It is the nature of Islam to dominate, not to be dominated, to impose its 
law on all nations and to extend its power to the entire planet. 263 
To the Islamic revivalists clinging to interpretations made by radical 
Islamic clerics, God demands that the world be purged of the unclean infidels 
through conversion or elimination. This on-going effort concludes only when a 
world Islamic order has been established. In this endeavor terrorism, sanctioned 
by religious interpretation, becomes a legitimate means to an end. This gives 
rise to the concept Amir Taheri calls "Holy Terror." Islamic revivalist movements 
that support spreading the rule of Islam through the use of Holy Terror, do so 
based on interpretations provided by respected religious clerics. Examples of 
such interpretations are evident in most of the literature published on the 
subject. Ayatollah Muhammad Baqur-al Sadr stated that: 
The world as it is today is how (the infidels) shaped it. We (therefore) 
have two choices: either to accept it with submission which means letting 
262 Ervand Abrahamain, Khomeinism: Essays On The Islamic Republic, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1993), 1-88. 
263 Amir Taheri, 1. 
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Islam die, or to destroy it so we can construct the world Islam requires. 264 
Another revivalist, Mostaf Chamran suggests that "(Muslims) are not fighting 
within the rules of the world as it exists today, we reject all those rules. "265 
Further, Hussein Mussavi, a leader in the Lebanese revivalist movement, 
suggests that: 
We are not fighting so that the enemy recognizes us and offers us 
something. We are fighting to wipe out the enemy ... what is demanded is 
not even negotiated surrender, but the enemies total annihilation.266 
For the Islamic revivalist, terrorism is conducted as a function of Holy War 
or Jihad. This concept forms a basis of a theory for individual behavior and 
state policy that suggests the duty of every believer is to convert or kill the 
enemies of Allah. Ayatollah Fazi-AIIah Mahalati sums this up opining that: 
An Islamic State is the sum total of such individual believers. An Islamic 
State is a State of War until the whole world sees and accepts the light of 
the True Faith.267 
Finally Shaikh Hassan ai-Banna adds that "The dagger, the poison, the 
revolver ... these are the weapons of Islam against its enemies. "268 
For the Islamic terrorist, violence is a divine duty. Where the use of 
indiscriminate violence is shunned by the secular terrorist as counterproductive, 
264 Ibid., 15. 
265 Ibid., 15. 
266 Ibid., 16. 
267 Ibid., 16. 
268 Ibid., 18. 
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the Islamic terrorist sees this violence as justified and necessary in their crusade 
to convert or destroy the infidel. As such the Islamic terrorist conducts violent 
acts for no audience but themselves, and God. Hoffman notes that: 
The absence of a constituency, combined with an extreme sense of 
alienation, means that such terrorist can justify almost limitless violence 
against virtually any target, e.g., anyone who is not a member of their 
religious sect. 269 
At a minimum, the rhetoric employed by radical Islamic revivalist suggests 
they are more than capable of committing ultra-violent acts. Indeed, events 
occurring in locations throughout the world confirm this assertion.270 
This next case examines the group of Islamic radicals held responsible for 
the February 26, 1993 bombing of New York City's World Trade Center complex. 
Steve Emerson notes that those involved with the bombing had ties to known 
Islamic terrorist organizations to include the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and 
Hamas; the Sudanese National Islamic Front; the Pakistan based ai-Fuqra 
(black Islamic group); and the Egyptian based ai-Gama's al-lslamiyya.271 
Journalistic accounts of the bombing and subsequent investigations indicate that 
the group received support from a number of sources to include Sudanese 
diplomats who aided them with money, access to the building and credentials. 
269 Hoffman, Holy Terror: The Implication of Terrorism Motivated By A Religious 
Imperative, 3. 
270 In a fourteen-day period between 15-29 July, 1996, Islamic related terrorism 
resulted in the death or injury of at least 103 people. See Newspage Direct internet 
news source and reference archive. 
271 Emerson, "The Other Fundamentalists." 
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Emerson suggests that the group came together as a diaspora here in the U.S., 
facing a common enemy: Westerners and their values. Shaikh Omar Abdul 
Rahman, an Egyptian dissident Sunni cleric living in the United States, provided 
this diaspora of Islamic radicals the spiritual direction and legitimacy they 
needed to engage in this act of holy terror, an act that resulted· in the death of six 
and injury of over one thousand. 
D. "THE JIHAD ORGANIZATION" 
The story of the February World Trade Center Bombing in New York is an 
incredible mosaic of Islamic militant networks and affiliations. The majority of 
information used in this narrative comes from press accounts of U.S. Justice 
Department efforts to track down, arrest, and prosecute the perpetrators. The 
relevance of this particular case lies in two areas. First, cyanide was alleged to 
have been incorporated in the bomb that damaged the World Trade Center.272 
This assertion is verified through press accounts of court proceedings 
documenting the sentencing of the defendants. Second, the investigation of 
those involved with this vicious act suggests some rogue state involvement e.g., 
Iraq, Iran, and Sudan. 
The group was assigned the name "Jihad Organization" by federal 
prosecutors who alleged they were conspiring to wage "holy war" against the 
United States.273 Unraveling the complex details of this case has been a 
272 Tom Post, "Doomsday Cults: 'Only the Beginning,'" Newsweek, March 29, 
1995, 40. Also Laurie Mylroie, "The World Trade Center Bomb," The National Interest, 
winter 1995/96, 3. 
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monumental effort primarily because the decisions and actions that culminated 
with the actual bombing were never linear, e.g., various disconnected events 
occurred, at times simultaneously, that eventually merged in the form of the 
Jihad Organization. It was not until this merger occurred that plans were made 
to attack the World Trade Center. In a simplistic overview this ·group came 
together as a result of individuals who shared certain frustrations and anger at 
the United States for: 
o Imprisoning EI-Sayyid Nosair, convicted for his part in the 
assassination of the radical rabbi Meir Kahane. 
o Supporting the State of Israel. 
o Supporting Hosni Mubarak's secular administration in Egypt. 
Early in 1992, the Jihad Organization made the decision to conduct 
terrorist acts as part of Jihad against the U.S .. Of note, most of the group's 
members belonged to the mosque were Shaikh Rahman frequently spoke his 
radical orations. Rahman provided spiritual guidance as the group's ideological 
leader, sanctioning their plans to commit urban terrorism (Jihad) in an effort to 
force U.S. policy changes toward Egypt and lsrael.274 
During the Jihad Organizations initial terrorist campaign planning phase, 
two individuals, Abdul Rahman Yasin, and Ramzi Yousef, arrived from Iraq and 
273 Steven Emerson, "Sunday Focus: The Trial We Should Be Watching" 
Newsday, July 7, 1995, A37. 
A23. 
274 Peg Tyre, "Sheik Called Backer in U.S. Terror," Newsday, February 2, 1995, 
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quickly became members of the group. Yousef is alleged to have assumed a 
position as the group's "operationalleader."275 As the "operations boss," Yousef 
was the one who selected the targets of "holy terror." He is lauded as having 
developed the plan to attack the World Trade Center, providing the money and 
technical skill to manufacture the improvised explosive device used in the 
bombing.276 laurie Mylroie suggests that Yasin and Yousef were professional 
terrorists operating under the direction of Saddam Hussein. She provides a 
circumstantial argument that suggests Yasin and Yousef were sent specifically 
to manipulate this group and focus their efforts, efforts that culminated in the 
attack against the World Trade Center complex on the second anniversary of the 
ending of the Gulf War. In a recent BBC news broadcast Hoffman suggests that 
manipulation of amateur terrorists by more professional, seasoned veterans, 
may be a developing trend.277 This case study is explained through a narrative 
of the personalities involved and the role each is alleged to have played in the 
World Trade Center complex bombing. Table 5-1 lists the conspirators in this 
American tragedy. 
275 John Goldman and Ronald J. Ostrow, "Iraqi is Nabbed in Pakistan and 
Returned to U.S. After a 2-Year Manhunt," los Angeles Times, February 9, 1995, A1. 
276 Ibid., A 1. Also see Mylroie, 3. 
277 BBC interview with Bruce Hoffman, Ph.D. and senior lecturer at St. Andrews 
College, Scotland, NPR, May 26, 1996. 
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Jihad Organization: "World Trade Center Bombing Conspirators and Co-
Conspirators" 
Shaikh Omar Abdei-Rahman: Spiritual Guide for ai-Gama'a al-lslamiyya, 
Gahid ai-Gadid and other radical lslamist movements. Provided the Jihad 
Organization with the "religious license" to conduct the bombing. 
El-5ayyid Nosair: The original leader of the "Jihad Organization." Jailed in 
Attica prison for the murder of extremist rabbi Meir Kahane, Nosair originally 
planned to direct a "minor" campaign of terror against those responsible for 
his incarceration. 
Mohammad Salameh: Impressionable Palestinian living illegally in New York. 
Reported to have been the driver of the Ford van used to contain the bomb. 
Ramsi Yousef aka Abdul Basit: Iraqi agent or free-lancing Islamic terrorist? 
Lauded as the "brains" behind the bombing. 
Abdul Rahman Yasin: Likely Iraqi agent. Yasin taught Salameh how to drive 
the van and assisted in mixing chemicals for the bomb used in the attack. 
Last reported living in Baghdad with his father. 
Ibrahim Elgabrouny: Nosair's cousin. Planned to break Nosair out of prison 
and assist his getaway to Nicaragua. 
Nidal Ayyad: Naturalized U.S. citizen of Palestinian heritage. A chemical 
engineer by education and profession, Ayyad helped to manufacture the 
bomb. He also assisted Nosair in the assassination of rabbi Kahane. 
Mahmud Abouhalima: Hamas operative? Egyptian born German citizen. 
Abouhalima worked for Shaikh Rahman and helped build the bomb. 
Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq Ali: Member of the Sudanese diplomatic mission. He 
aided the group in the greater plan (never realized) to bomb New York City 
infrastructure and the U.N. 
Mohammed Saleh: Owned a gas station in Yonkers. Provided diesel fuel for 
manufacture of the bomb. 
Osama ibn Laden: Wealthy Saudi dissident known for funding Islamic 
terrorist groups. 
Emad Salem: Former Egyptian Army colonel. One of Shaikh Rahman's 
security aids. Also an FBI informant and intelligence source for Egyptian 
military police. 
Table 5-1 "Jihad Organization" 
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1. Shaikh Omar AbdelwRahman 
Shaikh Omar Abdei-Rahman is lauded as the spiritual guide of the 
Egyptian ai-Gama'a al-lslamiyya, better known as the "Islamic Group." He was 
born in the village of ai-Jamallaya, north of Cairo. At 1 0 months he lost his 
eyesight because of diabetes. At age 5 years he had learned to read braille and 
is said to have memorized the Quran by age 11.278 Emerging in the 1960s as a 
dissident Sunni cleric (having earned a doctorate in Islamic theology from AI 
Azhar University in Cairo), his radical calls for an Islamic state led to accusations 
that he played a role in the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. Specifically 
he was accused of providing a religious edict (fatwa) for the assassination plan, 
though he was acquitted of the charge in 1984.279 In 1989 he was again under 
indictment by Egyptian authorities, this time for allegedly inciting a riot at Fayom 
Oasis. Acquitted of this charge he was held under house arrest until he secretly 
left Egypt for the U.S. via Khartoum, Sudan in 1990.280 
During the Mujahideen insurgency against Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan, Shaikh Rahman was alleged to have been influential in assisting 
CIA efforts to aid the Mujahideen Freedom Fighters. 281 For this "assistance," he 
278 Jeanne King, "Profile of Sheik Omar Abdei-Rahman," Reuters Oct 1, 1995. 
279 Ira Robbins, "Sheik's Side Witness Lies Won't Sway Jury," Newsday, March 
11, 1995, A3. 
280 Ibid., A3. 
281 Shaikh Rahman was alleged to have met rabbi Kahane's assassin, EI-
Sayyad Nosair, in Afghanistan in 1988. At the time Nosair was facilitating the 
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was able to obtain a tourist visa through the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, 
which permitted him to immigrate to the U.S .. 282 In April of 1991, the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service granted him a permanent resident visa as a religious 
leader. 283 EI-Sayyid Nosair is said to have been instrumental in this effort. 
Mustafa Shalabi, the head of an Afghan relief/refugee center iri Brooklyn kno'Nn 
as .. Aikifah .. , or the .. Brooklyn Jihad Office," is said to also have helped in this 
matter.284 
Arriving in the United States from Sudan via Pakistan in July of 1990, 
Shaikh Rahman began preaching at Brooklyn mosques. As the recognized 
spiritual guide of ai-Gama'a al-lslamiyya, Shaikh Rahman also began to appear 
at Islamic conferences throughout the United States at the invitation of various 
mosques and lslamist charitable and religious organizations. 285 During a 1991 
Mujahideen insurgency by providing recruits from Islamic groups in the U.S., ostensibly 
with the support of the CIA Robert Cleare (cover name), a former CIA officer assigned 
to the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, is alleged to have been involved in the 
inappropriate issuance of visas to certain Sudanese. Similar irregularities resulted in 
Shaikh Rahman receiving his visa, though Cleare was not held responsible for this; see 
James Risen, "Case of Spy in Anti-Terrorist Mission Points Up CIA's Perils," Los 
Angeles Times, February 11, 1996, A 1. 
282 L, Roberts, "Secret Tapes Key in U.S. Case Against Sheik," Los Angeles 
Times, January 8, 1995. A1 
283 
"After Bombing, New Scrutiny for Holes in Immigration Net," New York Times, 
March 12, 1993. 
284 Peg Tyre, "Bomber's Song FBI Makes Prison Calls for Testimony About 
Sheik," Newsday. March 27, 1995. A07 
285 Emerson, "Sunday Focus: The Trial We Should be Watching," A37. 
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lecture given in Los Angeles, he is quoted as telling followers "we have to be 
terrorists. "286 
It was through Alkifah that Shaikh Rahman was able to sustain himself. 
Even after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the organization 
continued to collect thousands of dollars in donations for Afghan relief efforts, 
dollars that Rahman allegedly used for himself. Clashes between Rahman and 
Shalabi over use of Alkifah funds resulted in a major falling out between the two 
shortly after Shaikh Rahman's arrival. Concurrently, Nosair split from Rahman, 
believing that the Shaikh was incapable of being a strong leader due to his 
blindness and diabetes. On November 5, 1990 Nosair is alleged to have killed 
rabbi Kahane. One year later Nosair was convicted of lesser charges connected 
with the murder and sent to Attica Prison.287 In May of 1991, Shalabi was found 
murdered in his Brooklyn apartment. 288 After Shalabi's death Shaikh Rahman 
established a new group, among them friends of the incarcerated Nosair. In fact 
the Abu Bar mosque, through which Rahman gave regular sermons, offered 
regularly scheduled bus trips (cost: $45.00) to visit "Brother El Sayyid Nosair."289 
Further, while Nosair serves his time in prison, Rahman is said to be providing 
286 Roberts, A1. 
287 Mylroie, 8. 
288 Tyre, "Bomber's Song FBI Makes Prison Calls for Testimony About Sheik" 
289 
"Islamic Extremists and the Terrorist Threat to America," report, Anti-
Defamation-League, New York, 1993. 
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financial support for his family. As alleged by Federal prosecutors, Shaikh 
Rahman is: 
... the spiritual leader of an organization of 'radical Islamic extremists' 
with members in California, New York, New Jersey, Texas, Michigan and 
other states. Abdel Rahman directed that all members should prepare 
for jihad, or holy war, against the West through paramilitary training for 
terrorist acts. 290 
· 
In support of this allegation Abdo Haggag, Shaikh Rahman's former aid, stated 
that when he asked the Shaikh if the group should carry out the (WTC) bombing 
the Shaikh said: 
Depend on God ... To carry out this operation does not require a fatwah (a 
religious opinion). You are already in training. Go ahead and do it. 291 
For providing the religious inspiration to the Jihad Organization and 
suggesting that violent means to ends (concept referred to as "niy'ya") was 
legitimate in the eyes of Allah, Shaikh Rahman is now serving a life sentence. 
Elucidating a perfect example of the Islamic use of dissimulation, 292 Rhaman 
said of his arrest in 1993: 
The American media has misinterpreted the concept of 'jihad,' ... it means 
building themselves economically, and not accepting welfare. It also 
means to help their Muslim brothers financially and help them liberate 
their occupied lands, like in Bosnia, Palestine, and south Sudan. I don't 
understand why America refers to one's fighting to liberate his occupied 
290 Roberts, A 1. Also recall that for the Islamic revivalist, terrorism is conducted 
as a function of holy war, forming a basis of a theory for individual behavior that 
suggests the duty of every believer is to convert or kill the enemies of Allah. 
291 Peg Tyre, "Sheik's Sermon's Haunt Him," Newsday. July, 3, 1995, A08 
292 Dissimulation is an accepted form of lying to protect ones self when serving 
the will of Allah. See Taheri, 32. 
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land as terrorism.293 
As part of the conspiracy charges Shaikh Rahman was also convicted 
for planning a 1993 assassination attempt against the Egyptian President, Hosni 
Mubarak. As an interesting side note, in 1993 an Egyptian court sentenced 
Shaikh Rahman to 7 years (in absentia) for inciting the Fayom Oasis riot. 
2. EI-Sayyid Nosair 
Accounts of EI-Sayyid Nosair's background and family ties are sketchy. 
He was born in Egypt in 1956. He eventually immigrated to the United States 
and received his citizenship in 1989 while being employed by the City of New 
York as a maintenance worker. In the mid-80's he is alleged to have worked 
with the CIA to provide Islamic (expatriate) volunteers to fight with the 
Mujahideen against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This effort was most 
likely linked to his work with Alkifah (The Brooklyn Jihad Organization). 
Court testimony indicates that Nosair received paramilitary training in the 
use of small arms and manufacture of improvised explosive devices through a 
U.S. Army's Special Forces training program designed to teach these skills to 
Mujahideen Freedom Fighters. 294 Further court testimony indicated that Nosair 
293 Robbins, A3. 
294 Tyre, "Bomber's Song FBI makes Prison Calls for Testimony About Sheik," 
A07. Nosair is also said to have met with Sheik Abdul Aziz Odeh, the spiritual 
leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Odeh reportedly entered the U.S. by 
slipping passed INS officials unaware of his political identity. He is suggested to 
have been actively involved with those who conducted the WTC bombing and 
remains an un-indicted co-conspirator, see Steven Emerson, "The Other 
Fundamentalists." 
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met Shaikh Rahman in Afghanistan in 1988. Later he assisted Shaikh Rahman 
by securing him a tourist visa through CIA contacts working out of the U.S. 
Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan in 1990. As earlier discussed, Nosair broke with 
Shaikh Rahman shortly after the latter's arrival in New York. He than formed a 
new group which included many of those convicted for the World Trade Center 
bombing. 
On November 5, 1990, Nosair, with the assistance of at least Clement 
Rodney El, Mohammad Salameh, and Nidal Ayyad, assassinated rabbi Meir 
Kahane in a mid-town Manhattan hotel.295 Nosair was eventually arrested and 
tried in New York State Court for the murder of rabbi Kahane in 1991. He was 
actually acquitted of the murder proper but convicted on Jesser related weapon 
and assault charges. For this crime Nosair was awarded a 7-22 year sentence 
and sent to Attica Prison. In prison he was often visited by members of the Abu 
Bar mosque congregation and family relatives, to include his cousin Ibrahim El-
. Gabrouny. He also kept in contact with Shaikh Rahman. During these visits 
Nosair made plans to wage a terrorist campaign against those involved with 
sentencing him to Attica, notably the judge who presided over his trial, and a 
Brooklyn assemblymen. 296 
In September of 1992, Ramzi Yousef arrived in New York from Karachi. 
295 J.J. Goldman and R.L. Jackson, "Sheik, 9 Others Guilty in N.Y. Terrorism 
Plot," Los Angeles Times, October 2, 1995, A1. 
296 Mylroie, 8. 
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A short time later Abdul Rahman Yasin arrived from Iraq. Both moved in with 
Yasin's older brother Musab Yasin and eventually connected with Nosair's group 
of "would be terrorists" through the mosque. Under Yousefs influence, Nosair's 
plans to wage a small scale terrorist campaign against specific personalities and 
Jewish targets quickly escalated to include: {1) the World Trade Center; {2) 
United Nations; (3) the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels (two tunnels linking New 
York and New Jersey); and (4) the Manhattan Field office of the FBI. 297 
Though incarcerated in Attica prison during the bombing of the World 
Trade Center, Nosair was charged as a conspirator in the crime. He was also 
retried for the murder of rabbi Kahane. This time federal prosecutors used the 
testimony of a physician who treated Nosair after the shooting,_ but who could not 
testify in the State Court trial. During the trial, Dr. Craig Nunn described asking 
Nosair "how could a nice man like you shoot someone," to which Nosair replied 
"I had no choice, it was my duty."298 For his part in the conspiracy and the 
murder of rabbi Kahane, El Sayyid Nosair was sentenced to life in prison without 
possibility of parole. 
3. Mohammad Salameh 
Mohammad Salameh was born in the West Bank town of Bidya. As a 26 
-year old Palestinian of Jordanian citizenship, he came to the U.S. on a six-
297 Ibid., also see John J. Goldman and Robin Wright, "N.Y. Police Act to Avert 
New Terrorist Attacks," Los Angeles Times, February 15, 1995, A 1. 
298 Tyre, "Sheik's Sermons Haunt Him," A08. 
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month tourist visa in 1988.299 He was said to have applied to stay in the U.S. 
under two amnesty programs, both of which were denied. Despite this, he 
stayed in the U.S. as an illegal alien. Salameh was reported be an active 
member of the AI Salam Mosque in Jersey City, (the same mosque frequented 
by Nosair) where Shaikh Rahman often spoke his fiery rhetoric: Through this 
connection he was recruited into Nosairs plots to wage a small scale terrorist 
campaign. According to Mylroie's research, Salameh comes from a long line of 
terrorists on his mothers side. 
His maternal grandfather fought in the 1936 Arab revolt against British 
rule in Palestine, and even as an old man joined the PLO and managed 
to get himself jailed by the Israeli's. A maternal uncle was arrested in 
1968 for terrorism and served eighteen years in an Israeli prison before 
he was released and deported, making his way to Baghdad where he 
became number two in the "Western Sector," a PLO terrorist unit under 
Iraqi influence ... on June 10, (1992) soon after being recruited into 
Nosair's plot Salameh made the first of forty six calls to his terrorist uncle 
in Baghdad. 300 
Mylroie speculates that Salameh was excited about the prospect of 
conducting Jihad in America and discussed Nosairs plans with his uncle. 
Phone bills for the forty-six calls Salameh made to his uncle in Baghdad 
exceeded $4000.00. Mylroie further suggests that Iraqi intelligence intercepted 
these calls and then formulated a plan to infiltrate Yasin and Yousef into 
Nosair's group. 
299 John Dillin,"Terrorist Incidents in the US Raise Immigration Concerns," The 
Christian Science Monitor, March 3, 1993. 
300 Mylroie., 8. 
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Salameh's role in the World Trade Center bombing was small. It was 
Salameh who rented the Ford Rider van used to contain and deliver the bomb. 
After the attack against the World Trade Center, Salameh, Yousef, and Eyyad 
Ismail drove to John F. Kennedy airport whereupon the latter two departed the 
country. Salameh attempted to follow suite, having in his possession an infant 
seat ticket for Amsterdam aboard Jordanian Air flight 262. The infant ticket had 
cost him $65.00 and was used to secure a Dutch visa. However when Salameh 
attempted to use the ticket he was refused passage. Left by Yousef with no 
money, Salameh attempted to recover the deposit he put down on the Rider 
rental van that he might use it to purchase an adult ticket for his escape. 
Informing the Rider rental agency that the van had been stolen, Salameh's 
multiple attempts to recover the money actually aided in his March 4, 1993 
arrest. 
4. Ramzi Yousef aka "Abdul Basit Mahmoud Abdul Karim 
Baluchi" 
Where Shaikh Rahman is lauded as the spiritual guide for the Jihad 
Organization, Ramzi Yousef is characterized as the group's "operational 
commander, and the brains behind the World Trade Center bombing." Yousef 
has also been cast as the "Carlos of the 90's" allegedly responsible for setting 
up Islamic terrorist cells in Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and 
the United States. In addition to being charged with the World Trade Center 
bombing, he has been indicted for the December 1, 1994 bombing of a Manila 
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theater; the December 11, 1994 bombing of a Philippine airliner in which a 
Japanese national was killed; planning to conduct a massive bombing campaign 
against U.S. airliners; and planning to assassinate Pope John Paul II. Yousef 
has also been accused of attempting to assassinate Pakistani Prime Minister 
Benazir Bhutto in a bombing incident which occurred in 1993.391 Following his 
arrest and return to New York, Yousef is noted as saying that the twin towers of 
the World Trade Center would not be still standing " ... if I'd had better help."302 
Mylroie provides a credible argument that typecasts Yousef as an "Iraqi 
agent" who, at the direction of Iraqi intelligence, penetrated and then took 
command of the Jihad Organization. Once in control of the group he steered 
them away from Nosair's limited scope objectives, focusing on _a much larger 
terrorist campaign ostensibly as revenge for the losses Iraq suffered during the 
Gulf War. 303 Though cautious in support of Mylroie's suggestion, my own 
research leads me to believe that Yousefwas employed by Iraq as a "free-lance 
operative," and another individual, Abdal Rahman Yasin, was the Iraqi 
intelligence agent. 
In public statements Yousef has said that he came to the United States 
301 John Thor-Dahlburg, "Bhutto Says Trade Center Suspect Also Targeted 
Her," Los Angeles Times, March 19, 1995, A4. Also see Pamela Mendels, "Arab Linked 
To Anti-Terrorist Network," Newsday, March 17, 1995, A12. 
302 Robin Wright, "First of 2 Trials To Open For Key N.Y. Blast Figure," Los 
Angeles Times, May 12, 1996, A12. 
303 Mylroie, 4. Note that the bombing coincides with the second anniversary of 
the end of the ground war offensive against Iraq. 
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on his own as a member of a group he calls "Liberation Fifth Battalion." He 
admits that he came to the United States to "pick targets" and intended to return 
to Pakistan to raise money to buy bomb making materials. 304 Instead, he says 
he met Mahmud Abouhalima and Mohammad Salameh and eventually joined in 
their conspiracy to wage a terror campaign in New York. What is actually known 
about Yousef is in contradiction to his assertion. 
Ramzi Yousef is reported to be Abdul Basit Mahmoud Abdul Karim 
(Baluchi) who's family originated in the Baluchistan region of Pakistan. Under 
this identity, Yousef aka Basit, was born in the Kuwait city of Fahaheel in 1968. 
His father was an emigrant from Baluchi Pakistan and worked for Kuwait 
Airlines. 305 Being a foreign "guest worker" Yousefs family was_ denied Kuwait 
citizenship and the subsequent benefits citizenship brings. As the oil boom of 
the 70's and 80's increased the wealth of Kuwait, it also increased the visible 
economic gap between Kuwait citizens and guest workers. This disparity 
certainly played a part in fueling animosities toward the wealthier Kuwaiti's. 
Fahaheel, being a Kuwait City suburb and home to many Palestinians and guest 
workers, was (is still) a hotbed for the fomenting of Palestinian nationalism and 
Islamic revivalism. 
Yousef is said to have developed his radical roots in this environment 
304 Peg Tyre, "Yousef Denies Role By Sheik In Terror Plot," Newsday. June 22, 
1995, A06. 
305 Robin Wright, "First of 2 Trials To Open For Key N.Y. Blast Figure," Los 
Angeles Times, May 12, 1996, A 12. 
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propelled less by Islamic piety then by bitterness and rage. 306 Mylroie supports 
this as her investigations show that Yousef was certainly no "fundamentalist" 
having a Filipina girlfriend and enjoying the "raucous night life in Manila. 307 In 
any event, Yousef fine tuned his radicalism and rage as a participant in the CIA 
financed Mujahideen fight against Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. As a 
freedom fighter, Yousef is alleged to have received training in the manufacture 
of explosives, possibly with the assistance of U.S. foreign internal defense 
training programs conducted in Pakistan or Afghanistan. 308 
In 1989, Yousef (as Basit) received a two year-degree in computer aided 
electronic engineering from the Swansea Institute in Wales. Faculty members 
do not recall Yousef being militant or even interested in the Islamic religion. 
Following graduation he returned to Kuwait where he worked in the planning 
ministry.309 During the six month Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, Yousef is alleged to 
have collaborated and worked with the Iraqi invasion force, although Kuwaiti 
officials refuse to specify the nature of his activities. 310 
306 Ibid., A12. 
307 Mylroie, 1 0. 
308 Steve Wick, "Terrorism Evidence Destroyed FBI, CIA Point Fingers On 
Erasure Of Computer Disks," Newsday April16, 1995, A03. Also see Priti Yelaga, 
"Worldwide Terror Plot Targeted 20 U.S. Jet Flights," Newsday, April14, 1995, A03. 
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Mylroie contends that during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, Iraqi 
intelligence operatives took the opportunity to remove personal files from the 
central population registry in order to create identities for their agents. She 
suggests that Iraqi intelligence gave Yousef Basit's identity papers in order that 
they might effectively use him at a later date. Of note, the Pakistani Embassy in 
Kuwait which was closed during the Gulf War and conceivably ransacked by 
Iraqi intelligence, reported that all files related to Abdul Bas it and his family were 
missing.311 
In early 1991, Yousef turned up in the Philippines where he joined a 
Filipino Islamic terrorist group known as Abu Sayyaf. 312 Under the nickname "the 
chemist" he established ties with Abdurajak Abubaker Janjalani aka Abu Sayyaf. 
Janjalani is reported to be a former Afghan freedom fighter. Yousefs link up with 
Janjalani suggests that a loosely-knit, global network of Islamic terrorists exists, 
commonly connected as veterans and former comrades of the Mujahideen 
insurgency in Afghanistan.313 
Yousef, traveling under the name of Azam Mohammad, arrived in the 
United States from Pakistan on September 1, 1992. Not having a valid U.S. visa 
he bribed an immigration official ($2700.00) in Pakistan to let him on the flight. 
Upon arriving he was detained by U.S. immigration officials, whereupon he 
311 Mylroie, 12. 
312 Ibid., 12. 
313 Builta, 277. 
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immediately applied for political asylum. Yousef's request automatically invoked 
a right to a hearing and he was allowed to enter the country.314 Flying in 
company with Yousef was Ahmad Ajaj, a 29 year old Palestinian who attempted 
to enter the U.S. using a false Swedish passport. Ajaj was not so lucky. He was 
immediately arrested when he arrived at Kennedy Airport. A search of his 
luggage resulted in the discovery of a dozen bomb making manuals. Forensics 
analysis of the manuals following the Trade Center bombing showed two of them 
to have Yousef's finger prints on them. Yousef's prints also showed up in a 
storage locker in Jersey City, N.J. where the bomb making materials (including 
the cyanide) were stored. 
Arriving at John F. Kennedy Airport, Yousef was met by Abuohalima and 
Mohammad Salameh. They took him to stay with Musab Yasin, an Iraqi living in 
Jersey City. A short time later Abdul Rahman Yasin (Musab's younger brother) 
arrived from Iraq. Once comfortably established in the "land of the free," Yousef 
and Yasin penetrated the Jihad Organization and redirected the group's 
strategic plans to focus on a variety of targets starting with the World Trade 
Center. 
In mid-November, 1992, Yousef started to build the World Trade Center 
bomb as shown by phone bill records that show numerous calls to chemical 
companies, companies through which he purchased bomb making materials. 315 
314 J.J. Goldman and R.J. Ostrow, "Iraqi Is Nabbed In Pakistan And Returned To 
U.S. After 2-Year Manhunt," A1. 
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In January of 1993, Yousef and Salameh moved to a different Jersey City 
apartment where the actually built the bomb. On February 23, Salameh rented 
the Rider van used in the actual attack. On February 26th, members of the 
Jihad Organization which included at least Yousef, Salameh, Eyyad Ismail, and 
Abouhalima, stopped at a gas station, topped off the tank in the van and drove to 
the World Trade Center where the van/bomb was detonated shortly after noon. 
Yousef and Eyyad Ismail (a 21 year old Palestinian and driver of the van), were 
later driven to John F. Kennedy Airport by Salameh. Yousef escaped to 
Pakistan under a passport listing him as Basit. Ismail returned to his home in 
Jordan. 
In Pakistan, Yousef allegedly made an attempt on Bhutto's life in 
October of 1993.316 He than flew to the Philippines where he re-established his 
terrorist activities in conjunction with members of Abu Sayyaf (ASG). Once back 
in the Philippines, Ramsi Yousef wasted little time in planning his next campaign 
of terror. Members of ASG included a number of individuals from Yousefs past, 
Abdul Hakim Murad, a childhood friend; and Adel Anonn, believed to be 
Yousefs brother. 317 At least nine other members were Arabs having come to 
the Philippines from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan. Reports indicate that many 
of these individuals fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan. 318 Yousefs plans 
315 Ibid., A1. 
316 John-Thor Dahl burg, A4. 
317 Builta, 278. 
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for a new terrorist campaign were extremely aggressive. They included at least 
two separate operations. One operation involved plans to destroy eleven U.S. 
airliners in a single day; the other to assassinate Pope John Paulll.319 
As part of the work-up for the massive assault against U.S. airliners, 
Yousef and Murad conducted two terrorist operations. The first attack involved 
planting a bomb in a Manila movie theater on December 1, 1994. In a second 
attack, they planted a bomb on board Philippine Air flight 434 on December 11, 
1994. Unfortunately for a Japanese passenger, Hariku lkegumi, the bomb 
functioned as designed.320 However, time was running out for Yousef. 
On January 21, 1995, Murad was allegedly making nitroglycerin based 
explosives in the kitchen of their Manila apartment. Something went wrong and 
318 The connectivity between Islamic terrorists, all veterans of the Afghanistan 
War, has been noted by many. In an elucidating paper, a graduate degree candidate at 
the American University in Cairo suggests that ai-Gama'a al-lslamiyya has two wings, 
one operating from Afghanistan, the other operating from within Egypt. ''The Egyptian 
and Afghan factions differ in the level of sophistication displayed in their operations as 
the Afghan faction is thought to have received training in demolitions and small arms 
usage in Peshawar from the CIA during the Afghanistan War. After the successful 
conclusion of the war in Afghanistan, these trained veterans moved back to their 
countries of origin. They have become a destabilizing force in the Middle East, 
particularly Egypt, due to their dedication to the concept of Islamic governance and 
their willingness to risk all in pursuit of this goal. There is speculation by the Egyptian 
government and US terrorist experts that the so-called Afghan wing has splintered from 
Gama'a and formed Gihad ai-Gadid, a separate organization whose hierarchical 
structure seems to be based upon the order of battle of the Afghan resistance to the 
Soviet Invasion." See Wassim Absood, ''The Militant lslamist Threat To Egypt," (http://infomanage. com/nonproliferation.html.) 
319 
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a fire broke out. When authorities arrived to investigate the fire they found 
Murad still there. He was subsequently arrested by the Philippine police. A 
search of the premises resulted in a windfall intelligence break for authorities. 
Amongst the gallon jars of nitroglycerin, timing devices, and bomb making 
materials was a computer that contained files on Yousefs plans and activities.321 
The computer files contained a comprehensive data base that listed ASG's 
planned activities, names of ASG's members, and links to other terrorist 
networks worldwide. From these files it was determined that ASG had planned 
to kill the Pope; wage a campaign against U.S. airliners; assault the U.S. 
embassy in Manila; bomb CIA headquarters in Langley, VA using a "kamikaze" 
style attack with a small plane loaded with explosives; and assassinate the 
ambassadors of Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Spain. 322 Shortly after 
recovering these computer files, Philippine police started a massive effort to 
"roll-up" ASG members. Arrested individuals were reported to hold Pakistani, 
Sudanese, Iraqi, and Saudi passports. Meanwhile Yousef departed the 
Philippines, eventually arriving back in Pakistan. 
In Pakistan things did not bode well for Yousef. With a $2 million dollar 
price tag on his head, a disaffected member of Yousefs Pakistani cadre turning 
him in. lstiaq Parker, a South African Muslim, notified Pakistani authorities of 
321 Priti Yelaga., A03. 
322 Ibid., A03. See also Ruben Alabstro, "Philippines Vows To Protect Leaders 
From Islamic Militants, Reuters, January 10, 1996. 
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Yousefs location. Yousefwas arrested on February 7, 1994.323 Parker was said 
to have known Yousef since 1992. In debriefings with U.S. authorities he 
provided a comprehensive list of Yousefs contacts, sources of funding, training, 
and techniques. Of note, when Yousef was arrested investigators found three 
passports and two letters on him. The letters were to be sent to the Philippine 
government and articulated a threat to kill the Philippine president and poison 
the country's water supply unless Murad was released. One of the letters 
specifically claimed the: 
" ... ability to make and use chemicals and poison gas .. .for use against 
vital institutions, residential populations and the sources of drinking 
water."324 
Both Yousef and Murad where extradited to the United States where they were 
subsequently convicted for their crimes and terrorist activities in the fall of 1996. 
5. Abdul Rahman Yasin 
Mylroie's research indicates that Abdul Rahman Yasin was born in the 
U.S. although in 1992 he was living in Baghdad, presumably with his father. In 
June of 1992 he showed up in Amman, Jordan where he requested and 
received a U.S. passport based on his U.S. birth records. Shortly after Yousefs 
September, 1992, arrival in New York, Yasin arrived and they both moved in with 
Yasin's older brother Musab. Not much information exists concerning Yasin's 
323 Wright, "First of 2 trials To Open For Key N.Y. Blast Figure," A1. 
324 Dan Morrison, "Threats Found On Bomb Mastermind," Newsday. October 7, 
1995, A15. 
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role in the World Trade Center bombing other than he helped to "mix 
chemicals ... to produce explosive materials, including urea nitrate and 
nitroglycerine."325 During the sweep to locate Salameh, Yasin was actually 
picked up, interrogated and then released by the FBI. According to an affidavit, 
Yasin told investigators that he taught Salameh how to drive the rented Ford 
van. 326 Yasin departed the United States for Amsterdam on Jordanian Air flight 
262, March 5, 1993 (the same one that Salameh was supposed to be on) and 
eventually made his way back to Baghdad. In 1994 Yasin was spotted in 
Baghdad by an ABC "stringer. "327 Subsequent inquiries made of his neighbors 
suggested that Yasin was known to work for the Iraqi government. 
6. Ibrahim Elgabrouny 
Elgabrouny is Nosair's cousin. An Egyptian immigrant, he is reported to 
have been a civil engineer and President of Brooklyn's Abu-Bar Mosque where 
Shaikh Rahman often spoke. Cousin Elgabrouny is said to have been Nosair's 
information source while in Attica. Elgabrouny was charged as a conspirator 
and for planning to break Nosair out of prison. When he was arrested he was 
carrying false Nicaraguan passports and birth certificates that were to be used 
325 
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by Nosair and his family.328 
7. Nidal Ayyad 
Nidal Ayyad was a naturalized U.S. citizen of Palestinian heritage. A 
chemical engineer, he was convicted for providing expertise for the construction 
of the bomb. Ayyad was also a member of Nosair's hit team that killed rabbi 
Kahane though this information did not emerge until the World Trade Center 
bombing trial. During sentencing Judge Kevin T. Duffy reserved his harshest 
condemnation for Ayyad saying that "You are clearly the most culpable of the 
defendants. You had the breaks," referring to his college education and U.S. 
citizenship. 329 
8. Mahmud Abouhalima 
Mahmud Abouhalima is believed to have been part of a Hamas terrorist 
cell.330 As an Egyptian born German citizen, he was reported as have worked 
for Shaikh Rahman. 331 In conversations with prosecutors he stated that he 
became Rahman's personal assistant and driver through his association with 
Mustafa Shalabi (Brooklyn Jihad Office). Following Shalabi's death, Abouhalima 
328 Larry Yudelson, "Search For Suspects In N.Y. Bombing Prompts Reopening 
Of Kahane Case," Jewish Telegraphic Agency, March 17, 1993, 5. 
329 R.L. Jackson, "Islamic Militants Given Life Terms in N.Y. Bombing," Los 
Angeles Times, Wednesday, May 25, 1994, A 1. 
330 
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said that Shaikh Rahman offered him a leadership position in a new organization 
he was forming, an offer Abouhalima says he declined. Abouhalima was 
convicted for helping to construct the bomb and is alleged to have been the one 
that purchased gas to top off the Rider rental van used in the bombing. 332 
Following the bombing he fled to Egypt where he was subsequently arrested and 
extradited back to the U.S. 
9. Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq Ali 
Siddiq Ali was part of the Sudanese diplomatic mission to the U.N. He 
was said to have been Shaikh Rahman's body guard. He is also reported to 
have been working with representatives of an unnamed foreign government that 
provided the group assistance. This aid came in the form of surveillance and 
access to the U.N. garage, and the use of diplomatic license plates. These 
efforts linked him to the greater terrorist campaign planned by the Jihad 
Organization, a plan which called for attacks against the U.N., the Lincoln and 
Holland tunnels linking New York and New Jersey, the George Washington 
Bridge, and the Manhattan office of the FBI. 333 In court proceedings he also 
admitted to helping test the explosives used in the World Trade Center 
bombing.334 
332 Roberts, A 1. 
333 Goldman and Wright, "N.Y. Police Act To Avert New Terrorist Attacks," A1; 
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10. Mohammed Saleh 
Mohammad Saleh is a 39-year-old-Palestinian who emigrated form 
Jordan in 1978. He operated a gas station in suburban Yonkers and is said to 
have provided 255 gallons of diesel fuel for use in the manufacture of bombs. 
11. Other Conspirators 
Other conspirators convicted for their part in Yousefs planned terrorist 
campaign include Tariq AI-Hassan (Sudanese); Faris Khalaf Allah (Sudanese); 
Fadil Abdel Ghani (Sudanese); Matrawy Mohammed Salih (Egyptian); Victor 
Alvarez (Puerto Rican), and Eyyad Ismail who was extradited from Jordan.335 
12. Denmark Connection 
In November of 1993, three Egyptians living in Denmark were arrested in 
connection with the bombing. Mohammed Abdel Halim Mohammed Fahim, 
Mohammed Shaaban Mohammed Hassainein, and Abdei-Hakem Mohammed 
Atia Soliman were accused of purchasing chemicals and materials to 
manufacture bombs. In their 1996 trial, Danish prosecutors brought forth 
evidence that included maps, plans of targets, and U.S. addresses and phone 
numbers linking them to the Jihad Organization in the U.S.336 In statements 
made to the court, the defendants said that they were purchasing chemicals as 
335 
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part of an export business. Fingerprints of both Soliman and Hassanein were 
found on material carried by Ahmed Ajaj. 337 Despite what appeared to be a clear 
cut case, all three defendants were acquitted of the charges in spring of 1996. 
13. Funding Sources: Osama ibn Laden and Mohammad Jamal 
Khalifah 
Osama ibn Laden is best known for funding Arab volunteers to fight in 
Afghanistan during the 1980-1989 war against the Soviets. Western intelligence 
agencies have long suspected that Osama ibn Laden's large land holdings south 
of Khartoum are used as military training camps for Islamic fundamentalists, with 
the training at least partly supported by Iran. 338 In media reports he has been 
accused by Yemen, Egypt, and Algeria of financing terrorist subversion in those 
countries. 339 
Osama is one of twenty sons of Saudi construction magnate Muhammed 
ibn Laden. He joined the Afghan resistance movement following the December 
1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Osama gained prominence by financing 
recruitment, transportation and training of Arabs who volunteered to fight 
alongside the Afghan Mujahideen. In 1985, Osama organized the Islamic 
Salvation Foundation (ai-Qaida) specifically to facilitate support for the 
337 Peg Tyre, "Sheik's Lawyers Rocked by Evidence," Newsday, March 13, 
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Mujahideen. Drawing on his family's wealth, and through donations from 
businessman in the Gulf region, he set up recruitment centers and guest-houses 
in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and funded camps in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. Of note, Ramzi Yousef is reported to have lived for three years in a 
Peshwar, Pakistan guest house funded by Osama. 340 
In a State Department report, Osama is said to have relocated to Sudan 
in 1991. He reportedly formed close ties with the Islamic government, becoming 
involved with business and civil infrastructure projects. This report also charges 
that: 
o Islamic extremist responsible for the December 1992 attempted 
bombings against U.S. servicemen in Somalia claimed funding for 
their operations came from Osama ibn Laden. . 
o A joint Egyptian-Saudi investigation revealed in May of 1993 that 
Osama ibn Laden "business interests" helped funnel money to 
Egyptian extremists who used the cash to buy equipment, printing 
presses and weapons. 
o Osama ibn Laden finances at least three terrorist training camps 
in northern Sudan. 
o Is the key financier behind the "Kunar" camp in Afghanistan which 
provides paramilitary training to at-Jihad and ai-Gama'a al-
lslamiya members. Note that Shaikh Omar Abdel Rahman is the 
spiritual guide for ai-Gama'a al-lslamiyya. 
Osama's Saudi citizenship was stripped in 1994 for allegedly adopting 
attitudes and behavior "in contradiction to the interests of the Saudi kingdom. "341 
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According to a Reuters wire report, Osama left his Sudanese safe-haven in April 
of 1996, probably due to the increasing pressure negative World opinion has 
been placing on Sudan for supporting Islamic terrorist groups. 342 He has since 
re-emerged in Afghanistan where he is said to be under the protection of the 
radical Islamic Taliban militia.343 In a Washington Times news report, Osama is 
lauded as having taken credit for the bombings of U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia 
(November 1995, bombing in Riyad; the June 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers 
in Dharan).344 He has been typecast as "the major potential threat to U.S. forces 
in the Arabian Gulf region" according to Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional 
Research Service. 345 
As an interesting side note, Osama's brother-in-faw, Mohammad Jamal 
Khalifah, was known for funding Abu Sayyaf activities in the Philippines. Khalifah 
is afso a wealthy Saudi businessman reported to own a rattan factory in the 
Philippines. He lists his permanent residence as Khartoum, Sudan. Like his 
billionaire brother-in-law, Osama ibn Laden, Kalifah also has a history of funding 
Islamic extremist movements around the world.346 In 1994, Khalifah was 
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arrested by federal authorities in Morgan Hill, California on charges of falsifying 
his visa. He was last reported awaiting deportation proceedings because of his 
ties to terrorist groups and involvement in bombing attempts in Jordan.347 In a 
classified Philippine intelligence report Khalifah is said to have orchestrated the 
international support for many Islamic extremist operating in Iraq, Jordan, 
Turkey, Russia, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, Romania, Lebanon, Syria, 
Pakistan, Albania, the Netherlands and Morocco.348 
E. BOMBING OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER: "THE ACT AND THE 
DEVICE" 
Just past noon on 26 February, 1993, a massive explosion rocked the 
World Trade Center complex killing six people, injuring at least one thousand, 
and causing some $550 million dollars in damage. The investigation into the 
World Trade Center bombing, linked to the subsequent investigation of the 
greater Jihad Organization terrorist campaign conspiracy, revealed various 
levels of participation in the World Trade Center attack by all the individuals 
discussed. Reports concerning the conspirators suggest that the actual 
placement of the bomb/van in the World Trade Center basement parking lot was 
done by four men: Yousef, Salameh, Ismail, and Abouhalima. Manufacture of 
the bomb included at least Yousef, Yasin, Niyyad, Salameh, Abouhalima, and 
346 Builta, 278; see also Prudencio R. Europa "Saudi Trader Held In California 
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Siddig Ali. 
The device was said to contain approximately 1200 lbs of ammonium 
nitrate and fuel oil making a potent explosive commonly referred to as ANFO. 
ANFO is categorized as a slow detonating explosive that creates a large volume 
of gas and pressure. It is typically used in quarry operations as it is well suited 
for displacing large amounts of dirt and rock. It requires a high energy initiator 
such as TNT or dynamite in order to detonate, otherwise it just burns. In this 
case nitroglycerin and compressed hydrogen were use to initiate and enhance 
the ANFO main charge. 349 According to Judge Duffy who presided over the 
World Trade Center trial, cyanide was said to have been packed into the bomb 
to poison the area.350 Reports indicate that at least 500 grams (1 lb) of sodium 
cyanide was found in a locker used by the group to store bomb making 
materials.351 Fortunately the fireball from the ANFO device consumed this 
deadly chemical instead of dispersing it. Commenting on this case in a recent 
conference, Senator Sam Nunn suggested that this might very well have been 
the first act of WMD terrorism committed on U.S. soil. 352 
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F. ANALYSIS OF THE "JIHAD ORGANIZATION" 
Information indicating sodium cyanide was added to the device used in 
the World Trade Center bombing is rather obscure. As mentioned earlier, Judge 
Duffy addressed the cyanide component during the sentencing of Shaikh 
Rahman. David Kaplan notes the use of cyanide by the Jihad Organization in 
his concluding remarks regarding the case of Aum Shinrikyo. 353 Ron Purver's 
report adds strong circumstantial evidence that the chemical may have been 
placed in the device. Ramzi Yousefs letters to the Philippine government 
concerning the threat to use poison against Philippine water supplies provides 
additional circumstantial weight to the assertion that cyanide was indeed placed 
in the World Trade Center bomb. At a minimum Yousefs letter_ implies a 
knowledge of how to employ this lethal substance in a terrorist attack. 
Despite the circumstantial nature of the information concerning the 
inclusion of cyanide, the sheer size of the explosive device used (estimated at 
1200 lbs net explosive weight) is indicative of the group's intent to cause an 
ultra-violent event resulting in mass casualties and mass disruption. An analysis 
of the Jihad Organization using both the Structural Realist and The Synthetic 
Theory of Structural Realism and Organizational Process Models of Effective 
Demand indicates that a ripeness to threaten the use of WMD was evident prior 
to the bombing incident, though discerning this would have probably required 
353 David Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult At The End Of The World, 292. 
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·the penetration of the group by an agent provocateur. 354 
1. Structural Realist Model 
Act of revenge perpetrated by Ramzi Yousef at the direction of Saddam 
Hussein?, or part of a rational strategy envisioned by Shaikh Omar Abdel-
Rahman wherein the infidels of the West are rudely awakened to the power of 
radical Islam? Bombing the World Trade Center with this extremely large 
improvised explosive device could have been a logical choice in either event. 
Saddam Hussein had been humiliated and humbled by a multi-national coalition 
led by the U.S .. What better way to strike back (considering the weakness of 
Hussein's conventional capability) at the U.S. than through a terrorist attack 
using an improvised WMD, the use of Shaikh Rahman's "amateurs" providing 
the perfect cover for plausible denial! 
On balance, what better way to perpetuate Jihad than through the use of 
an exceedingly lethal device that kills thousands of infidels while increasing the 
tension between the West and Islam. By causing more friction, Shaikh Rahman 
virtually guaranteed the perpetuation of a Western myth that holds Islam 
synonymous with violence. This may have been part of a planned strategy to 
354 In fact there was an "agent" of sorts operating inside the Jihad Organization. 
Emad Salem, a retired Egyptian Army colonel, was said to have posed as Shaikh 
Rahman's security officer while operating as a paid informant by the FBI. Interestingly, 
Salem is said to have been ''fired" by the FBI before the bombing of the World Trade 
Center occurred, then re-recruited in exchange for $1 million dollars. He is also 
reported to have been passing information on Shaikh Rahman and the FBI 
investigation to Egyptian military police. See Peg Tyre, "Sheik Sought Slaughter," 
Newsday, January 1, 1995, A04. 
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preclude efforts of Islamic moderates to "integrate" their faith and religious 
practice into a peaceful co-existence with the multi-ethnic, multi-religious, 
environment found here in the U.S .. This act may also have represented an 
attempt to encourage radicalization of those Muslim's on the fringe of adopting 
extremist views. In this regard, the use of an improvised WMD. in a terrorist 
attack sends a message that radical Islam possesses a power great enough to 
balance against even the great Satan (U.S.), and that now is the time to join in 
Jihad. 
Both Yousef and Ayyad appeared to have the requisite knowledge and 
skill needed to produce a low-tech WMD. Structural facilitators inherent to U.S. 
society allowed the group to easily purchase materials and avoid detection 
(operating under a religious veneer is a great way to avoid the intrusiveness of 
U.S. law enforcement officials as it backs right up against rights protected under 
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). Financial resources and material 
access obviously were not a problem as evidenced by the group's ability to 
purchase the materials, chemicals, and hydrogen gas used to build the bomb. 
Viewed through the framework of the Structural Realist Model of 
Effective Demand, the Jihad Organization adopted a rational approach to 
overcome (internally balance) their inherent political and military weakness vis-
a-vis the U.S. e.g., they pursued the development and use of the power afforded 
by WMD, see Table 5-2. Though Structural Realism Theory certainly provides 
an answer regarding why the Jihad Organization would want WMD, it does not 
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explain how the Jihad Organization overcame those traditional constraints that 
have precluded other non-state groups from pursuing this course. As in the 
case of Aum, The Synthetic Theory of Structural Realism and Organizational 
Process seems to clarify the reasons behind the Jihad Organization's pursuit of 
a WMD capability. 
Attribute Set for Structural Realist Model of Effective Demand: Jihad 
Organization 
Demand Indicator Score .0 or 1.0 Supply Indicator Score .0 or 1.0 
Desire for power Group membership 
great enough to 1.0 knowledgeable of 1.0 
balance against WMD technical 
the "nation-state" requirements 
Group possesses 
financial resources 
to fund a WMD 1.0 
program 
Group has access 





Structural Realist Model 
Desire for Power x (Knowledgeable Membership x Funding x Access to 
Materials) = Effective Demand 
1. x (1. x 1. x 1.) = 1.0- no negative external influences= Effective 
Demand for WMD 
Table 5-2: Analysis of Jihad Organization: Structural Realist Model 
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2. The Synthetic Theory of Structural Realism and 
Organizational Process Model 
How is it that a non-state group (of amateurs no less) can choose to use 
WMD while other more competent and professional non-state groups refrain 
from even threatening the use of such weapons? The addition of cyanide to the 
bomb used in the World Trade center attack speaks for itself. However, it is 
conceivable that this may have been more of an "afterthought" as evidenced by 
the inept manner in which the cyanide was included. A better cyanide dispersal 
system could have been easily constructed, strategically located, and activated 
in concert with the explosive device. At a minimum, this system would have 
resulted in a large number of casualties all on its own. 355 In any event, 
examination of the Jihad Organization through the framework of the Synthetic 
Theory of Structural Realism and Organizational Process crystallizes the 
understanding of why this group chose to engage in WMD (albeit "to-tech") 
terrorism. 
a. Power to Balance Against the State 
Radical Islam, by its very nature, desires not just power to 
balance against it's enemies, but power to conquer them. As stated by Shaikh 
Hassan ai-Banna: 
It is the nature of Islam to dominate, not to be dominated, to impose its 
355 I will not describe the specifics concerning the exact construct of such a 
device for obvious reasons. 
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law on all nations and to extend its power to the entire planet. 356 
In this regard, Hans Morgenthau's theories of classical Realism( ultimate power) 
might be more appropriately applied to this case than the neo-Realism (power 
enough to balance) exposited by Kenneth Waltz. Indeed, the World Trade 
Center bombing surely represents an attempt by radical Islam to show the world 
it possessed a power great enough to compel, deter, or destroy an adversary. 
b. Leadership of the "Authoritarian Sociopath" 
Who was providing firm direction for the Jihad Organization? If 
one accepts the New York State prosecutors office position, Shaikh Omar Abdei-
Rahman was the man-in-charge. If one believes Laurie Mylroie's contentions, 
Ramzi Yousef was the master-mind behind the group's terrori~t campaign plans, 
tactical strategy and decision to use WMD. Not having the benefit of Dr. Post's 
assessment on these two individuals, I will provide an educated guess as to the 
nature of their personalities based on: (1) what is understood about this type of 
personality as addressed in Chapter II of this study; (2) what has been written 
about these two individuals. Hopefully this assessment will be accepted as 
something more than "lay psycho-analysis." 
Charismatic is not the typical first impression one thinks of when 
first exposed to Shaikh Rahman, authoritarian yes, charismatic no. However, an 
in-depth look at the man elucidates a radical, authoritarian, Islamic cleric that 
indeed commands a loyal following stretching from Egypt to Afghanistan, the 
356 Taheri, 1. 
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Philippines to the U.S .. Shaikh Rahman's appeal ostensibly flows not so much 
from what he initially projects, but from what he has done through his career as a 
radical, Sunni, cleric. From early on, he has vociferously opposed the secular 
government of Egypt, often inciting others to violence with his fiery, rhetorical 
calls for an Islamic theocracy to replace, first Sadat, and then Mubarak. Shaikh 
Rahman was also very much involved in mobilizing young Islamic militants to 
join the Mujahideen insurgency against the Soviets in Afghanistan. For his 
opposition to the Egyptian government and alleged involvement in the 
assassination of Sadat, Shaikh Rahman spent time residing in Egyptian prisons 
or under house arrest. For these things, he gained the respect and admiration 
of a rather robust following that includes members of the ai-Gama'a al-lslamiyya 
in Egypt, Gihad ai-Gadid in Afghanistan, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, and the 
American Islamic Society located in San Diego, California. 
Capitalizing on this "appeal," Rahman aggressively influenced 
others to commit ultra-violent acts by legitimizing terrorist actions through 
religious rhetoric, e.g., God not only sanctions these acts, he demands theml 
Followers of the Shaikh perceive him as a "holy man," complying with his 
directives and providing him with their unqualified support. Additionally, it is 
convincingly evident that he perceives the world from an us-against-them 
mentality, regularly exhorting his "closed cell constituency" to destroy the out 
group "others" (those not of Islam, to include the secular politicians residing in 
many Muslim states). Based on this observation, it appears that Shaikh Rahman 
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manifests the traits of the authoritarian-sociopathic personality capable of 
directing the use of WMD in a terrorist attack. 
Ramzi Yousef seems to fit Dr. Post's profile of the self-centered, 
narcissistic, deluded, "mirror-hungry," personality of a sociopathic nature. In his 
own words, Yousefs criticism of his co-conspirators in the Wortd Trade Center 
attack is telling, as he suggests to Federal agents that the twin towers would not 
be standing if he had been able to garner "better help." Motivated by a rage that 
may have developed as a fall-out of being raised the son of a "guest-worker'' in 
Kuwait, Yousef seems to have grown in to his terrorist role as a function of a 
deep seated need to satisfy his narcissistic self e.g., do something that 
appeared "very important." Participating in the Mujahideen insurgency in 
Afghanistan, collaborating with Iraqi intelligence during the Gulf War, allegedly 
setting up an international terrorist network, and directing the tactical part of a 
large scope terrorist campaign against the U.S., were aU acts that would 
enhance and enlarge Yousefs image to his peers, others and most importantly, 
to himself. Certainly this personality type, as discussed by Dr. Post, is more 
than capable of engaging in unconscionable acts of ultra-violence. 
Regardless of whether it was Yousef or Shaikh Rahman who 
commanded the Jihad Organization, both appear to manifest personality traits 
that lend themselves to directing and committing acts of a horrific nature. The 




The militant, redemptive rhetoric used by Shaikh Omar Abdel 
Rahman ran rich with suggestions that the use of violence, sanctioned by fatwa, 
was a legitimate means to perpetuate the vision of an Islamic world. This 
should have been noted as the warning sign of an impending storm, particularly 
since his calls for the use of violence to overthrow the secular government in 
Egypt had been well documented. 
Furthermore, once Shaikh Rahman arrived in the U.S., he took 
advantage of the rights (afforded people in this country) concerning freedom of 
speech and religion as evidenced by his radical sermons. These sermons 
became increasingly more inflammatory, openly exhorting followers to violence 
in the name of Islam. In a statement made following Shaikh Rahman's arrest, 
Ezzat ai-Sheemy, a founder of the Brooklyn Abu Bakr Mosque, said that the 
Shaikh was using the mosque school to "brainwash the children ... and turn them 
into militants. "357 AI-Sheemy further stated that in 1992 he was warned by the 
Shaikh's followers that the Shaikh had approved the use of violence against both 
him and certain teachers unless he ceded control of the mosque's educational 
programs. 
Religious ideologies, Christian, Islamic or otherwise, can 
obviously be manipulated to suggest that violent, unconstrained acts, sanctioned 
by God, are legitimate. This certainly appears to be the case as elucidated by 
357 1993 ADL report. 
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the terror campaign planned by the Jihad Organization. The danger of this 
· phenomenon is self evident. The Jihad Organization receives a score of 1.0 for 
maintaining an ideology that advocates ultra·violence. 
d. Extremist Use of Ultra-Violence 
Shaikh Omar Abdel Rahman supported the use of ultra-violent 
extremism to punish the enemies of Islam and he expressed these ideas in his 
fiery sermons. Facilitated by these ideas, Islamic militants assassinated Anwar 
Sadat, EI-Sayyed Nosair assassinated rabbi Meir Kahane, and members of the 
Jihad Organization bombed the World Trade Center. Even from the confines of 
a prison cell, Shaikh Rahman's ideas continue to influence Islamic militants as 
evidenced by members of ai-Gama'a al-lslamiyya who continue in their attempts 
to kill Hosni Mubarak. 
At a minimum, EI-Sayyed Nosair, Shaikh Rahman, and Ramzi 
Yousef all had an "ax to grind" with some part of society. To violently strike back 
at a world or specific individuals they perceived as illegitimate or unfair was truly 
the only way to right wrongs done to the world of Islam in general, and to 
themselves in particular. The Jihad Organization's attack against the World 
Trade Center complex and plans for a large scale terrorist campaign, ostensibly 
under the spiritual guidance of Shaikh Rahman and the operational direction of 
Ramzi Yousef, arguably shows that extreme use of violence was to be the 
group's modus operandi. They came together as a group specifically to "strike" 
out at the perceived enemies of Islam using methods that would assure mass 
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casualties and destruction. The Jihad Organization receives a score of 1.0 for 
use of ultra-violence. 
e. The Closed Constituency and Group Cohesiveness 
The Jihad Organization represents a small part of a very large 
closed cell system, "radical Islam." Within this group the world·is seen as 
divided into two mutually exclusive camps, the City of War and the City of Faith: 
The City of War and the City of Faith lies at the heart of Islam's 
traditional view of existence. Places where Islam rules supreme and its 
laws are strictly obeyed are known as Dar al-lman or the City of Faith. 
The rest of the world is signified under the title of Dar ai-Harb or the City 
ofWar.358 
As a result of this dichotomous view of the world, the Jihad Organization 
operated under the siege mentality that has "infected" radical l.slamists since 
Shaikh Hassan ai-Banna suggested in the 1930s that the nature of Islam is to 
dominate the entire planet. Extreme acts of terroristic violence are conducted to 
benefit those who belong to this "large cell," e.g., other radicallslamist and God. 
There is little concern for the rest of the population that resides in "Dar ai-Harb", 
or the City of War. The Jihad Organization receives a score of 1.0 for this 
indicator. 
f. Lack of Concern over Public or Government Backlash 
Since non-Islamic populations and governments represent Oar-at 
Harb (City of War), little concern was given to the possible backlash effects that 
would result from the Jihad Organizations terrorist acts. To the members of the 
358 Taheri., 20. 
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group, backlash posed a threat of either capture or death. In either event their 
fate vvould be viewed as a self-sacrificing gesture that would ensure entry to 
paradise in the life hereafter. As in the case of Aum and the Japanese 
government of 1941, the Jihad Organization perceived the use of WMD as not 
threatening its survival, but enhancing its possibility. The Jihad Organization 
receives a score of 1. 0 for their disregard of "backlash." 
g. A Wl1/ingness to Take Risks 
Extreme risk taking is an attribute that is evident in any individual 
that would resort to the use of violence, certainly in those who would suggest 
murder as a legitimate method to press an agenda. For the Jihad Organization 
members the perceived pay-off of gaining access to paradise was worth any risk 
involved. For sanctioning the use of murder as a legitimate means to ends, the 
Jihad Organization receives a score of 1.0 for this indicator. 
h. A Demonstration of a Certain Degree of Sophistication 
in Weaponty or Tactics 
Only certain members of the Jihad Organization possessed an 
advanced knowledge of the construction of improvised explosive devices, 
timers, and the like. Ramzi Yousef was one of them. As reported during his 
trial, Yousef understood how to modify Casio digital wristwatches that they 
might be used as timing devices for the bombs he intended to place. He also 
knew how to mix various chemical compounds into potent explosives. Letters 
found on his person threatening to commit terrorist acts against the Philippine 
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people also suggest he knew something about the use of chemicals as poison. 
Other knowledgeable members included Nidal Ayyad who was educated as a 
chemical engineer. His undergraduate work in areas of chemistry and physics 
alone would have been enough to give the Jihad Organization the ability to 
produce chemical agents. 
Evaluation of information gleaned from analysis of evidence taken 
during the investigation of the Jihad Organization is indicative of their ability to at 
least plan a large scale terrorist campaign. Had they not been compromised by 
an inside informant, the group may very well have caused a tremendous amount 
of damage to critical highway infrastructure leading into New York City. The 
Jihad Organization receives a score of 1.0 for this indicator. _ 
I. Membership Knowledgeable of WMD Technical 
Requirements 
The educational backgrounds of both Yousef and Ayyad suggest 
that there might have been some understanding of how to construct, minimally, a 
low-tech WMD using lethal chemicals. As court records suggest, cyanide was 
placed in the explosive device detonated under the World Trade Center 
complex. That this was not a viable method to disperse cyanide is indicative of 
some mis-understanding on the part of those that constructed the bomb. For 
membership that includes personnel knowledgeable of WMD technical 
requirements, the Jihad Organization receives a score of .6. 
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j. Financial Resources to Fund a WMD Capability 
It is not truly clear how much money the Jihad Organization had 
access too. The body of circumstantial evidence available suggests that Shaikh 
Rahman was well funded through a conduit that included the Alkifah Refugee 
Center, donations from mosques, sources from Iran and possible Osama ibn 
Laden. When the Shaikh was arrested, he reportedly was in possession of at 
least $60,000.00 in cash.359 Court testimony taken from Salameh indicates that 
money used to purchase materials for the World Trade Center bomb came from 
Yousef. Yousefs alleged ties to Osama ibn Laden, a man known to generously 
support radical lslamists, suggest that a substantial amount of money may have 
indeed come from him. The information arguably indicates th~t the Jihad 
Organization possessed the funds to construct a lo-tech WMD. The Jihad 
Organization receives a score of 1.0 for financial resources. 
k. Intervening Processes and Summary of the Analysis 
The primary Intervening Process seen as enhancing Effective 
Demand for the Jihad Organization are centered around the "priori rights" and 
freedoms enjoyed by those that live in the U.S. These freedoms, coupled with 
our overarching concern for human rights facilitated Shaikh Rahman's and 
Ramzi Yousefs ability to enter the U.S .. The inability of Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) to closely monitor the movement of non-resident 
aliens also facilitated the ability of the group to plan and engage in terrorist acts. 
359 Tyre, "Sheik Called Backer in U.S. Terror." 
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Muhammad Salameh would have probably been deported had the INS been 
staffed and better equipped to maintain visibility on non-resident aliens. Ramzi 
Yousef might not have so easily entered this country had our policies to 
welcome the oppressed been even marginally restrictive. 
Accessibility to materials needed to construct even a low-tech 
WMD in the U.S. is only inhibited by the efforts of those that would want to build 
such a device. As one individual suggested to me at a recent conference, "the 
U.S. leaves itself wide open for these events to occur. It is the price you pay for 
maintaining a relatively free society." Table 5-3 provides a visual summary of 
the Jihad Organization analysis. 
G. SUMMARY OF THE JIHAD ORGANIZATION CASE 
The Jihad Organization certainly possessed Effective Demand as shown 
through analysis using both theoretical frameworks. However, as in the Aum 
case, even though the Theory of Structural Realism suggests greater 
strength in expressing Effective Demand, it is only through the framework 
of The Synthetic Theory of Structural Realism and Organizational Process 
that the more finite understanding emerges, one that elucidates this group's 
ability to to transcend those previously identified traditional constraints that 
have precluded other terrorist groups from using WMD. Again, key variables 
such as the personality of leadership, group ideology, and group behavioral 
history say much in helping us to understand the motivations and intentions of 
such non-state groups. 
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The analysis of this case brings up many interesting questions. The 
most glaring has to do with how far our government should go to accommodate 
those individuals who on one hand seem to be of some assistance to U.S. 
agenda's e.g., Shaikh Rahman facilitating the recruitment of volunteers to fight 
the Soviets in Afghanistan, but on the other use our open society and protected 
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Attribute Set for The Synthetic Theory of Realism and Organizational 
Process: 
"The Jihad Organization" 
Demand Indicators Score Supply Indicators Score 
.0-1.0 .0-1.0 
Groups desires power to 1.0 Group exhibits sophisticated 1.0 
balance against the use of weapons or tactics 
nation-state 
Group leader manifests 1.0 Group includes individuals .6 
the "authoritarian- knowledgeable of WMD 
sociopathic" personality technology 
Ideology advocates use of 1.0 Group possesses financial 1.0 
ultra-violence resources to fund WMD 
program 
Group engages in 1.0 Group has access to WMD 1.0 
extremes of violence materials and technology 
Group is cohesive and 1.0 
closed cell 
Group disregards 1.0 
backlash 
Group willing to take high 1.0 
risks 
Product of Demand Indicators Product of Supply Indicators 
1.0 0.6 
Dl(r) x Sl(r) = Effective Demand(r) - Intervening Processes = Effective 
Demand for 
WMD 
1.0 x .6 = .6 - enhancing Intervening Processes = Effective Demand for 
"lo-tech" WMD possessed by the Jihad Organization 
Table 5-3 Analysis of Jihad Organization: Synthetic Model 
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"rights" as a weapon against us. The case also elucidates some glaring holes 
that exist within the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Specifically, these 
holes seem to be present in areas related to screening and tracking non-
residents, clearly illustrated by the fact that several members of the Jihad 
Organization seemed to have no trouble residing illegally in the U.S .. At a 
minimum, Yousefs method of entrance into the U.S. should be flagged by all 
nations that maintain relatively liberal Jaws regarding the manner in which 
political refugees are admitted. No doubt this method will continue to be 
exploited by those that desire to commit nefarious and deadly acts within our 
borders. Those claiming a desire for asylum from states known to be hostile to 
the U.S. should be viewed with great suspicion and investigated accordingly.360 
As of this writing, the United Nations is examining options and methods that 
might be used to preclude terrorists from using Jaws designed to protect 
legitimate "seekers" of political asylum e.g., if the asylum candidate is known to 
have engaged in certain violent activities, he or she would not be granted 
political asylum in one country, to avoid prosecution in another. 
In conclusion, if law enforcement and intelligence agencies had been 
360 Representative Bill McCollum (R) of Florida introduced the Exclusion and 
Asylum Reform Amendments of 1993 which would grant federal officials immediate 
authority to expel aliens who enter the U.S. without proper documents. This proposal 
was not well received, though many agree that the asylum laws are so lenient that they, 
in the words of Joseph Churba, president of the International Security Council think 
tank in Washington D.C., " ... invite terrorism ... " In 1993, INS processed 22,674 cases, 
while the backlog exceeded 135,000. See John Dillin, "Terrorist Incidents in the US 
Raise Immigration Concerns," The Christian Science Monitor, March 19, 1993. 
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keyed to monitor the development of this non-state group using something 
similar to the frameworks discussed herein, they might have at least noticed that 
the Jihad Organization possessed a penchant to commit ultra-violent acts. 
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VI. ETHNIC RACIST HATE GROUP: COVENANT, SWORD AND ARM OF 
THE LORD (CSAL) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The case of the Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the lord (CSAL) is 
interesting for several reasons. First, it exposits a trend unique to U.S. right 
wing extremist groups e.g., an ideology that blends a combination of anti-
government, and racist sentiments with a religious underpinning known as the 
Christian Identity Movement or Identity Movement. Second, it elucidates the 
subtle danger these groups pose to the safety of the American public, as can be 
seen in the case of the Oklahoma City federal building bombing of April 19, 
1995.361 Several of these organizations cloak themselves in a.veneer of ultra-
nationalism, referring to their groups as "Patriot Movements" or "Militias." To be 
fair, not all of these groups maintain racist or violent tendencies. Many 
individuals that join such groups claim that these organizations provide them 
with a legitimate way to express their anger and frustration at a government that 
361 Timothy McVeigh is alleged to have had more than a passing association 
with the Identity movement through residents of Robert Millar's "Eiohim City compound 
in Oklahoma. Millar is the founding father and patriarch of "Eiohim City." Elohim City is 
actually a 400 acre well armed and fortified compound located in eastern Oklahoma. It 
is home for a group of Identity adherents and white supremacists. Millar's followers 
have included members of several right wing terrorist groups: The Order; The 
Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord; the Posse Comitatus; and the Aryan Republican 
Army. See "False Patriots: The Threat Of Antigovernment Extremists," report, Southern 
Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, AI, (1996), 54. Also interview with Bob Sands, 
investigative journalist engaged in writing a book concerning the Oklahoma City 
bombing, November 16, 1996. 
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seems distant and unconcerned, in some cases even hostile.362 One balance, of 
the 441 active Militias and 368 allied Patriot groups identified by Morris Dees 
(Southern Poverty Law Center), 137 of these groups have ties to racist 
organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan, Aryan Nations, and the Neo-Nazi 
movement, groups that certainly advocate the use of violence to obtain desired 
ends.363 
Third, among this amalgamation of white supremacists and Identity 
believers, there has been at least five incidents involving the planned use of 
chemical or biological agents, four having occurred in the last decade. In 
chronological order they include: 
o Late 1960s, early 1970s: A plot by the Minutem~n Organization to 
introduce hydrogen cyanide gas into the air conditioning system of 
the United Nations building in New York City. This group also 
threatened to release a virus developed by its leader, Robert De 
Pugh, on the floors of major airline terminals. De Pugh owned a 
veterinary drug firm known as the Biolab Corporation in Norborne, 
Missouri. De Pugh served four years in federal prison. Released 
in 1973, he has recently been convicted again, this time for 
firearms violations which could result in a twenty year prison 
term.364 
D 1972: Members of the Neo-Nazi group "Order of the Rising Sun" 
were arrested in Chicago, Illinois, for plotting to contaminate city 
362 Morris Dees and James Corcoran, "Still A Recipe For Disaster," USA 
Weekend April 12, 1996, 4. 
363 Ibid., 4. 
364 Builta, 920. Also see Purver, 34, 85; John George and Laird Wilcox, 
American Extremists: Militias Supremacists. Klansman Communists. & Others, 
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1996), 242. 
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water supplies with 80 lbs of typhoid bacillus. 365 
o 1985: Justice Department raid on the "heavily armed compound" 
of the Covenant, Sword, Arm of the Lord (CSAL), nets a large 
weapons cache, large quantities of potassium cyanide, and plans 
to use the chemical to poison the water supplies of several U.S. 
cities.366 
o 1995: Four members of the Minnesota Patriots Council were 
convicted in federal court for conspiracy to use the deadly toxin 
ricin, to kill federal agents and law enforcement officers. 367 
o 1995: Patriot Larry W. Harris arrested for buying bubonic plague 
bacteria by mail from the food test lab where he worked.368 
These acts, combined with the recent proliferation of right wing survivalist 
literature focusing on the use of chemical and biological agents, may be the 
harbinger of horrific events that could make the Aum gassing of the Tokyo 
subway pale in comparison. 369 
This chapter specifically addresses the WMD threat posed by one 
segment of extremism in American society, white extremism empowered by the 
365 Richard C. Clark, Technological Terrorism, (Old Greenwich, CT: Devin-Adair 
Company, 1980), 111. Also see Purver, 37. Of note, members of "The Order of The 
Rising Sun" planned to be inoculated against typhoid prior to handling and 
disseminating this disease. 
366 Purver, 86. Also see J. Coats, 140. 
367 Dees, "False Patriots," 31. 
368 Ibid., 32. 
369 Survivalist literature that caters to the extreme right typically carries articles 
discussing Chem-Bio personal protective measures, and advertisements selling gas 
masks and protective suits. See American Survival Guide, v. 18, n. 10, (October, 
1996), 56. 
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Identity movement. tt begins with a brief, historical overview of the development 
of the white supremacist movement in the U.S., and the subsequent integration 
of Identity ideology into that movement. A narrative of the events leading to the 
federal raid on the CSAL compound follows. The discussion concludes with an 
analysis of the CSAL using the now familiar models of Effective Demand. 
B. THE GENESIS OF THE WHITE SUPREMACY MOVEMENT AND 
IDENTITY CHRISTIAN IDEOLOGY 
The white supremacist/Identity movement is a sub-set of a greater 
concept referred to as right wing extremism. For purposes of discussion, right 
wing extremism in the U.S. is generally divided into several categories: anti-
government/anti-tax groups commonly referred to as Posse's, Patriots or Militias; 
racists/white supremacist groups such as the Neo-Nazi Aryan Nations or 
National Alliance; and Identity Christians. The difficulty in trying to "typecast" a 
group as "Supremacist," "Patriot" or "Identity" lies in the fact that despite their 
articulated differences, many of these groups share commonly held assumptions 
based on: (1) an overarching mistrust of the government; (2) anti-Semitic, anti-
black, and anti-Catholic views; (3) and a religious orientation that supports 
notions of white supremacy. Discerning the motivations and intentions of these 
right wing, religiously oriented racists, truly requires a robust understanding of 
their ideology and behavior. Lacking an understanding of the right wing racists' 
underpinning ideology, cultural variance, and personal nuances, leads to 
tragedies such as Waco and Ruby Ridge, cases arguably suggesting that 
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Federal agents responding to these events, mis-understood, minimally, what 
they were dealing with. 
This case study hopefully provides an understanding of the underpinning 
foundation of Identity, and its influence on the extreme right in America. 
Additionally, it makes a case for why some of these groups should be monitored 
with measured caution. On balance, though many groups such as: (1) the Issue-
oriented Patriots comprising the Christian Coalition, (2) Home Schoolers, (3) 
Moral Majority etc., manifest extreme right attributes, they certainly do not pose a 
threat the likes of their distant cousins, The Order, Phinehas Priesthood, Aryan 
Republican Army, the National Alliance, or the Aryan Nations.370 
1. The Beginning of Hate in America 
In his study of the survivalist right in America, Coats provides a 
comprehensive overview of the genesis of racial/ethnic hate in America. For the 
sake of brevity, only the salient points of this overview are presented. 
English colonists that settled the New World brought with them an anti-
Catholic tradition as part of their English heritage. This "tradition" developed 
under King Henry VIII, who had departed from the Church of Rome.371 In 
colonial times, conspiracy theories addressing the causes of regional calamities 
Vv~ere most often pinned on the "Papist" instead of the Jews. Many nascent laws 
370 Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg, Encounters With The Contemporary 
Radical Right, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 192-193. Also see Builta, 862, 
872. 
371 Coats, 22. 
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passed by the new states following the Revolutionary War were designed to 
marginalize the influence of Catholics and preclude them from holding state 
office. In New Jersey, North Carolina, Georgia, and Vermont, only Protestants 
were allowed to hold state political positions. This distinctly American, anti-
Catholic, movement was commonly referred to as the "nativist movement." 
The nativist movement insisted that the Pope was planning to take over 
the New World by infiltrating large numbers of armed Catholics into the newly 
established U.S., who would in turn destroy their Protestant brothers. From 
1812-1844, much Protestant terrorist violence was focused at Catholic priests, 
nuns and churches. 372 In 1844, when the Irish potato blight resulted in a huge 
influx of Irish Catholics emigres to the U.S., the native Protestant groups became 
a political force of some influence. Called the "Know-Nothings" (their doings 
were "secretive, members encouraged to "know nothing" about party workings) 
the group's strong anti-Catholic platform, and harsh criteria for U.S. citizenship 
resulted in seventy five of their members being elected to Congress (1850's), 
others gaining majority control of several states legislative bodies. 373 The height 
of their appeal came in 1856 when their American Party candidate for president, 
Millard Fillmore, received 21 percent of the electoral vote. That year the 
American Party also won congressional races in New York, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland 
372 Ibid., 23-26. 
373 Ibid., 28. 
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and California. 
By the start of the Civil War in 1860, the Know Nothings were a politically 
impotent force, the nation focusing on more pressing issues. Following the 
South's loss, a new "hate group" emerged under the tutelage and guidance of 
the Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forest. This group came to be kno'Ml 
as the "Invisible Empire of the Ku Klux Klan." Their major political objective was 
ostensibly focused on subverting "Northern Oppression" of the South. From this 
objective emerged a strategy of actions designed to prevent newly emancipated 
blacks from voting for Northern political agendas and laws, these things being 
viewed as harmful to the viability of the Southern way of life. In this vein, the 
Klan was also anti-Catholic because much of the political power in the North was 
held by Catholics. As the fundamentalist Baptist South permeated Klan 
membership, the Klan also claimed itself as a white Christian movement, replete 
with secret code-words, and rule books. 374 
By the 1920's the Ku Klux Klan had flourished, claiming a membership of 
some 4-5 million. 375 Much of this membership growth was attributed to the 
leadership of William Simmons, who wisely hired two top-notch publicists to 
assist in marketing the Klan movement, Edward Clarke and Elizabeth Tyler. 
Clarke and Tyler are said to have increased Klan membership by creating a new 
target group for members to hate, the Jews. Additionally they recommended the 
374 Ibid., 29. 
375 Builta, 911. 
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adoption of a nationalistic veneer that advertised the Klan as: 
"1 00 percent American, 1 00 percent Christian, 100 percent Protestant, 
and 1 00 percent against niggers, Catholics, Jews and others who would 
disdain the (Kian)."376 
The Klan's strategy, as developed by the team of Clarke and Tyler, was 
exposed in the media in 1919, however it would take the combination of the 
Great Depression of the 1930's and WWII to reduce the Klan to playing bit parts 
in local politics. Coats notes that in an attempt to revitalize the movement in 
1940, Klan leadership collaborated with the German-American Bund, an arm of 
Hitler's Nazi party. Coats further notes that since that time, the Klan, in its 
various contemporary iterations, has maintained a close connection with the 
American Neo-Nazi movement. In fact many individuals that start out as Klan 
members are known to have gravitated to Identity oriented Hitlerite groups such 
as Aryan Nations, Posse Comitatus and The Covenant, Sword, the Arm of the 
Lord.377 Since WWII, the Klan has been a marginal force in U.S. domestic 
politics, however, they remain the archetypical reminder of the powerful forces 
that can be marshaled under the rubric of racist hate. 
2. The Christian Identity Movement 
The "theology of hate ... (provides) the framework (based) on a bizarre 
religion that unites numerous segments of the Survivalist Right that in the 
past had been so inclined toward internecine squabbling that the prospect 
of joint action was remote. Further, the doctrine of hatred preached from 
Identity pulpits transforms the sort of violence advocated by the fringes of 
376 Coats, 33. 
377 Ibid., 36. 
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the Survival Right from furtive sin to virtue praised by one's 
congregation ... And they to fear an uncertain future even as they dream of 
a shining city on a hill. But for them it will be a city without blacks. A city 
free of Jews. A city of like-minded white Christian right-wingers, a bastion 
of bigotry.378 
Before the Identity ideology infiltrated the extreme right in the U.S., Coats 
argues that most of these groups could rarely collaborate effectively with one 
another, each having its own agenda. He suggest that Identity's message of 
white supremacy, rationalized by a religious myth, has played a significant role 
acting as the "great unifier of the radical right. "379 
Coats refers to Identity Christianity as a "mixture of pseudo-science and 
theology," wherein God's chosen people are the white, Aryan descendants, of 
the ten lost tribes of northern Israel, part of which settled the U!1ited States.380 
All non-whites are said to be God's "pre-Adamite" mistakes. Jews are explained 
as the off-spring of the union of Satan and Eve (Eve having been fooled by the 
duplicity of the Devil whilst living in the Garden of Eden). Identity argues that 
the ultimate goal of non-whites and Jews is the complete destruction of the white 
race; this objective to be accomplished through a process of interracial mixing 
and economic strategies designed to cause the collapse of the U.S. economy. 
Identity further suggests that the real "Jews" of the Bible left the Holy Land in the 
days before Christ and settled Western Europe and Great Britain. One tribe of 
378 Ibid., 18, 80. 
379 Ibid., 81. 
380 Ibid., 14. 
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"true Jews" (tribe of Manasseh) is said to have crossed the Atlantic and settled 
the America's becoming the founding fathers of the United States. 381 
Other parts of the Identity myth suggest that the Declaration of 
Independence and the U.S. Constitution (inclusive of only the first ten 
amendments) were given to the tribe of Manasseh by the hand ·of God, these 
documents becoming corrupt by the "satanic Jewish Khazars" (off-spring of the 
Eve/Satan union) who masquerade as God's chosen ones. Typical examples 
used by Identity to elucidate the "corruption of the Constitution" include article 
XV which guarantees voting rights for women and blacks, the establishment of a 
federal income tax, and accusations that the Federal Reserve Bank is really a 
Jewish Khazar conspiracy to destroy the U.S. economy. 
3. The Creation of the Myth 
In 1871, Edward Hine wrote a book entitled Identification of the British 
Nation with Lost Israel, which drew on the teachings of the Irish lecturer John 
Wilson. 382 Wilson published a series of lectures known as Lectures on Our 
lsraelitish Origin in which he argues that:383 
o Jews came from the biblical southern kingdom of Judah, whereas 
the British and other Europeans came from the northern kingdom 
381 Ibid., 14. 
382 Ibid., 81. Also see Michael Barkun, Religion and the Racist Right: The 
Origins of the Christian Identity Movement, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1994), 6-7. 
383 Major Larry Curtain, "White Extremism in the U.S. Military," thesis 
(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1996), 12. 
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of Israel. 
o The Jewish claim of undiluted descent from biblical ancestors was 
false e.g., they intermarried with Gentiles as did their Anglo-Israeli 
brethren. 
o That the Jews could only be saved by accepting Jesus. 
Hine's book eventually sold 250,000 copies, for its day becoming a best 
seller. The core thesis argued by Hine suggested that the true Jews, 
(descendants of Moses, Abraham and Jesus e.g., God's chosen people) are the 
people of the British Isles; and that the Jews, as they are known today, are 
actually Mongolian-Turkish Khazars (who are of the lineage of Cain, born of Eve 
and Satan).384 Hine's book also suggested that Cain's offspring were 
responsible for having crucified Jesus. 385 
This "literary" myth was brought to the U.S. in the late nineteenth century 
by two subscribers to this tale, G.W. Greenwood (a New York publisher), and 
Reverend W.H. Poole of Detroit, Michigan. Over the years this myth developed 
into several different versions. The more popular ones suggests that the twelve 
tribes of Israel (each led by one of the twelve sons of Isaac, son of Abraham) 
eventually aligned into northern and southern branches following the great 
Exodus from Egypt. In the south, known as Judah, settled the Levites, Judaist, 
384 Arquilla points out that Arthur Koestlar, writing in his book, "The Thirteenth 
Tribe," makes the scholarly case for modern Jews as Khazars. His point, ironically, is 
that this connection to a transcaucasion people makes the Jews far more Aryan than 
those who persecute them. 
385 Coats, 82. 
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and Benjaminites; the other ten tribes settled the north known as Israel). In 721 
B. C. the Assyrian army captured the ten northern tribes, who literally "disappear'' 
never to be again mentioned in scripture.386 To paraphrase the more popular 
Identity historical account of what transpired, the following excerpts from Coats' 
writing are helpful: 
Soon after they were formed, all twelve tribes were placed in bondage by 
the rulers of Egypt, where they remained for 430 years, until two 
members of the tribe of Levi-Moses and his brother Aaron (neither one a 
Jew)-led the Exodus ... Once the tribes were in the Promised land, God 
parceled out the ground to each of the twelve. But the tribe of Levi was 
named to a priesthood and assigned to service each of the other tribes 
instead of being given land of its own. God then gave the twelfth parcel 
of land that the Levites would have received to the descendants of 
Joseph's son, Manasseh, creating the legendary thirteenth tribe of 
lsrael. .. ldentity ... teaches that this Manasseh tribe ultimately moved into 
Europe, then across the Atlantic on the Mayflower to Arr)erica, where God 
gave them such sacred documents as the Declaration of Independence, 
the Constitution and the first ten amendments, known as the Bill of Rights. 
Subsequent amendments, holds much of the Identity movement, are 
blasphemous additions dictated by Satan's Jewish forces and designed to 
bring down the white race ... the tribes of Israel (eventually migrated 
across) the Caucasus Mountains ... Manasseh ... became the United States; 
the tribe of Zebulun became France; Ephraim become Great Britain; 
lssachar became Finland; Asher was Sweden; the tribe of Gad; became 
Italy; Simeon's descendants became Spain; the people of Naphtali 
became Norway; the tribe of Reuben settled Holland; the people of Dan 
settled Denmark ... ln 586 B.C .... the Babylonian tyrant Nebuchadnezzar 
seized the tribe of Judah, killed most of the Jews, sacked the temple at 
Jerusalem and took the survivors into captivity. It was during the years of 
Babylonian captivity that the tribe of Judah became the evil force in global 
affairs known as Jewry. Babylon, according to Identity, was the kingdom 
of Cain, who after killing Abel, fled eastward to reign under the name of 
Sargon the Great. In Babylon, the tribe of Judah was introduced to the 
black magic of Satan ... ln Babylon, the whole character of Judaism was 
changed, for when they left Babylon they no longer had priests but in their 
place rabbis, and rabbis were never ordained of God ... In place of the 
386 Ibid., 84. 
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temple and tabernacle they instituted the synagogue ... ln place of the Old 
Testament teachings they came out with the Babylonian Talmud, which 
became the new religion of Judaism from that day ... No other civilized 
religious teaching underwrites superstition and black magic 
(and) ... vulgar ... (practices).387 
Identity scholars argue that it was the Babylonian Jews that crucified 
Christ, caused Nero to slaughter the Christians in the Colosseum, brought Black 
Plague to Europe, undermined Napoleon's drive for a world French empire, 
inspired a Jew named Karl Marx to bring communism to the world, promoted the 
Bolshevik Revolution, and formed the hated Federal Reserve banking system in 
the United States.388 It is these themes that underpin the Identity ideology, 
providing a myth that creates a visible enemy that can be blamed for all manner 
of perceived social, moral, and economic ills in U.S. society. 
4. Formation of the Identity Movement 
In the late 1940s, Westly Swift popularized Identity Christian ideology 
within right-wing circles by combining tenants of British Israel ism (the myth 
concerning the development of satanic Judaism under Babylon) and political 
extremism. 389 He founded the Anglo-Saxon Christian Congregation, later to be 
known as the Church of Jesus Christ Christian. Significant voices credited with 
influencing the emergence of the Identity myth during the 1940s and 1950s 
included Howard B. Rand of Massachusetts. His group elevated Hitler to the 
387 Ibid., 82-85. 
388 Ibid., 86. 
389 Barkun, 52. 
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level of prophet, circulating the manuscript The Holy Book of Adolph Hitler, 
(written by James Larratt Battersby of England in 1951 ). This work argues that 
white women have a duty to bear children, and that white males (having a 
responsibility to ensure the proliferation of the white race) should be accorded 
sexual freedom.390 Preservation of the "white seed" has always been a 
singularly important theme in much of Swift's Identity teachings says Coats, Swift 
having integrated Hine's Anglo-Israel myth with the teachings of Gerald L.K. 
Smith, leader of the post WWII anti-Semitic/racist Christian Defense League. 391 
In the late 1950s, Swift joined with Smith's former attorney, Bertrand 
Comparet of Louisiana, and started the aforementioned Anglo-Saxon Christian 
Congregation. It was through this organization that Swift fuseq British lsraelism 
and Hitlerite Identity, providing his congregation with a powerful argument to 
support notions of white supremacy.392 Eventually Swift took his movement to 
Lancaster, California, renaming it the Church of Jesus Christ Christian. 393 
Two disciples of Swift's, Richard Girnt Butler and William Potter Gale, 
have also played a major role in spreading the Identity message to the extreme 
right. Gale eventually founded his Christian Defense League (a paramilitary, 
anti-Semitic, white supremacist group located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana) and 
390 Coats, 93. 
391 Ibid., 94. Note that Swift worked for Smith as his chauffeur. 
392 Ibid., 95. 
393 Curtain, 20. 
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the more notorious anti-tax/anti-government Identity group Posse Comitatus. 
394 
Eventually Richard Butler migrated to Coeur d'Alene, Idaho (1973) and 
established the Aryan Nations at Haden Lake, Idaho. Michael Barkan, who has 
done extensive research on the extreme right in America, suggests that Butler's 
Aryan Nations has become the most visible manifestation of the Identity 
movement. Other "infamous" Identity oriented groups include; (1) "The Order," 
also known as the "Bruders Schweigen" (extremely violent group consisting of 
former members of Aryan Nations, Ku Klux Klan, National Alliance, and the John 
Birch Society, put out of business in 1985); (2) The National Alliance, led by 
William Pierce (former physicist and author of the Turner Diaries); (3) Jim 
Ellison's The Covenant, Sword, Arm of the Lord; and (4) Rober:t Millar's "Eiohim 
City."395 
In summary, Christian Identity is built around three concepts: (1) that 
white "Aryans" are descendants of the biblical tribes of Israel; (2) that today's 
"Jews" are the product of Satan; (3) that the world is on the verge of the final 
apocalyptic struggle between good and evil. The evil is represented by the U.S. 
government which is said to have been unduly influenced and totally 
undermined by the Khazer Jews and their allies the non-white, "pre-Adamite 
394 Curtain, 21. Also see Builta, 871,923; and Barkun, 221. Note that two 
Posse Comitatus organizations emerged circa 1969. One was a non-Identity Posse 
founded by Henry L. Beach, the other being formed in southern California by Gale. 
Gale died in 1988; Beach's organization moved to Michigan in 1972. 
395 Curtain, 23-28. Also see Dees, "False Patriots," 54. 
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mud people. "396 
Thus the Christian Identity myth seamlessly blends with the dogma of 
many U.S. right wing extremist groups, in some cases becoming the foundation 
on which they base their confused ideology. The true danger of this movement 
lay in its religious orientation which argues that God demands the purifying of his 
chosen people, the white race. This argument is frequently used by Identity 
adherents to justify their racial bigotry, criminal activity and terrorist violence 
against "out-group" others. 
C. JIM ELLISON AND THE COVENANT, SWORD, AND ARM OF THE 
LORD (CSAL) 
1. Introduction 
James Ellison, formerly a Protestant fundamentalist preacher from San 
Antonio, Texas, was drawn to the Identity movement through the influence of 
Wesley Swift. 397 In 1971, Ellison moved from San Antonio to northwest 
Arkansas where he purchased a 224 acre tract of land located in a remote, 
heavily timbered comer of the state, near the Arkansas-Missouri border.398 Of 
note, it seems to be a common practice of Identity oriented groups to purchase 
large tracts of land near multi-state border areas. This practice seems to be 
done to: (1) facilitate criminal activity of group members who ostensibly would 
396 Curtain, 21. 
397 Builta, 879. Also see Coats, 138. 
398 Brent L. Smith, Terrorism in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams, (NY: 
State University of New York Press, 1994), 62. 
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commit crimes in one state, and then seek sanctuary in another (outside the 
jurisdictional boundaries of law enforcement in the case of the former); (2) 
provide tracts of land large enough to allow paramilitary and weapons training to 
be conducted outside the visible eye of the public and law enforcement. 
Ellison original purpose was to develop a religiously oriented haven for 
ex-cons and drug addicts. With this in mind, he named his acreage Zarepath-
Horeb, Mount Horeb being the place that Moses is said to have received the ark 
of the covenant from the Lord; Zarepath being a Phoenician City where soldiers 
went for rest and relaxation. 399 He reportedly took four wives (Identity ideology 
supporting polygamous behavior as a way to propagate the white race), and 
subjected male residents to harsh discipline. In a 1981 interview, Ellison is 
quoted as saying that his followers: 
... are appointed by God to prepare for the coming doom ... and survive it by 
killing, if necessary, to protect themselves.400 
Zarepath-Horeb was a self contained community having its own water 
supply, electrical system, and dormitories. By the mid-eighties the property was 
home to one-hundred men, woman and children who resided in one of three 
separate compounds. A building in one of the compounds was used to 
manufacture weapons and explosives. Smith writes; 
The main compound consisted of approximately twenty five-buildings, five 
399 Coats, 136; Smith, 63. 
400 Robert M. Press, ''They Play War Games in U.S. Countryside," The Christian 
Science Monitor, March 23, 1981. 
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of which were strictly organized as bunker-style fighting positions. The 
church, six residences, and assorted storage buildings were also located 
at this compound. The other two smaller compounds were referred to as 
the 'plateau compound' and the 'valley compound.'401 
The arms manufacturing facilities boasted a capability to make hand grenades, 
silencers, and convert weapons to incorporate a select fire (fully auto) capability. 
The compound also had a cyanide manufacturing plant, at least thirty gallons of 
cyanide; Ellison is alleged to have made plans to poison the water supplies of 
several major U.S. cities. As reported by several sources, these things were 
discovered during a raid of the compound by Federal Agents conducted in April 
of 1985.402 
In the early years of Zaropeth-Horab's existence, Ellison and his 
compound dwellers were reported to be quiet folks, on good terms with their 
neighbors. This changed in 1977 with the arrival of Kerry Noble and Randall 
Radar. Shortly after their arrival, Ellison ordained these two radicals as elders in 
the community.403 Radar started the "militarization" of the compound by 
establishing a training facility for teaching urban warfare. Called the "Endtime 
Over-comer Survival Training School," Radar charged $500 for a weekend-
seminar that taught marksmanship, and tactics in a "Silhouette City" were 
401 Smith, 63. 
402 Builta, 880. Also see Coats, 140; Purver, 86; Douglass et al., America The 
Vulnerable, 183-187. 
403 Smith, 64. 
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aspiring survivalist could shoot and train in a realistic, urban setting. 404 Both 
Radar and Noble were weapon enthusiasts and they frequently attended gun 
shows, purchasing large quantities of semi-automatic weapons that could be 
converted to fire in either a semi or fully automatic mode. They also began to 
manufacture their own silencers and other weapons.405 In 1982, linkages 
between the CSAL and Butler's Aryan Nations were established. Smith reports 
that weapons used by Robert Mathews Aryan Nations splinter, ''The Order," 
were provided by CSAL through Radar.406 
2. Significant Affiliations and Financial Support 
Following a 1983 shootout between Posse Comitatus member Gordon 
Kahl and Federal agents, Ellison enjoined with a coalition of supremacist 
leaders to plot a strategy against the U.S. government. 407 These leaders 
included Richard Butler, Louis Beam, Robert Miles, and Robert Mathews. 
Ellison's CSAL compound was to be used as an arms depot and paramilitary 
404 Smith, 64; Coats 137. Gordon Kahl was a former Mormon Bishop turned 
Identity minister. He was wanted by the IRS for income tax evasion, and by the FBI for 
killing three law enforcement officer and wounding four. He was killed in a shoot out 
with Federal Agents in 1983, gaining the distinction of becoming the first real "martyr" 
for the Identity cause. 
405 Coats, 136-138; Also see Press, "They Play War Games in U.S. 
Countryside." 
406 Smith, 64. The Order might be defined as a paramilitary wing of the 
movement whose mission was: ( 1 ) to develop cash reserves through hitting banks and 
the like, and (2) to carry out acts against the enemies of the movement e.g., whoever 
Mathews picked. 
407 Ibid., 64. 
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training facility to prepare white, male members for the great battle of 
Armageddon, see Table 6-1. 
Kahl's death is alleged to have had a dramatic effect on Ellison who 
immediately directed several terrorist actions against the U.S. government or 
"Zionist Occupation Government" (ZOG) as it is known to members of the 
Identity movement. These acts, outlined in Smith's book, included:408 
o August 9, 1983: CSAL members burn down the Metropolitan 
Church in Springfield, Missouri for supporting gay-rights. 
o Mid August, 1983: CSAL members burn down the Jewish 
Community Center in Bloomington, Indiana. 
o November 2, 1983: CSAL members including Richard Wayne 
Snell, attack a major natural gas pipeline near Fulton, Arkansas. 
Following this attack, Snell robs and murders a Jewish pawnshop 
proprietor. 
0 December, 1984: Ellison proclaims a new motto for CSAL, "War in 
'84." 
o October-November, 1984: Robert Smalley, a CSAL member and 
gun dealer begins buying large quantities of 5.56mm, semi-
automatic, AR-15 assault rifles. These weapons were transferred 
to Radar, who had joined Robert Mathews' The Order. December, 
1984: Robert Mathews is killed during a shoot out with Federal 
agents at his home in Whidbey Island, Washington. 
It is clear that CSAL developed strong linkages with Identity oriented 
groups, most notably William Butler's "Aryan Nations;" John Harrell's "Christian-
Patriots Defense League;" Robert DePugh's "Minutemen;" associates of Larry 
Humphreys' "Survival Right;" Robert Jay Mathews' "The Order," and Robert 
408 Ibid., 65-66. 
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Millar's "Eiohim City."409 This is significant for two reasons: ( 1) it is indicative of 
the existence of a loose affiliation between these groups that arguably has been 
firming up through the adoption of a mutually agreeable, theological 
underpinning, Identity Christian; (2) Harrel, and Humphreys are reported to be 
moderately wealthy (millionaires). No doubt they have facilitated various 
racist/Identity movements and organizations with substantial sums of money. 
Ellison's known affiliation with these two gentlemen suggest that CSAL was 
probably a beneficiary of their "philanthropic" nature. Though Mathews is dead, 
(having been killed in a shoot-out with Federal agents on December 7, 1984 at 
his Whidbey Island, Washington hide out), members of his gang are said to 
have funneled large sums of cash (total take in 1984 reported to be $4 million) 
from their various robberies to the CSAL. 410 
409 Builta, 874; Also see Press, "They Play War Games in U.S. Countryside;" 
Coats, 140. Jim Ellison has been in Elohim City since his release from prison in 1995. 
41° Coats, 140-144; Smith 71. In a November 3, 1996 interview with freelance 
journalist/private investigator living in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Bob Sands said that 
seventy-five percent of ''The Order" membership came out of William Pierce's National 
Alliance. The other twenty-five percent coming from the Aryan Nations. Sands further 
suggests that Mathews' operations were conducted to mirror events written in Pierce's 
fictional work "The Turner Diaries." 
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Significant Members of Radical Identity Movement 
Richard Butler: Founder of Aryan Nations, Hayden Lake, Idaho 
Louis Beam: Once head of the Texas Knights of the Ku Klux Klan until a mid-1980s law suit 
brought by Southern Poverty Law Center effectively shut him down. Author of the "Leaderless 
Resistance" doctrine he presently works as an Ambassador-at-Large for the Aryan Nations. 
William Pierce: Leader of The National Alliance 0/'J. Virginia), former physicist and author of 
"The Turner Diaries." The "Turner Diaries" is lauded as the blueprint behind operations 
conducted by "The Order," and Timothy McVeigh's bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal 
building on April19, 1995. 
Robert Millar: Founder and patriarch of Elohim City, Oklahoma. Prophet and spiritual guide for 
many Identity adherents including Jim Ellison of CSAL. 
Jim Ellison: Former Texas Protestant Fundamentalist preacher turned Identity minister. Head 
of Covenant, Sword, the Arm ofthe Lord extremist group. Jailed in 1985 for (among several 
charges) his role in assisting members of "The Order" execute their terrorist campaign of murder 
and robbery. Released in 1995, now living in Elohim City, Oklahoma. 
Mark Thomas: Neo-Nazi leader affiliated with Aryan Nations and his own Pennsylvania Patriot 
group. Alleged ties to supremacist bank robbing cell known as "The Aryan Republican Army." 
Andrew Strassmeir: Son of a German politician; former German Army officer in the Panzer 
Grenadiers. Arriving in the U.S. circa 1990, Strassmeir allegedly became head of security and 
para-military training in Elohim City. Some suggest that he was a German agent sent to keep 
tabs on U.S. Neo-Nazi's who were inciting a resurgence of neo-fascism in Germany. He is also 
alleged to have had foreknowledge of McVeigh's intentions to bomb the McMurray building in 
Oklahoma City, and to have passed this information to members of the Justice Department 
prior to the bombing. Information recently obtained from Bob Sands suggests that 
Strassmeir may in fact be an international te"orist. In a January 1997 interview with 
Sands, he stated that a mercenary operating in Latin America indicated that (in the late 
80's) he sold Strassmeir a consignment of explosives that were then transfe"ed to the 
Seider Meinhoff gang (also known as the Red Army Faction). Sands also stated that 
Strassmeir may have been providing training to international te"orists at Elohim City 
during the time he is alleged to have lived there. Whatever role Strassmeir did or did not 
play in Elohim City, he has reportedly moved back to Germany were he remains an 
interesting, a/belt, untouchable figure as an adjunct to his alleged activities with the white 
supremacist movement in the U.S. 
Richard Guthrie: Leader of bank robbing cell known as the "Aryan Republican Army." 
Captured in January of 1996, Guthrie committed suicide shortly after agreeing to assist Federal 
prosecutors unravel his two-year, twenty-two bank, bank robbing campaign. Money from his 
bank robberies is alleged to have gone to Aryan Nations and Elohim City. Tim McViegh is 
alleged to have been a member of this cell, using the name "SGT Mack," Onforrnation derived 
from Bob Sands). 
Table 6-1: Significant Members of Radical Identity 
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As mentioned, CSAL was also in the business of selling and modifying 
weapons, hate literature, and conducting paramilitary training "seminars" 
throughout the Midwest and the South. In short, Jim Ellison's CSAL was a well 
funded organization. 
3. The Raid of 1985 
Interestingly enough, the 1985 raid on the CSAL compound did not occur 
as a result of Jim Ellison having visibly broken any laws. Agents of the Justice 
Department raided the compound when it became apparent that members of 
''The Order'' had sought safe haven there following a Brinks armored car heist 
that took place in Ukiah, California. 19 July, 1984. 411 As mentioned, ''The 
Order'' was an extremely radical off-shoot of several supremacist organizations. 
Led by Robert Mathews, the group netted $3.6 million dollars from their Brinks 
armored car operation. Following this robbery, members of ''The Order" split up 
and fanned out across the country, several working their way to Jim Ellison's 
CSAL compound in Arkansas. 
In April of 1985, a Missouri state trooper pulled over a brown van driven 
by "Order" member David Tate of Athol, Idaho. Tate had been part of the Brinks 
armored car hit. Coats writes that as the trooper approached the car, 
Tate opened the door and smoothly rolled to the ground, clutching a 
submachine-gun to his hip. As the startled trooper reached for his 
weapon, Tate let loose with a withering burst of submachine-gun fire that 
sent several slugs slamming into Linegar's (state trooper) bullet-proof 
411 Ibid., 71. 
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vest, and several others into his unprotected side. 412 
Arkansas authorities, augmented with assistance of FBI SWAT teams, 
deputies, and armed Cobra helicopter gun ships of the Missouri National Guard, 
searched six days for Tate. Tate was arrested when he finally emerged from 
hiding. 
Between the evidence garnered from Tate's brown Chevrolet van 
(stocked full of weapons), and other leads, the FBI was able to secure warrants 
from the Arkansas court to search Jim Ellison's Zarepath-Horeb compound. 413 
However, Ellison and his followers were not inclined to entertain a visit from "the 
Feds." Armed to the teeth, Ellison and his followers were not overly interested in 
capitulating to agents of a government they did not recognize. - Confrontation 
between the two parties was inevitable. 
In the initial assault, members of the FBI SWAT team stormed the gate 
and occupied several outbuildings. In Smith's account of the raid, CSAL had 
planted at least one remote controlled mine near the main gate. 414 Once inside 
the compound the FBI began a terse forty eight hour negotiation process in 
which the patriarch of Elohim City, Robert Millar (spiritual guide to Jim Ellison) 
was flown from his compound in Oklahoma to help authorities talk Ellison into 
412 Ibid., 141. 
413 Ibid., 142. 
414 Smith, 63. 
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giving up.415 Subsequent to Ellison's surrender, two indicted members of "The 
Order" hiding out on the CSAL compound, Randall Evans and Thomas Bentley, 
were immediately arrested. A search of compound facilities netted a large 
assortment of munitions and explosives. Confiscated items included: fifty 
pounds of dynamite, 146 rifles, thirty machine guns, nine silencers, three mines, 
two antiaircraft rockets, and other equipment416 to include the cyanide and plans 
to contaminate the water supplies of an unidentified city. 
In 1985, Ellison and others (including Richard Wayne Snell) were 
convicted and sentenced for violating a number of federal statutes. Radar 
turned states evidence and was given a six year suspended sentence for the 
role he played.417 Ellison received a twenty-year sentence on weapons and 
racketeering charges. 418 He was released from prison in 1995 and is reported to 
have moved to Robert Millar's Elohim City compound located in a secluded, and 
rugged section of Oklahoma, near the Arkansas border. 419 He is also reported to 
415 Donna Hales, "A Look At One Wilderness Compound, Gannet New Service, 
March 29, 1995. 
416 Warren Richey, "U.S. A Safe Haven For Paramilitary Groups That Provide 
Legal Mercenary Training," The Christian Science Monitor October 8, 1985. 
417 Smith, 7 4. 
418 Ibid. 
419 Doug Ferguson, "Okla. Leader Says Community Anti-Government, Anti-
Violence," The New York Beacon June 7, 1995, PG. 
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have married one of Millar's granddaughters in a June, 1995 wedding.420 
Of note, in Ft. Smith, Arkansas 1987, Federal prosecutors brought a 
number of charges against thirteen individuals, many of whom were leaders in 
the white supremacist movement. Accused of sedition, planning to poison urban 
water supplies, and counterfeiting, those charged included William Butler, leader 
of the Aryan Nations; Louis Beam, author of the "Leaderless Resistance 
Doctrine," and Aryan Nations Ambassador-at-Large; Robert Miles, former Grand 
Dragon of the Michigan Ku Klux Klan; Richard Scutari, member of The Order hit 
team that killed Denver talk show host, Alan Berg, in 1984; and Richard Wayne 
Snell, a member of CSAL. Jim Ellison was a key witness against his former 
comrades in these proceedings.421 All thirteen individuals were, minimally, 
acquitted of the sedition charges by a jury of their peers in 1988. 
On April 19, 1995, Richard Wayne Snell was executed by the State of 
Arkansas, for the murder of the Jewish pawnshop owner.422 Ellison, testifying 
on behalf of the prosecutors, said that Snell had described the pawnshop owner 
as " ... an evil man, and that he just needed to die."423 Several hours preceding 
Snell's execution, a team of individuals bombed the Oklahoma Federal building 
420 Ibid. 
421 Coats, 56-57, 140; also see Dees, "False Patriots," 40-41. 
422 Dees, "False Patriots," 41; Also see Kelly P. Kessel," White Supremacist 
Said Grateful for NAACP Assistance," The New York Beacon, May, 3, 1995, PG. 
423 Kissel, PG. 
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using a large ANFO type, improvised explosive device. In what has become 
known as an infamous moment in American history, Timothy James McVeigh, 
Terry Nichols, and unidentified co-conspirators, are alleged to have bombed 
the Alfred P. McMurray Federal building, resulting in a tremendous Joss of life 
and injury. McVeigh is known to have had contacts with individuals living in 
Millar's Elohim City before this attack occurred.424 Snell's body was buried in a 
remote area of the Elohim City compound on April 20th, the day following his 
execution. 425 
4. Summary of the CSAL Case Study 
From the perspective of an outsider, the underpinning belief of CSAL 
members appears to be grounded in the irrational fantasy-myth of Identity, this 
myth giving their otherwise mediocre lives meaning and purpose. In and of 
itself, Jiving out a fantasy-myth on an isolated compound does not pose a major 
threat to the American public at large. However, CSAL members and those like 
them, were (are) truly not interested in living apart from the mainstream of 
society. This is clearly shown in their ideology, literature, and behavior which 
has included criminal and terrorist violence. As stated in numerous orations by 
radical Identity leaders, the desired end state for the movement will only be 
achieved once God's law is re-established on earth. This post-millennia! 
424 Janice Bullard, "Bombing Investigators Looking At Reclusive Oklahoma 
Cult," Gannet News Service, May 23, 1995. 
425 Donna Hales, "A Look At One Wilderness Compound," Gannet News 
Service, March 29, 1995. 
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doctrine demands nothing short of the complete destruction of the "satanic 
beast" (the U.S. government as it is known by the movement) before the second 
coming will occur. 426 By design, this goal "begs" a violent strategy focused at 
attacking and destroying the Federal infrastructure, and those non-white, out-
group "others" (and those aligned with them) who are viewed as having caused 
the ills of the world. What better reason to acquire and employ WMD, the 
perfect tool to compel, deter, or eradicate the "enemy." 
At a recent conference on terrorism, Dr. Post and I discussed what 
appears to be a causal reason behind much of the bigotry and extreme prejudice 
found in many terrorist groups: the almost institutionalization of racist, ethnic and 
religious hate, where ideas and myths are passed down from one generation to 
the next, ensuring the survival of the same. This strategy virtually guarantees a 
pool of future recruits for the "ethnic/racist" terrorist group. Examples Post uses 
includes the recent Palestinian lntifadeh, the Balkans, and the Identity 
movement. In these situations, Post says, a framework exists that clearly 
identifies and defines the enemy to the children. These young minds, in the 
prime moment of developing their psycho-social identities, are exposed to an 
egregious form of "socialization." This results in the development of a deep-
seated "us against them" mentality that so often typifies the psycho-social 
426 Dees, "False Patriots," 11. 
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orientation of the ethnic/racist terrorist group.427 
The real danger (for society}, comes from trying to second guess the 
Identity movement through the use of mirror-imaging rationality. Assumptions 
concerning these types of groups cannot be made based on normative 
perceptions of reality, for it is a reality not shared by those involved with the 
Identity movement. As such, a typical response to these groups by the Justice 
Department is to ignore them until they do something illegal e.g., crises 
response vice pre-emption. Even vvhen the authorities do respond to illegal acts 
perpetrated by members of the Identity movement, they see them as atomistic 
events, not as part of a grand strategy being executed under the Louis Beams' 
doctrine of "Leaderless Resistance." This doctrine calls for the. development of 
numerous disconnected, horizontally aligned "cells" consisting of no more then 
twelve individuals. These cells supposedly represent the para-military arm of 
the movement and are encouraged to locate themselves away from the 
movement's political headquarters. 428 Members all understand the "Grand 
Strategy" wherein individual cells execute attacks against "out-group others" 
vvhen they feel ready. Once a cell exceeds twelve members and has developed 
a robust arms cache and financial reserves, it is supposed to divide and 
427 Dr. Jerrold Post, "Psychological Profiles of Terrorists," presentation, 
Association of Former Intelligence Officers 1996 Conference, Washington D.C., 25 
October, 1996. 
428 Perhaps making it less likely that these "cells" would operate out of the 
Hayden Lakes or Elohim City compounds, organizations that claim to be politically 
extreme, but otherwise harmless to society. 
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spread ... elsewhere, see Appendix. An elucidating example of this is seen in the 
case of CSAL and Jim Ellison. As a result of the 1985 raid on Zarepath-Horab, 
many would agree that the days of CSAL were finished. Weapons were 
confiscated, cash reserves were no doubt taken, and members not incarcerated 
melted away into the Arkansas landscape (though some stayed on at the 
compound).429 But did they really "melt away," or just regroup to carry on the 
grand strategy (Leaderless Resistance) of the movement another day? 
In the spring of 1996, two individuals claiming membership to the "Aryan 
Republican Army" were arrested in connection with a number of bank robberies. 
Cash taken during these robberies is said to have exceeded $500,000 dollars. 430 
Richard Lee Guthrie Jr. and Peter Kevin Langan are said to have diverted at 
least $250,000 of their ill gotten gains to the Aryan Nations and the CSAL in 
Elohim City. As told by Bob Sands (freelance journalist and private investigator), 
Guthrie, Langan and two other members of the "Aryan Republican Army," Kevin 
McCarthy and Scott Stedeford, all had ties to Elohim City and the Aryan 
Nations. Recounted by Robert Millar: 
(Andy) Strassmeir and (Mike) Brecia spent time with them (reference to 
McCarthy and Stededford) while they were here (in Elohim City) ... prior to 
429 November 3, 1996 interview with Bob Sands. 
430 Judy Pasternak, "Did Bandits Bankroll Extremists?," Los Angeles Times, 
March 30, 1996, A 1. The name "Aryan Republican Resistance" is probably a throw-
away name, used to divert attention away from groups that may have benefitted from 
Guthrie and Langan's robbery exploits. This fits in well with Louis Beams doctrine of 
Leaderless Resistance. 
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the Oklahoma City bombing.431 
The following is an abstract of a telephone interview with Sands 
concerning Guthrie's Aryan Republican Army: 
Mark Thomas, head of a Posse Comitatus/Identity group near 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and also affiliated with Butler's Aryan Nations, 
sent his son, McCarthy, and Stedeford to Elohim City to receive para-
military training. In news media interviews, Thomas admits to having 
introduced the later two to Guthrie and Langan. He also admits to having 
been at Elohim City several days prior to the Oklahoma City bombing. All 
four of these young men reportedly received training in weapons and 
tactics from Andy Strassmeir, Mike Brescia and possibly Timothy 
McVeigh. Following his arrest, Guthrie admitted that the gang's purpose 
was to finance the white supremacist movement. 432 
In my interview with Sands, I spoke to him concerning the fact that 
McVeigh was employed by an armored car company prior to showing up in 
Elohim City circa 1993. We both agreed that he probably provided useful 
information to his "students" on how to take down an armored car - if in fact he 
was involved with their training. In a March, 1996 report by the Los Angeles 
Times, Guthrie was reported to have joined the Navy and attempted to qualify as 
one of the Navy's elite Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) commandos. He never made it and 
was in fact court martialed in 1983.433 
Langan is reported to be the son of a CIA employee. His trouble with the 
431 J.D. Cash, "Agents Probe OKC Bombing Links To Bank Robberies," 
McCurtain Daily Gazette, July 16, 1996. 
432 Interview with Bob Sands of November 3, 1996. In 1993, McVeigh received 
a ticket from an Arkansas state trooper on a back-road highway that goes past Elohim 
City. 
433 Pasternak, "Did Bandits Bankroll Extremists?" 
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law started at age 16, when he ran away from home and was shot while engaged 
in a robbery. Langan had been a close friend of Guthrie's since they lived 
together in Wheaton, MD (1979). By order of the Secret Service, he was 
released from prison in 1993 with the understanding that he would help them 
track down Guthrie. Guthrie had allegedly been making threats against the 
President since 1991.434 Instead of cooperating with the Secret Service, Langan 
went underground when he caught up with Guthrie. Guthrie, Langan; McCarthy, 
and Stedeford, were arrested in Winter of 1996. Guthrie is alleged to have 
committed suicide in his jail cell soon after his arrest. As of this writing, Kevin 
McCarthy has turned states evidence and is now testifying to: (1) the intent of 
the heists e.g., to develop cash reserves for Aryan Nations and Elohim City, (2) 
the involvement of Mark Thomas and Mike Brescia. 435 In a case that appears to 
be a repeat of Robert Mathew's ''The Order," McCarthy has thus far stated 
that:436 
o The gang "hit 22 banks" in a two year period. 
o Fake identities were developed using the names of dead people to 
apply for social security numbers. These social security numbers's 
were then used to apply for driver's licenses that could further be 
used to purchase cars, though sometimes a bogus company name 
was used. Police checking the registration of such vehicles would 
434 Ibid. 
435 Robert Ruth, "Conspiracy Is Focus Of Case In East," The Columbus 
Dispatch. November 17, 1996. 
436 Robert Ruth, "Robbers laid Plans Carefully," The Columbus Dispatch. 
November 18, 1996. 
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then see that these cars belonged to a "company" vice an 
individual, and be less inclined to "stop them." 
o Tactics used by the group included using two vehicles to exfiltrate 
from the scene of a heist. Usually a bank would be surveilled for at 
least a week before it was "hit." Banks with guards were avoided. 
On the day of the robbery, team members would use two-way 
radios to stay in touch with each other. One member always had a 
police scanner so the team could monitor law enforcement activity. 
Team members always wore masks, bullet-proof vests and at 
times, left unarmed pipe-bombs at the scene to divert law 
enforcement. 
In a recently published article concerning the group, Ambrose-Evans Pritchard 
writes: 
... The FBI captured a shoulder-fired rocket launcher, semtex explosives, 
hand-grenade canisters, (eleven) pipe-bombs, and an arsenal of guns. 
"These people had a support system. They had safe-houses and very 
good false documents ... They were clearly preparing for .something 
beyond bank robberies" ... What makes this Aryan Army cell so menacing 
is the growing body of evidence that its members were in contact with Tim 
McVeigh (alleged to be "Sgt. Mack", the prime suspect in the bombing of 
the Oklahoma federal building in April of 1995). Two of the bank robbers 
were residents of ... Eiohim City. McVeigh telephoned Elohim City minutes 
after reserving the truck allegedly used in the bombing. Michael Brescia 
is believed to be the fifth member of the Aryan Army cell. He also lived at 
Elohim City. Five women at a night club in Tulsa have identified Brescia 
as the man they saw sitting with Tim McVeigh - and paying for drinks - on 
April 8, 1995, 11 days before the bombing. A mother and daughter in 
Kansas have told the FBI that they met Brescia in the company of 
McVeigh several times ... one thing is clear: the Aryan Republican Army 
is intent on mass violence. The recruitment video (made circa 
December 1995) ends with Commander Pedro (Langan), in a 
chemical warfare mask, discussing plans to build an Aryan super-
bomb made with "yellow cake" plutonium residue ... . 437 
The similarities between the Aryan Republican Army and "The Order'' are 
437 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, "America's 'Aryan' Hard Men Take Lead from the 
IRA," London Telegraph, December 8, 1996. 
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unsettling to say the least, particularly with Langan's having made reference to 
the existence of plans to construct a radiological device. In another recent case 
involving the Identity movement, three individuals belonging to the shadowy 
supremacist group "Phinehas Priesthood" were arrested in connection with 
several bank robberies in the Pacific Northwest, robberies that netted them 
$100K.438 This radical splinter group takes its name from a biblical story 
concerning a Jew named Phinehas. As told, Phinehas kills a Midonite woman 
and her Jewish male lover for "mixing seed. "439 Entry into this radical splinter 
apparently requires that the "acolyte" kill an individual (Jew, Black, Catholic, 
government employee). In my discussion with Sands, he stated that one of the 
members arrested possesses both a nuclear power background, and a high level 
security clearance, having been assigned to the U.S. Navy's nuclear submarine 
fleet while "serving his country." Reflecting on this information one cannot help 
recall the story of the mythical "Phoenix," a great bird which rises from the ashes 
of its funeral pyre, to live yet another day. Though Jim Ellison's CSAL was 
effectively put out of business in 1985, radical individuals of the movement 
continue their efforts in other groups, in other locations. As mentioned, Jim 
Ellison was recently released from prison (1995) and is now a resident of Elohim 
City. 
438 
"3 Suspected White Supremacists Charged with Robberies," Associated 
Press, October 10, 1996. 
439 
"Numbers 25:1-18," The Bible, 233-234. 
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Elohim City is a 400-acre complex located near the Arkansas border.440 It 
boasts homes, a sawmill, church, and a one room school house. Men frequently 
carry holstered guns and patrol the perimeter of the property. Though the 
compound "patriarch," Robert Millar, insists that Elohim residents have not 
engaged in seditious or illegal activities, the fact remains that: (1) linkages exist 
between Elohim City and the Ray Lampley, who, as leader of the Oklahoma 
Constitutional Militia, planned to destroy the Southern Poverty Law Center and 
Anti-Defamation League's Houston, Texas, office in 1995; the Oklahoma Posse 
Comitatus, another Identity anti-government/anti-tax group; Dennis Mahan, 
leader of the Oklahoma chapter of the White Aryan Resistance (Tom Metzger's 
WAR headquarters is located in Southern California. In an Oklahoma 
newspaper interview, Mahan sayed that ever since he had staged a protest 
against U.S. involvement in the Gulf War (Chicago, 1991), he has been 
receiving money from a location in Washington D.C. which he believes to be an 
office occupied by Iraqi diplomats); and Richard Butler's Aryan Nations;441 (2) 
Strassmeir was believed to be operating a large scale-paramilitary training 
operation in Elohim City. As reported, every few weeks fifteen to thirty 
440 Janice Bullard, "Bombing Investigators Looking At Reclusive Oklahoma 
Cult," Gannet News Service, May, 23, 1995. Sands says the compound may actually 
be inclusive of 1 000 acres, additional property allegedly being added under names not 
easily affiliated with Robert Millar. 
441 Ferguson, "Okla. Leader Says Community Anti-Government, Anti-Violence," 
PG; also see Bullard, "Bombing Investigators Looking At Reclusive Oklahoma Cult;" 
Hales, "A Look At One Wilderness Compound;" and "False Patriots,"report, 52, 54. 
Also interview with Bob Sands of November 3, 1996. 
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individuals from around the U.S. would show up for military training. Most of 
these "recruits" were said to be primarily members of the Aryan nations.442 
Millar is lauded as being the spiritual guide to many Identity factions 
throughout the U.S., a position that in some respects mirrors that of another 
spiritual guide addressed earlier in this study, Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman. Jim 
Ellison is also living in Elohim City these days, a situation that begs the 
rhetorical posit "where there's smoke, there's probably fire." This observation 
takes on greater importance if one considers that Millar is, as of this writing, 
seventy-two years old. Depending on his health, he may be preparing to "retire" 
from the active ministry. In his wake lies the heir apparent, Jim Ellison, or even 
Louis Beam. In either event a dangerous potential exists wheo men, with guns 
and hate on their minds, "talk to God." 
D. ANALYSIS OF CSAL 
1. Structural Realist Model 
Justice Department agents must have been extremely surprised at the 
existence of CSAL's robust arsenal cache and weapons manufacturing 
capabilities; they were probably mortified upon discovering CSAL's to-tech WMD 
capability and nefarious plans to use this ability upon the unsuspecting 
population of a large U.S. city. After an extensive review of the radical side of 
the Identity movement, it appears that their main goal is to segregate 
themselves from the multi-ethnic, multi-religious culture that is distinctly 
442 J.D. Cash, "Agents Probe OKC Bombing Links To Bank Robberies." 
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"America." However, being "left alone" to the movement means that members 
object to paying income taxes, registering their vehicles, or following the lavvs 
and authority of anyone higher than the elected county sheriff. Certainly the 
discovery of cyanide is indicative of CSAL's desire to develop a potent weapon, 
one that could be used to "balance" against the power of the U:S. government. 
Equipped with WMD, leadership of radical Identity elements appear to believe 
that they can successfully create "white-only-enclaves" and Balkanize America. 
As shown in the narrative, CSAL possessed the finances and knowledge 
to modify and manufacture weapons and explosives. It is a foregone conclusion 
that the necessary materials and equipment to develop a "lo-tech" WMD were 
available to them. As the logistics and weapons supply stock-point for the 
loosely connected movement, CSAL association with the Aryan Nations and 
National Alliance suggests that these groups see some utility in development of 
alliances as a method to externally balance against their perceived enemies. 
Viewed through the framework of the Structural Realist Model of Effective 
Demand quickly elucidates CSAL's deadly potential, see Table 6-2. However, it 
is still glaringly evident that Structural Realist Theory provides little in the way of 
explaining how CSAL came so close to transcending the "traditional constraints" 
that have held back other non-state groups from developing WMD. Again the 
analysis turns to the Theory of Structural Realism and Organizational Process to 
find these answers. 
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2. The Theory of Structural Realism and Organizational Process 
If one is truly immersed in the culture and ideology of Identity beliefs, then 
the acquisition of a powerful weapon becomes a logical objective. Following 
Gordon Kahl's death and the 1983 summit held at Aryan Nations (Hayden 
Lakes, Idaho), Jim Ellison must certainly have been experiencing a heightened 
sense of a "security dilemma," a dilemma that ultimately led CSAL to 
manufacture and stockpile the deadly chemical agent cyanide. Of greater 
interest is why? Why, did CSAL choose to develop a WMD program when other 
non-state terrorist groups (groups that probably have more legitimate reasons to 
be engaging in "terrorist violence") have eschewed such things? The Synthetic 
Theory of Realism and Organizational Process helps to provide answers to this 
perplexing question. 
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Attribute Set for Structural Realist Model of Effective Demand: CSAL 
Demand Indicator Score .0 or 1.0 Supply Indicator Score .0 or 1.0 
Desire for power Group 
great enough to 1.0 membership 1.0 
balance against the knowledgeable of 




resources to fund 








Structural Realist Model 
Desire for Power to "balance" x (Knowledge x Funding x Access)= 
Effective Demand: 
1. x (1. x 1. x 1.) = 1.0- no negative external influences= CSAL Effective 
Demand for WMD 
Table 6-2: Analysis of CSAL: Structural Realist Model 
a. Power to Balance Against the State 
The argument for CSAL's desire to acquire the power afforded by 
WMD was thoroughly addressed in the proceeding section. CSAL receives a 
score of 1.0 for this indicator 
b. Leadership of the "Authoritarian Sociopath" 
Personality 
Jim Ellison was obviously an individual concerned with his fellow 
man. Originally his compound of Zarepath-Horeb was created to provide social-
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misfits a religiously oriented haven where they could come and sort out their 
lives. Unfortunately, somewhere along the line, this former Protestant 
fundamentalist preacher from Texas became enthralled with the power and 
image he must have portrayed to the former cons and drug abusers, mis-fits who 
came to him looking for answers. This situation is a prime example of Dr. Post's 
"lock and key" relationship discussed in Chapter II of this study. Here, powerful 
forces are at work wherein Jim Ellison, representing the "mirror-hungry" 
personality, finds those poor lost souls representing the "mirror-ideal" 
personality. The sum of this dynamic resulted in Jim Ellison becoming a 
practicing polygamist and an authoritarian leader who allegedly ruled CSAL 
members with a heavy hand. CSAL receives a score of 1.0 for this indicator. 
c. Ideology 
The underpinning belief of the Identity "religion" is one of paranoia, 
mistrust, ethnic and racist hate, religious prejudice and white supremacy. This 
belief system automatically blames a "large" percentage of the world population 
for the problems they perceive as existing in U.S. society. In this situation, the 
only alternative for such individuals is to isolate themselves or destroy the 
offending population. Acts committed by those affiliated with this ideology 
provide ample evidence of their predisposition to use ultra-violent means in an 
attempt to "Balkanize" America. 
Though the Identity movement's Jim Ellison's, Richard Butler's, or Timothy 
McVeigh's may presently represent something less than a major security threat 
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to the citizens of the U.S. is irrelevant. Events such as Oklahoma City, the 
World Trade Center, or the Tokyo subway gassing will pale in comparison to 
what might occur when these "home-grown" American groups start to execute 
their strategy of "Leaderless Resistance," using WMD.443 To date the facts 
surrounding radical, Identity groups suggest they possess a "ripeness" to 
develop and use WMD in their version of Identity "Jihad" in America. For 
expositing an ideology that supports ultra-violent means to ends, CSAL receives 
a score of 1.0. 
d. Extremist Use of Ultra-Violence 
The reason the Second Amendment was put into the United States 
Constitution ... (was) so that when officials of the federal and state 
and local government get out of hand, you can s~oot 
them ... eventually people like Janet Reno will be ... summarily 
executed. 
- Mark Reynolds, Unorganized Militia 
Stevens County, Washington 
Following the death of Gordon Kahl, Jim Ellison directed a 
campaign of terrorist acts that gradually escalated. This included the bombing of 
a major natural gas pipeline in Fulton, Arkansas. The facts suggest that CSAL's 
primary mission, within the coalition of the Aryan Nations, National Alliance, and 
Ku Klux Klan, was to provide training, weapons, and logistic support to the para-
military "cells" of this loosely connected alliance. Part of that support included 
443 William Pierce's fictional novei"The Turner Diaries" is often referred to as 
the "bible" of the extreme right. This novel calls for white America to mount an 
insurgency against the Federal government, an insurgency that culminates in the 
detonation of a nuclear device (set off by the "Patriots") in Washington D.C. 
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the manufacture and stockpiling of cyanide, to eventually be used in an attack 
against several large metropolitan cities. CSAL receives a score of 1.0 for this 
indicator. 
e. The Closed Constituency and Group Cohesiveness 
This attribute is truly self-evident. CSAL and the Identity 
movement represent a small part of a "size yet to be determined" closed cell 
system of anti-government, racist, white supremacists. In fact CSALs group 
dynamics parallel much of what is seen in the cells of radical Islamic groups with 
one exception, Islam is supplanted by radical Christian Identity. CSAL receives 
a score of 1.0 for this indicator. 
f. Lack of Concern over Public or Government Backlash 
This study has established that closed cell groups typically do not 
concern themselves with the effects negative public opinion may have on the 
group. Ellison did not purport to represent the masses, only that part of "white 
America" that chose to follow him. On balance, when members of the radical 
right are arrested by the authorities, they seem more than willing to "turn" on the 
movement. Jim Ellison testified on behalf of the prosecution in the 1988 trial of 
Richard Butler, Louis Beam and Robert Miles. In this particular case, these 
individuals were accused (and acquitted) of inspiring the crime spree played out 
by members of ''The Order." 
Despite this "proclivity to roll over" once ~aught, members of these 
groups seemed unconcerned with the efforts of the Justice Department to 
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eradicate them. Indeed, as discussed in this Chapter, members of "The Order," 
and other such groups, seem to prefer standing their ground and "shooting it out 
with the Feds" over surrendering to a government they do not recognize as 
legitimate! Surrender, under these circumstances, is viewed as giving into the 
Devil. As Pierce writes in his fictional account of Earl Turner: -
With the other initiates he is given a necklace with a pendant bearing a 
cyanide capsule. He then reiterates the sacrad compact: 'I offer you my 
life. Do You accept it?' To this the priest replies: 'Brother! We accept 
your life. In return we offer you everlasting life in us. Your deed shall not 
be in vain, nor shall it be forgotten, until the end of time.' 'Even though 
you die,' the priest promises, 'you will continue to live in us.' 'Only in the 
moment of my death,' Turner repeats the words, 'will I achieve full 
membership in the Order. '444 
How distinctly familiar this position is. As in the case of the Sicarrii Jews; the 
Japanese government of 1941 ; Aum Shinrikyo; and the Jihad Organization; 
survival becomes dependant on the ability to strike a blow severe enough to 
cause the opposition to capitulate or negotiate terms favorable to the attacker, 
thus the utility of WMD use. If an attempt to strike out using WMD results in 
their eradication, so be it, as death is better than life under the tyranny of the 
Zionist Occupation Government. For this indicator CSAL receives a score of 
1.0. 
g. A Willingness to Take Risks 
Jim Ellison made a decision to participate in a campaign of terror 
following Gordon Kahl's death. To Ellison, his followers and associates he was 
444 James A. Aho, The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism 
(Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1990), 64. 
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allied with {specifically the Aryan Nations and National Alliance), the risks 
involved with their plan to attack their enemies (Jews and the Federal 
government) were worth the pay-off they perceived as reachable. For this 
indicator CSAL receives a score of 1.0. 
h. A Demonstration of a Certain Degree of Sophistication 
in Weaponty or Tactics 
Ellison's follower's included those who knew and understood how 
to wage a guerrilla war, manufacture explosive devices, modify weapons, and 
produce deadly chemical agents. For this indicator CSAL receives a score of 
1.0. 
i. Membership Knowledgeable of WMD Technical 
Requirements 
The educational background of those involved with CSAL is 
assumed to be high enough to at least have enabled the development and 
weaponization of a "lo-tech" WMD (cyanide) and dispersal system. For this 
indicator CSAL receives a score of. 7. 
j. Financial Resources to Fund a WMD Capability 
CSAL is known to have generated financial reserves by: teaching 
para-military seminars; weapons sales; donations from supporters; illegal 
activities of a varied nature. The existence of the group's robust arms cache and 
cyanide stockpile indicate that they possessed an adequate financial base to 




k. Intervening Processes and Summary of the Analysis 
The primary Intervening Processes seen as enhancing Effective 
Demand for the CSAL are the same as those noted in the case of the Jihad 
Organization. In essence they include the rights, freedoms, and protection 
afforded citizens of the U.S.; and the ability to access a plethora of materials 
needed to construct a to-tech WMD. Table 5-3 provides a visual summary of the 
CSAL analysis. 
E. SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS 
The analysis of CSAL through both theoretical frameworks indicates the 
.group possessed Effective Demand for WMD. As in the previous two cases, 
structural realism seems to provide the stronger theoretical explanation 
concerning CSAL's desires for WMD, though it again fails to address important 
questions concerning the group's ability to overcome traditional constraints that 
have precluded others from developing a WMD potential. In this regard, the 
utility of the synthetic model is reconfirmed. Indeed, it truly elucidates why CSAL 
was able to ignore these constraints to produce cyanide poison for the purpose 
of causing a mass casualty event. 
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Attribute Set for The Synthetic Theory of Realism and Organizational 
Process: 
"Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord" 
Demand Score .0-1.0 Supply Score .0-1.0 
Indicator Indicators 
Group desires Group exhibits 
power to balance sophisticated use 
against the state 1.0 of weapons or 1.0 
or regime tactics 
Group leader Group includes 
manifests the individuals 
"authoritarian- 1.0 knowledgeable of 0.7 
sociopathic" WMD technology 
personality 
Ideology Group possesses 
advocates use of financial 
ultra-violence 1.0 resources to fund 1.0 
WMD program 
Group engages Group has 
in extremes of access to WMD 
violence 1.0 materials and 1.0 
technology 
Group is closed 
cell and cohesive 1.0 
Group disregards 
backlash 1.0 
Group willing to 
take high risks 1.0 
Product of Demand Indicators = 1.0 Product of Supply Indicators = 0.6 
Dl x Sl =Effective Demand(r) - Intervening Process =Effective Demand for 
WMD 
1.0 x .7 = .7-enhancing Intervening Process= Effective Demand for 
"lo-tech" WMD 
Table 6-3 Summary of CSAL Analysis: Synthetic Model 
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VII. THE CASE OF THE PROVISIONAL WING OF THE IRISH REPUBLICAN 
ARMY(PIRA) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The conflict in Northern Ireland, often referred to as "The Troubles," 
possesses several unique attributes that make it an ideal candidate for inclusion 
in this study. First, the struggle of the IRA represents the "oldest"' active 
revolutionary movement still in existence. J. Bowyer Bell writes that the genesis 
of the movement dates back to the Society of United Irishmen and the rebetlion 
of 1798.442 The "Rising" of 1798 has since been followed by other "risings," that 
to this day have, for the most part, failed. 443 Second, the foundations of this 
movement are enmeshed with issues of ethnicity and religion, wherein 
generations of Irish Catholics have been at odds with the English and their Irish 
Protestant brethren, particularly in the northern areas of Ireland known as the six 
counties. Third, the violence that has characterized ''The Troubles" has typically 
been modulated and focused as each side attempts to force their agenda for 
resolution on the other. In summary-, this case represents two-hundred years of 
continuous violence, violence that has included terrorism, insurgency, and civil 
war. 
442 J.Bowyer Bell, The Gun in Politics, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction 
Publishers, 1987), 136. 
443 Ibid, 136. 
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1. A History of Conflict 
It is said in Ireland that when you reach the point were you think you 
understand the underpinning issues and events driving the violence, you 
understand nothing. Despite this truism, a short chronology of Ireland's difficult 
past and historic conflicts brings some retrospective insight as to why the conflict 
persists and festers: 444 
o 1155: King Henry II of England obtains a document from Pope 
Adrian IV, authorizing him to take possession of the island in return 
for paying the papal treasury an annual revenue. Despite 
possession of this holy decree, King Henry II made no attempt to 
act on this 'decree.' 
o 1169: Dermot MacMurrough, deposed Irish king of Leinster, gains 
the assistance of King Henry ll's court. Returning to Ireland with 
an army of foreign mercenaries, he recovers part. of his lost domain 
to include Dublin and towns on the east-coast of Ireland. 
o 1172: King Henry II visits Ireland to establish a presence of the 
crown. Several minor Irish chieftains and Norman leaders pay 
homage to him. In return they receive charters to take possession 
of several portions of the Island. Violent fighting ensued as the 
Norman leaders encountered stiff resistance to their plans to 
conquer, divide, and rule the Island. Those areas falling under 
Norman control become subject to England and English law. 
o 1185: Prince John of England is sent to Ireland by King Henry II. 
His despotic conduct results in civil disturbances and he is recalled 
to England. In 1210 he returns to deflate the power base of his 
Norman barons who have since made strong alliances with the 
Irish. 
o 1314: Edward Bruce of Scotland, invades Ireland in an attempt to 
overthrow English hegemony there. At the insistence of the 
English court, the Pope excommunicates Bruce and his Irish allies. 
444 This brief chronology is synthesized from "Ireland," Microsoft Encarta, 
Microsoft Corporation, (1993). 
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Though Bruce's invasion failed, he is credited with reducing British 
power in Ireland. 
o The descendants of the most powerful Anglo-Norman settlers in 
Ireland gradually adopt the Irish culture, language, and laws. To 
counter-act their pro-Irish sympathies, the Anglo-Irish Parliament 
passes the Statute of Kilkenny (circa 1366), which threatened 
excommunication and other penalties for those that adopted Irish 
custom and culture. However, by the end of the fourteenth century 
the power of the native Irish was great enough to restrict the 
English influence to a small area near Dublin and the port city of 
Drogheda, this area being referred to as the English Pale. During 
England's War of the Roses (struggle between the Houses of York 
and Lancaster), the Irish supported the losing house of York. 
o 1494: Henry VII places Sir Edward Poynings in the position of 
Viceroy of Ireland. Poynings first act is to reduce the power of the 
Anglo-Irish Lords by forbidding them to oppress their underlings, 
exact tribute from tenant farmers, or to assemble their armed 
retainers. He also enacts laws that prohibit Irish law and culture 
from being practiced in Pale; and also prohibits the Irish and 
English from living together (early form of 'Balkanization'). All 
political offices are filled by appointments made by the English 
King. Additionally, all legislation proposed by Irish Parliament must 
first be approved by the King, who then issues a license 
authorizing a session of Parliament to be held. 
o 1537: Henry VIII attempts to introduce the Reformation to Ireland. 
Once dissolution of the monasteries, relics, and symbols of 
Catholicism is complete, the King grants cooperative Irish 
chieftains a share of the spoils. King Henry VIII's strategy involved 
conciliating the Irish by giving them English titles and land grants 
under the authority of the English crown. Courts were run by 
English commission, however Henry the VIII's policies were 
designed to respect the culture of the Irish. In 1541 he receives 
the title King of Ireland from a consortium of native chieftains and 
lords of the Pale. 
o In the latter half of the sixteenth century, Queen Elizabeth I divides 
Ireland into counties as a response to a seditious uprising led by 
the rebellious Ulster chieftain Shane O'Neill. Counties are put 
under the stewardship of a commissioner of justice, each 
commissioner being vested with military powers which are used in 
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an arbitrary and often cruel fashion. Elizabeth's reign is 
punctuated by rebellions of the Irish Roman Catholics. In order to 
stop Irish rebellion, the English turned to using a tactic that still 
possesses great efficacy today; they devastated Irish villages, 
crops, cattle, and the Irish. Many died not from the ensuing 
conflict, but from starvation. 
Under Elizabeth and James I, the power of the Angelican Church 
of England extends throughout Ireland. As such the Church of 
England obtains the assets of the Church of Pale and that of the 
Celtic Church. The two later churches have a history of feuding 
and the negative relationship continues, particularly as the Church 
of Pale comes under the influence of the Reformation. The Celtic 
Church takes up the mantle of Roman Catholicism and with it the 
majority of the Celtic population of Ireland. The Pale Church 
comes to represent the political will of the English. Under James I, 
English law became "the law" in Ireland. Under his rule, the Irish 
Parliament loses the last vestiges of autonomy from English 
influence. 
o 1641: Under the leadership of Irish Chieftain Rory O'More, a 
conspiracy is formed to seize Dublin and expel the British. The 
Irish succeed in driving English settlers out of Ulster, the violence 
used against them being reported as "extreme." The insurgents 
join with the Roman Catholic Lords of the Pale and eventually 
make an accommodation with Charles I of England. 
o 1649: Lord Cromwell (of the English Parliamentary Army which 
successfully beat the Kings Royalist troops) lands at Dublin, seizes 
the city (which the Pale Lords had been unable to do), storms 
Drogheda castle and kills the 2000 man garrison. He repeats this 
success at Wexford. This war concludes with the English 
rewarding themselves by dividing up the spoils (in this case Ulster) 
amongst the soldiers of the parliamentary army. Roman Catholic 
and English Royalist "losers" in this conflict have their land seized 
and are banished. Later, under King Charles II, some of this land 
is restored, but nearly two-thirds of it stays in the hands of the 
Protestants. 
o Under King James II, Roman Catholics regain access to positions 
of state and control of the militia. Subsequently the entire Roman 
Catholic population sides with James II during the English 
revolution of 1688. Protestants are forced from their homes. 
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o 1691: Forces of King William Ill defeat the Irish. Under the terms 
of the Treaty of Limrick, Roman Catholics are allowed to retain 
their faith and lands they possessed under Charles II. The 
Parliament of England does not agree with this mandate and they 
force William to break the treaty. Subsequent to this the 
Parliament of Ireland withdraws laws of religious freedom and 
enacts the Penal Laws which seriously affect Irish commerce and 
trade. Under these laws, no Irish goods may be exported save 
linen. These measures are lauded as causing the economic 
decline of Ireland and the migration of significant numbers of Irish 
folk, Catholics going to Spain, Protestants to America. 
o 1778: Irish Parliament passes the Relief Act, removing many of the 
constraints imposed by the Penal Laws. Under a pretense of 
defending Ireland from encroachment of the French (who had 
allied with the Colonial Army of the Americans), the Irish 
Protestants put together an 80,000 man militia. Using this force as 
a lever, the Irish Protestants demand legislative autonomy from the 
British. Through the motions of British statesman James Fox, 
Ireland is granted relief from the Poynings Laws and much of the 
anti-Catholic legislation. However, the Irish Parliament, chaired by 
Protestants, is unwilling to extend suffrage to Roman Catholics. 
D 1798: The Catholic peasantry of Wexford rise under the banner of 
the Society of United.lrishmen to meet the cruelties imposed under 
Protestant rule. These 'insurgents" are defeated. In an attempt to 
satisfice both Protestants and Catholics, Prime Minister William Pitt 
· forces the enactment of a union between England and Ireland. 
Known as the Act of Union, its passage in January of 1801 does 
not preclude the continuance of sporadic violence and rebellion. 
D 1803: Irish patriot Robert Emmet leads an armed uprising which is 
quickly suppressed. 
D 1823: The Catholic Association is founded and successfully 
lobbies for the complete Roman Catholic emancipation in Ireland. 
Emancipation is granted in 1828. In 1829 Catholics are permitted 
to hold public office and seats in Parliament. Conflict between 
Catholics and Protestants erupts again as Roman Catholics balk at 
paying tithes to the Angelican Church. This conflict is referred to 
as ''The Tithe Wars." It is exacerbated by strong anti-Union Act . 
sentiments. 
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o 1838: A bill is passed in Parliament that converts tithes to rent 
charges, reducing the sectarian agitation for a time. By the later 
part of the nineteenth century many concessions are made by the 
English to reform sectarian and agrarian related inequities amongst 
the Irish. These things do little to supplant Irish nationalism and 
desire for home rule. Many secret societies working for the 
establishment of an Irish republic emerge, some engaging in 
political assassination and terrorism. 
o 1882: British Chief Secretary for Ireland, Lord Fredrick Charles 
Cavendish and the undersecretary, Thomas Henry Burke, are 
murdered as a protest against the establishment of the Coercion 
Act of 1881. This act give the English sponsored authorities the 
power to arrest people under the mere suspicion of treason. 
o 1886: English Prime Minister William Gladstone introduces an Irish 
Home Rule bill. The bill is opposed by the both the British House 
of Commons and in Ulster. Gladstone attempts to pass an Irish 
Home Rule Bill again in 1893, this attempt also fails. 
o In the later part of the nineteenth century-early part of the twentieth 
century, two organizations emerge to improve Irish economic and 
intellectual resources. One is the Irish Agricultural Organization 
Society (1894), the other being the Gaelic League (1903). About 
the same time, a conceptual aggregate of these two organizations 
emerges. Known as Sinn Fein, this group's focus is to promote 
Irish economic welfare and political independence from England. 
· As shown through this brief narrative, the conflict in Ireland has truly been 
a convoluted web of difficulties that has pitted the Irish against the English; and 
the Irish against themselves. 
2. Irish Republican Myths Fuel the Fire 
Republican history has, to a great extent, been mythicized, romanticized 
and embellished. This history, coupled with the persistent socio-economic-
religious differences that characterize the relationship between Irish Catholics 
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and Irish Protestants, has been the "fuel" that tends the fire of political violence 
in Ireland. Scholars who address the Irish ''Troubles" are very cognizant of the 
influence Irish history has on contemporary events. Bell states: 
In Ireland, each death somehow becomes magnified; martyrs and patriots 
have names; each ambush or assassination, every hunger strike, most 
boycotts or pogroms, every small war is exaggerated, echoing through the 
island and out on the world stage, filmed, transmuted into poems and 
plays, added to scholarly agenda - a special case for use by all. 445 
Robert Kee, in a discussion of Irish history refers to it as a folk-trauma, likening it 
to Jewish history.446 Kee and Bell provide specific and insightful examples of 
republican myths, myths that serve two functions: (1) to memorialize Irish 
republican heroes, (2) to perpetuate divisive attitudes that exist between 
Republican Catholics and Loyalist Protestants. 
The first myth addresses the Gaelic Chief Shane O'Neill, typically lauded 
as one of the great heros of Ireland for having fought the English under a 
nationalistic banner cry. Kee discusses this in a narrative covering O'Neill and 
the Battle of Kinsale (1601). The Battle of Kinsale marked the defeat of O'Neill 
by the Tudor King James I. O'Neill, who was also the Earl of Tyrone, then lost 
all his land (two thirds of the Ulster counties) to English-Scottish Protestant 
settlers. Kee described the Gaelic tribal society of this era as a loose 
association of tribal kingdoms that shared common laws, customs, and a 
language. Because of its individualistic organization, this tribal society truly had 
445 Bell, 60. 
446 Robert Kee, The Green Flag (N.Y.: Delacorte Press, 1972), 8. 
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no hope of becoming a nation. He asserts that Gaelic chiefs had no patriotic 
objections to submitting to an English king and states that O'Neill, who was 
raised as an Elizabethan gentleman in London, acknowledged the sovereignty of 
the English monarchy. O'Neill's opposition to English rule had more to do with 
Tudor efforts to turn nominal feudal ties into centralized administrative ones. 
Kee concludes that the Battle of Kinsale and the saga of O'Neill does not fit into 
the heritage of the Irish nationalist/separatist movement because O'Neill was 
only fighting for his local self-interest and ambition.447 
In a second example, Kee addresses the Battle of the Boyne (1690) 
which is steeped in both Unionist and Republican history. In this battle, James II 
(a Catholic king) is defeated by William of Orange (of the Protestant Parliament). 
Keep argues that this was a battle over religion and not nationality. He further 
suggests that in this battle the Irish supported their English king in the fight. 
This particular point is used to debunk assertions that "The Troubles" historic 
roots are vested solely in a nationalistic sentiment. Other myths Kee rebukes 
are those that suggest Irish Catholics have been oppressed by the English and 
that Ireland was held by English force. Here, Kee points out that from 1845-
1919 (a time when this "myth" was being spread by Irish nationalists), Ireland 
was in fact "held" by 12,000 Catholic Irishmen of the Royal Irish Constabulary, 
drawn largely from the younger sons of suffering Irish peasants.448 
447 Kee, 18, 12-14. 
448 Kee, 6. 
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It is notable that myths and heroes have been effectively used by Irish 
Nationalist to raise the spirit and emotion of Irish Catholics. A prime example is 
seen in the aftermath of the Dublin rebellion (or Easter Rising) of 1916. 
According to Bell, the rebels expected to be defeated but they also hoped to 
awaken another generation with their blood sacrifice. Their gamble apparently 
paid off, for within a year of the failed rising: (1) those killed became martyred 
patriots, (2) those detained became living heroes, (3) actions of the rebels 
mobilized the Irish population to support the Republican cause resulting in the 
Tan War, 1918-1921.449 Kee tends to differ with Bell regarding the underpinning 
reasons why the Irish population supported the Republican cause and fought the 
Tan War. He suggests that it had more to do with provisions of the Home Rule 
Act of 1914 which would have granted Ireland self-rule, but excluded the six 
Ulster provinces (the northern counties). This, Kee argues, is what truly 
infuriated a large segment of the Irish population causing them to rise up in the 
Republican cause to fight the British.450 Lastly, the power of Irish myths can be 
seen in the 1970s Irish civil rights movement and the emergence of the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army. Again, Bell succinctly sets the stage for this 
event by noting that: 
Ireland has not always been a very practical country, has often preferred 
the old myths to the new realities, and still can be touched by the old 
449 Bell, 64-65. 
450 Kee, 591. 
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dreams made manifest in the old ways. 451 
During this civil rights movement, Bell argues that the PIRA exploited 
three factors to their advantage: (1) the living historical rituals that grant 
legitimacy to a long tradition of fighting for freedom, (2) the reluctance of the 
population to betray those who advocated the old ideals of the people, (3) they 
represented themselves as defenders of the northern Catholics. 452 
Irish schools in general are said to teach the heroes-and-martyrs-history. 
For those PIRA volunteers, this is typically where they develop a strong sense of 
Irish nationalism, a nationalism born of a highly emotional, troubled, history. 
B. "THE TROUBLES" IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
The settlement to the Tan War was codified in the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 
1921. This treaty partitioned Ireland into two parts. The lower part included 
twenty-six predominately Catholic counties that became a dominion of the 
United Kingdom. The six northern counties remained a British province, the 
majority of the population being descendent of Protestant settlers. Despite 
being born of Ireland, many Irish Protestants considered themselves "British" 
and truly feared complete independence because they would become a minority 
in a united Ireland. In Ulster, the Protestant population enjoyed a two to one 
majority over Catholics to include dominance in areas of politics and business. 
The twenty-six southern counties operated within the Commonwealth as the 
451 Bell, 179. 
452 Ibid., 179. 
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Free State until becoming the Irish Republic in 1949. 
Since 1921, Ireland has seen the development of various "groups." 
There are the Loyalist and Unionist who consider themsetves British and who 
desire to keep the six northern counties as part of the United Kingdom. 
Loyalist/Unionist parties gave rise to the development of the Ulster Defense 
Force and the Ulster Defence Association. These paramilitary groups were 
formed to protect Protestant citizens from violence perpetrated by Republican 
(Catholic) terrorists. Then there are the Nationalists who desire a settlement 
that will unite Northern Ireland and the Republic through the use of non-violent 
means. They are represented by the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) 
presently headed by John Hume. Republicans are those that want both a united 
Ireland and a complete withdrawal of British forces from the northern counties. 
They advocate the use of force to accomplish this objective. The Provisional 
Wing of the Irish Republican Army is Republican. PIRA's political arm is the 
Sinn Fein party headed by Gerry Adams. 
As mentioned, the IRA has its roots in the rise of various secret societies 
that emerged in Ireland during the late 1700s. The IRA appeared following the 
failure of the 1916 Easter Uprising in Dublin. Since that time, the IRA 
membership has vacillated according to trends in the political and social 
environment of Ireland In 1969, the IRA received a major boost when authorities 
used unprecedented violence to quell a rather pacifistic civil rights protest being 
staged in Derry. This crackdown convinced IRA members that the organization, 
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as chartered, could do little to protect Catholics from physical violence, let alone 
protect their civil rights. Young members anxious to accelerate their plan for a 
united Ireland splintered off from the IRA and formed the Provisional Wing of the 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA).453 PIRA's goal is the same as that of the IRA, 
however their doctrine and strategy calls for the use of violence to achieve their 
objectives. 454 
In 1977 the Provisionals conceded that their struggle to drive the British 
from Ulster would take decades. As a result, they underwent an organizational 
and philosophical reorganization. The Provisional's adopted a two tiered 
approach for realizing their objective of a united Ireland and British expulsion - a 
"long way" and an "open way." Within this doctrine were two underpinning sub-
objectives: (1) to make the northern counties ungovernable by sapping the will of 
the British government and public; and (2) to provoke extreme countermeasures 
by alienating the Catholic community from existing institutions, making them 
more dependant on the PIRA. 
The "long way" approach centered around preparing for years of 
insurgency and called for restructuring the PIRA army of brigades and battalions 
453 Builta, 513. 
454 The spirit of the PIRA is stated in point three of its constitution under the 
heading of Means: "To wage revolutionary armed struggle." see Martin Dillon, The Dirty 
War, (London: Arrow Books Limited, 1990), 483. Note also that though IRA officials 
were not adverse to the use of the gun, they were concerned that the use of physical 
force as the sole method for forcing their agenda would lead to sectarian war and 
would never unite the whole of Ireland. See J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA 
1916-1979, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1979), 37. 
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to a less vulnerable "revolutionary cell"structure. These cells are made up of 
clandestine groups of Active Service Units (ASU). ASU's carry out the terrorist 
actions of the PIRA. Each ASU is comprised of five to twelve members and 
possesses a particular expertise, e.g., bomb-making, intelligence gathering, 
bank robbery, assassination. Four to five cells are loosely connected to a local 
brigade or area commander. The local commander takes his orders from a 
seven-man Army Council which meets monthly to discuss strategy and authorize 
various operations. Every six months the Army Executive meets to evaluate the 
actions of the Army Council and elects Council members. The entire structure is 
under the leadership of the General Army Convention, which meets every two 
years. 455 Moving to a cellular structure of well trained members is reported to 
have increased the efficiency of the PIRA which is said to possess a hard corps 
cadre of 400-500 supported by several thousand sympathizers. 456 They are also 
noted for their ability to execute terrorist operations and their ability to avoid 
being caught. 457 
455 Builta, 513. 
456 Ibid., 513. 
457 The increased efficiency and effectiveness of the (P)IRA has been noticed by 
British military members stationed in Ulster. One retired brigadier general noted that· 
"Evidence ... does not support the view that they are mindless hooligans drawn from the 
unemployed and the unemployable. The Provisional IRA now trains and uses its 
members with some care. The AS Us are for the most part manned by terrorist 
tempered by up to ten years operational service." See Tom F. Baldy, Battle for Ulster: 
A Study of Internal Security, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 
1987), 69. 
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The "open way" strategy centered on assisting the IRA's political struggle. 
through the political efforts of the Sinn Fein party, efforts designed specifically to 
afford conflicting parties a non-violent alternative method (negotiation) for 
resolving the problems. In fact, Sinn Fein gained dramatic electoral support at 
the expense of the more moderate SDLP, following the republican hunger strikes 
in the late 1970s. 458 
1. (P)IRA Campaign 1970-1996 
The (P)IRA spent most of 1970 training and equipping a cadre of hard-
core members.459 Intense sweeps by security forces resulted in the capture of 
many weapons caches forcing the (P)IRA to produce their own weapons ... and 
they did. They developed a top notch capability to produce quality improvised 
explosive devices. In 1970 they began a bombing campaign to drive the security 
forces from IRA strongholds and to destroy commercial property. The 1970s are 
said to have been the bloodiest years of "The Troubles." Civilian deaths were 
high, sectarian tit-for-tat killings occurring on a frequent basis. The egregious 
acts committed by the (P)IRA resulted in a backlash effect e.g., they started to 
lose the support of their communities. In response to this the (P)IRA established 
a "priority of targets." First on the list are off-duty security force personnel 
458 Point four of "Means" in the IRA constitution states an aim "to encourage 
popular resistance, political mobilization and political action ... " See Dillon, 483; also 
Bell, 33, 240, 255. 
459 The "parenthetic P" is herein indicated to show that the PIRA and IRA share 
a mutual agenda. 
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(British forces, members of the Ulster Defence Regiment and Royal Ulster 
Constabulary); the second target of choice includes on-duty security force 
personnel; third on the list are prominent government officials, primarily British; 
fourth are targets that when hit, disrupt the daily routine and commercial 
enterprises (include Protestant businesses and British homeland). 
In August of 1994, the (P)IRA declared a unilateral cessation of military 
operations when it appeared that the political circumstances had emerged 
wherein negotiated settlements (with the British Government) could take 
place. 460 Sinn Fein, representing Republican interests, desired these talks to 
address three areas: (1) political and constitutional changes; (2) democratization 
of the situation; (3) a demilitarization of the north of Ireland. H_owever, before 
any productive discussions could be enjoined, the British Government insisted 
that the (P)IRA surrender its vast arsenal of weapons and explosives. In the 
words of Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams, this precondition to negotiation: 
... not only denies Sinn Fein and our voters the right to negotiate the future 
of our island, but by extension denies that right to the rest of the Irish 
people also. 461 
In a January 1996 statement, Gerry Adams suggested that the British 
precondition was untenable unless it applied to British forces and the Irish 
Protestant paramilitary organizations of Ulster. Both sides deadlocked and on 
460 
"Building a Permanent Peace in Ireland: Sinn Fein's Submission to the 




February 2, 1996, the (P)IRA detonated a large explosive device in the heart of 
London's financial district.462 One hundred people were injured in the blast. In 
rapid succession, the (P)IRA launched a series of terrorist attacks against the 
British homeland. Bomb and mortar attacks were conducted against targets in 
London, Manchester; and the British Army barracks in Osnabru·ck, Germany.463 
On August 7, 1996, two car bombs were reportedly driven into the heart of the 
British Army's headquarters in Northern Ireland and exploded. Casualties 
included twenty soldiers and thirteen civilians (two children). British military 
authorities estimate that the device contained 500kg of high explosives.464 Until 
an accommodation concerning the demilitarization of both Catholic and 
Protestant paramilitary forces (to include the status of British force presence in 
Northern Ireland) is reached, peace talks between the IRA and British 
government will likely remain at an impasse. The violence continues. 
C. FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND AFFILIATIONS 
British intelligence estimates that PARA's annual financial requirements 
exceed $12.5 million to keep up operations.465 Sources of income include tax 
462 
"Huge Bomb Wounds More Than 100 In London," Reuters Ltd, January 2, 
1996. 
463 
"Chronology of IRA Attacks and Major Bomb Finds," Reuters Ltd, September, 
23, 1996. 
464 
"Twin Car bombs Explode at N. Ireland Base," Emergency Net News 
Service, October 7, 1996. 
465 Builta, 523. 
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fraud, legitimate business, drinking clubs, gaming machines, pirate videos and 
smuggling, protection and extortion.466 Other sources of funds come from PIRA 
counterfeiting and bank robbery. External support reportedly comes from 
NORAID, a U.S. organization based in New York City; Cuba; Libya; Algeria; and 
the PL0.467 NORAID support is said to have fallen somewhat following the PIRA 
assassination of Lord Mountbatten and members of his family in the 1970s. This 
event damaged PIRA's U.S. support network as many Irish-American became 
aware that NORAID was not a charitable organization but one designed to 
bankroll terrorists. In addition, Gerry Adams' Marxist politics turned off a number 
of anti-communist U.S. trade unions that historically had provided funds to their 
cause.468 
Network contacts for paramilitary training and acquisition of weapons is 
reported to come from the African National Congress (ANC); Basque Separatist 
Movement (ETA); Cuba; PLO; and Libya's Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. RISCT 
reports that: 
It is estimated that the PIRA acquired some 1000 AK-47s from Libya in 
the mid-80s; a number of heavy machine guns capable of use against 
aircraft, 12 SAM-7 shoulder-launched ground-to-air missiles, and over a 
466 Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism (RISCT), Northern 
Ireland: Reappraising Republican Violence, (Great Britain: The Eastern Press Limited, 
1991 ), 3; also see James Adams, The Financing of Terror, (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1986), 156-184. 
467 Builta, 523. 
468 Adams, 140-143. 
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tonne of Semtex explosive. 469 
Prior to the Libyan connection it appears NORAID was the PIRA's main source 
of weapons. Colt-AR15s and AR-180 Armalites from the U.S. are very popular 
with PIRA gunmen.470 The extent of NORAID's involvement in supplying 
weapons to PIRA is documented in various FBI investigations and sting 
operations. 
In 1976 NORAID was implicated in two large gun and ammunition thefts. 
One involved the theft of 1 00 M-16s and eight M-60 machine guns from a 
National Guard Armory in Danvers, Massachusetts, and the other the theft of 
over one million rounds of ammunition and several guns from Marine Corps 
Base Camp Lejeune, NC. The weapons stolen in Danvers were intercepted in 
Dublin; however, at least 600,000 rounds of the Camp Lejeune ammunition 
reached Northern Ireland. 471 
In the wake of these thefts the FBI conducted a couple of successful 
sting operations against U.S. gun runners. In 1981 "Operation Bushmill" 
exposed the 20 year NORAID operation run by George Harrison, a 66-year old 
Irish immigrant. During this period Harrison supplied the (P)IRA with more than 
1000 weapons and 900,000 rounds of ammunition. Later that year "Operation 
Hit and Win" resulted in the arrest of Gabriel Megahey and two of his 
469 RISCT, 15. 
470 Bell, 53. 
471 Adams, 145. 
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. . 
associates. Megahey, who formed a splinter group from NORAID, attempted to 
purchase weapons to include Redeye surface-to-air shoulder launched missiles 
from undercover FBI agents. Information received during this operation, led to a 
joint FBI, CIA, British intelligence, and Irish government operation. The following 
items were seized as a result of this joint venture: Korean-manufactured 
grenades, 1 00 West German automatic rifles, fifty-one handguns, shotguns and 
a .50 caliber machine gun.472 Although relying almost exclusively on external 
arms support, the (P)IRA have developed sophisticated home-made weapons. 
Examples include improvised multi-barreled mortars mounted on trucks and a 
Semtex drogue grenade which is designed to be dropped on the top of armored 
vehicles. The (P)IRA have also been credited with possessing a highly 
sophisticated and skillful improvised explosive device design and manufacturing 
capability.473 
The ( P)IRA have reportedly used their RPG-7s, machine guns and at 
least one of their SAM-7 s. They have had poor results with the RPG-7, which is 
an extremely difficult weapon to master. 474 Their use of machine guns and one 
reported SAM shot against British helicopters were lauded as unsuccessful. The 
PIRA's possible acquisition of a more lethal SAM capability has the security 
forces justifiably concerned. Besides Megahey's attempted Redeye purchase, 
472 Adams, 147-147, 149-152. 
473 RISCT, 14-15. 
474 Bell, 53-54. 
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the FBI has reported PARA attempts to obtain Stinger missiles.475 
D. SUMMARY OF (P)IRA CASE STUDY 
From the perspective of Sinn Fein and the (P)IRA, British preconditions 
for all-party peace talks, the disarming of (P)IRA, is untenable. In their view, 
they have made it clear that they are willing to commit to the democratic process 
as evidenced by a joint Sinn Fein-SDLP statement (made August 28, 1995) 
wherein both parties agreed to work together to remove the underlying causes of 
conflict and instability; and the ceasefire that went in to effect in 1994. 
From the perspective of the British and Loyalist/Unionists of the six 
northern counties, agreeing to negotiate with Sinn Fein and an the (P)IRA may 
be interpreted as providing an air of legitimacy to these groups. For the British 
in particular, this may be a very hard-pill to swallow indeed, as there appears to 
be a dominant element in the British government that remains locked in the 
victory/defeat mindset. Nevertheless it has been the international experience 
that inclusive dialogue is truly the only means by which seemingly intractable 
conflicts have been resolved. Recent examples of this are evident in countries 
such as South Africa, and the Balkans, and Israel (though conditions still remain 
tense in the latter two.) 
475 RISCT, 15. 
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E. ANALYSIS OF (P)IRA 
1. Structural Realist Model 
For twenty five years, the goal of the (P)IRA and Sinn Fein has been to 
expel British influence from Northern Ireland. Surely they desire a power great 
enough to compel the British government to negotiate with them. This would 
certainly explain why two members of the IRA reportedly went to Japan to seek 
out Aum members in a quest to investigate the potentials of WMD. 
In a meeting held between Gerry Adams (Sinn Fein) and John Hume 
(SDLP), a plan was drawn up and presented to John Majors calling for: (1) Sinn 
Fein participation in the Stormont talks following a new ceasefire; (2) 
establishment of a time-frame for these talks to take place; (3) de-arming only 
after significant progress is made in political negotiations; (4) introduce 
confidence building measures by releasing some terrorist prisoners and making 
reforms in the Royal Ulster Constabulary.476 John Major's government rejected 
these demands paving the way for what will likely be renewed (P)IRA violence. 
In statements made by Sinn Fein, the (P)IRA will minimally renew its attacks on 
police and army barracks in Northern Ireland and attempt to assassinate 
members of the judiciary. 477 
Within its cadre of members, the (P)IRA possesses the capability to 
476 Nicholas Watt, "IRA Threatens Renewed Violence Over Demands," The 
London Times November 25, 1996. 
477 Ibid. 
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develop, minimally, a .. low-tech" WMD capability. With access to substantial 
financial reserves, material (possibly even ready-made agents provided by 
rogue states such as libya), and membership able to produce chemicals or 
biological toxins, the (P)IRA surely possesses a .. ripeness" to develop and use 
WMD, see Table 7-2. In this case, as in the previous three, structural realist 
theory suggest that the PIRA does indeed possesses strong Effective Demand 
for WMD. However this is a "mis-prediction" for though the PIRA has had ample 
opportunity to develop such a powerful capability, they still rely mainly on the 
use of bombs, and guns to force their political agenda. An analysis of the 
(P)IRA through the framework of The Synthetic Theory of Structural Realism and 
Organizational Process explains: (1) why this is so; and (2) confirms the strength 
and validity of this frameworks usefulness to predict or disconfirm the existence 
of Effective Demand. 
284 
Attribute Set for Structural Realist Model of Effective Demand: (P)IRA 
Demand Score .0 or 1.0 Supply Indicator Score .0 or 1.0 
Indicator 
Desire for power Group 
great enough to 1.0 membership 
balance against knowledgeable of 1.0 




resources to fund 1.0 








Structural Realist Model 
Desire for Power to "balance" x (Knowledge x Funding x Access)= 
Effective Demand for WMD 
1. x (1. x 1. x 1.) = 1.0- no negative external influences= (P)IRA Effective 
Demand for WMD 
Table 7-2: Analysis of (P)IRA: Structural Realist Model 
2. The Synthetic Theory of Structural Realism and Organizational 
Process 
As mentioned, the goal of the (P)IRA and Sinn Fein has been to expel the 
British from Northern Ireland, but in a manner that would allow them a measure 
of legitimacy in the eyes of the global community, and the support of their 
Catholic constituents. Despite the news that the (P)IRA may be contemplating 
the development of a WMD capability, their use of such a weapon would more 
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than likely threaten vice facilitate their strategic objectives. 
a. Power to Balance Against the State 
Certainly Sinn Fein and the (P)IRA desire to acquire a power great 
enough to balance against the influence of the United Kingdom. However, 
rather then attempting to do this through internal methods involving the 
development and use of WMD, the have opted to engage in an approach that 
utilizes elements of legitimate politics and para-military (terrorist) operations. 
From the perspective of Gerry Adams and the (P)IRA, the British are truly not 
interested in suffering anymore casualties in this affair. Therefore intolerable 
damage can still be accomplished through the use of conventional means, a 
means that the (P)IRA has promised to use if negotiations are not resumed by 
Christmas of 1996.478 In addition, Sinn Fein continues to cultivate external 
support for their cause, in particular from the U.S. administration of President 
Clinton, a relationship that no doubt irritates the government of John Major to 
say the least. For their attempt to balance against the British government using 
both political and terrorist means the (P)IRA receive a score of .7 for this 
indicator. 
b. Leadership of the "Authoritarian Sociopath" Personality 
Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinnes, Mitchell Mclaughlin and other 
leaders in Sinn Fein and the (P)IRA can hardly be typecast as "authoritarian 
478 Tony Harnden, "New Bombing Alert As IRA Proposals for Ceasefire are 
Rejected," London Daily Telegraph, November 27, 1996. 
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sociopaths," though it is recognized that a few members of the (P)IRA may 
actually enjoy engaging in "terrorist" acts of violence. Certain members of the 
British government may feel that the leadership of Sinn Fein and the (P)IRA fit 
this mold, however it appears that these men are truly no different (in their 
minds) from the American colonial revolutionary insurgents that fought the 
British in 1776. On balance, this leadership has directed and managed a 
terrorist campaign that over the course of twenty five years has seen the death 
of 3,200 people.479 The (P)IRA receives a score of 0.5 for this attribute. 
c. Ideology Supportive of Ultra-Violence 
The underpinning ideology of Sinn Fein and the (P)IRA is reported 
to be grounded in socialism layered with a healthy dose of Cat_holicism. 
Members and supporters of these groups truly seek to rejoin Northern Ireland 
with the Irish Republic under a socialist-type government. As such, though 
terrorist violence is used, it has typically been focused and modulated in a 
fashion designed to compel the British government to the negotiating table. The 
(P)IRA receive a 0.5 for this attribute. 
d. Extremist Use of Ultra-Violence 
The "para-military" strategy used by the (P)IRA calls for attacks 
against British businesses in England, and military targets in the six counties. 
Though recent attacks in 1996 have incorporated rather large explosive devices, 
they have been set at times or in places where they would do minimal damage 
479 Builta, 535. 
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to "civilians." Considering what the (P)IRA are capable of, there terrorist acts 
have not been out of control. For this indicator the (P)IRA receives a score of 
0.5. 
e. The Closed Constituency and Group Cohesiveness 
The (P)IRA appears to be a fairly cohesive group; though the 
purport to represent the desires of the Catholic population of Ireland. For this 
indicator the (P)IRA receive a score of 0.3. 
f. Lack of Concern over Public or Government Backlash 
Sinn Fein and the (P)IRA are very much dependant on public 
support and in fact receive assistance from their main rival, the SDLP, in their 
attempts to reach a negotiated settlement with the British government. The 
legitimacy of Sinn Fein is an interesting paradox for as the political entity of the 
movement, they must keep themselves separate from the para-military 
operations (terrorism) conducted by the (P)IRA. On the contrary, both elements 
of this Republican effort rely on the support of the public, and the calculated risk 
that British counter-terrorist efforts can be absorbed. The (P)IRA can ill afford to 
totally alienate the Irish population, or "piss-off' the Brits. The (P)IRA receives a 
score of 0.3 for this attribute. 
g. A Willingness to Take Risks 
Truly a self evident attribute amongst the hard corps cadre of the 
(P)IRA. for this indicator (P)IRA receives a score of 1.0. 
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h. A Demonstration of a Certain degree of Sophistication 
in Weaponry or Tactics 
Again, for the hard core cadre of the (P)IRA, this attribute is easily 
recognized. (P)IRA receives a score of 1.0 for this indicator 
I. Membership Knowledgeable of WMD Technical 
Requirements 
(P)IRA cadre maintain the capability to manufacture their own 
explosives, explosive timers and the like. Personnel with this type of knowledge 
are certainly capable of constructing a "low-tech" WMD of a chemical or 
biological nature. For this indicator, (P)IRA receives a 0.7. 
j. Financial Resources to Fund a WMD Capability 
Since (P)IRA's annual operating expenses typically exceed some 
$12.5 million dollars annually, it is almost an axiom that the group possesses the 
financial capacity to fund a WMD program. For this indicator, (P)IRA receives a 
score of 1.0. 
k. Intervening Processes and Summary of the Analysis 
The Primary Intervening Process seen as degrading Effective 
Demand for the (P)IRA is related to their desire to participate in Irish political 
processes, and to be recognized by the global community as a legitimate entity. 
Committing horrific acts using mass casualty causing chemical agents, 
pathogens, toxins, or radiological devices would totally negate this possibility, 
see Table 7-3. If Gerry Adams, his Sinn Fein staff, and constituency desire to 
find solutions to resolve the conflict in a manner that allows their participation in 
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the Irish political process, then the (P)IRA will constrain themselves from using 
WMD in terrorist attacks as world opinion and British retribution would surely 
negate this possibility. For the (P)IRA at least, it would seem that the traditional 
constraints for precluding use of WMD are applicable. 
In this particular case note that the Synthetic Theory of Structural 
Realism and Organizational Process "gets the case right" by being able to 
identify, a non-state group that is less then likely to use WMD in a terrorist 
action. That said it has been reported in the London Daily Telegraph that two 
IRA activist travelled to Japan within the last year to research plans for 
conducting an Aum style raid on the London subway system. In response to this 
the British Transport Police are reported to have set up a consequence 
management capability in which a small team has been equipped with hand-held 
gas detectors and protective suits. Commenting on this issue a Ministry of 
Defense source said: 
Our intelligence on that visit lead us to believe that two IRA activists have 
travelled to Japan in the past year and were researching plans for such 
an attack on london. It seemed to us essential to speed up defence just 
in case any such attack was planned. 480 
Despite this news, Sinn Fein and its paramilitary counterpart 
(P)IRA, are ultimately desirous of maintaining a position that appears reflective 
of the desires and ambitions of the Catholic community in the Republic and the 
six counties. To engage in terroristic violence that includes the use of WMD 
480 Jo Knowsley, "Railway Police Set Up Nerve Gas Task Force," london Daily 
Telegraph June 3, 1996 
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would more than likely threaten that coveted position for the traditional reasons 
mentioned in this study. 
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Attribute Set for the Synthetic Theory of Realism and Organizational 
Process: 
"Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army" 
Demand Score .0-1.0 Supply Indicator Score .0-1.0 
Indicator 
Group desires Group exhibits 
power to balance .7 sophisticated use 1.0 
against the state of weapons or 
of regime tactics 
Group leader Group includes 
manifests the individuals 
"authoritarian .3 knowledgeable of 1.0 
sociopathic WMD technology 
personality" 
Ideology Group possesses 
advocates use of .5 financial 
ultra-violence resources to fund 1.0 
a WMD program 
Group engages Group has 
in extremist of access to WMD 
violence .5 materials and 1.0 
technology 
Group is closed 
cell and cohesive .3 
Group disregards 
backlash .3 
Group willing to 
take high risks 1.0 
Product of Demand Indicators = .004 Product of Supply Indicators= 1.0 
OJ x Sl =Effective Demand(r) -Intervening Process= Effective Demand for 
WMD . 
. 004 x 1.0 = .004 - degrading Intervening Process = highly unlikely that (P)IRA possesses Effective Demand for WMD. 
Table 7-3: Summary of (P)IRA Analysis: Synthetic Model 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
A. OBJECTIVE PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study was to: ( 1) present an argument about whether 
terrorist groups with strong religious underpinnings represent the most likely 
type of non-state group to use weapons of mass destruction in· a terrorist act 
specifically designed to kill or injure a large number of people; (2) to identify key 
indicators which would have to be present in a group desirous of a WMD 
potential; (3) "fuse" these indicators into an appropriate analytic framework 
which could be used to determine a terrorist group's potential to develop and 
threaten use of WMD. 
1. Objective One 
Did this study present a supportable argument to adequately test the 
hypothesis suggested?, e.g., that religiously oriented terrorist groups are the 
most likely candidates to threaten use of WMD in a terrorist action. Though the 
study was limited to four cases (one being of an antithetical nature), three of 
these showed similarities indicative of a predisposition to commit unmodulated 
or disproportionate violence against perceived "out-group others." In each case 
(as argued and supported) this violence was done to satisfy: (1) the goals of the 
group and (2) God. And it is truly the perception that their acts were approved (if 
not demanded) by God that seems to be the over-riding, legitimizing variable. 
This variable, buried within the ideology of: Aum; The Jihad Organization; and 
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Covenant, _Sword, the Arm of the Lord, becomes the "great-unleasher" of 
constraints that have precluded secularly oriented terrorist groups from 
engaging in the threatened use of WMD. At a minimum these cases elucidate 
potential trends strongly supportive of the hypothesis. It is truly up to "others" 
interested in this subject to refute the findings through their own examinations 
and academic arguments. 
2. Objective Two 
This study found support for the notion that certain supply and demand 
variables need to be present for a non-state group to possess a "ripeness" to 
threaten use of WMD. However, noting the existence or presence of these 
variables does not automatically support the conclusion that th~ group under 
analysis will actually attempt a mass casualty causing event using WMD. Each 
variable or indicator needs to be closely examined and then "gauged" 
(numerically scaled) based on what is understood about group leadership, 
ideology, past behavior, group dynamics, and a host of other important 
"indicators." To effectively "gauge" a non-state group's WMD potential, the 
analyst must have a sound academic understanding of the underpinning 
ideology of the group being examined. Practical experience is also beneficial to 
this process. The study also addressed the importance of external-internal 
influences that may enhance or degrade a non-state group's ability or desire to 
develop a WMD capability. 
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3. Objective Three 
Two theoretical models were constructed and used to test the hypothesis 
concerning WMD proliferation amongst religiously oriented groups. One, based 
on Structural Realism, suggested that terrorists suffer from weak relative power 
in relation to the nation-state. To offset this asymmetric situation, the non-state 
group makes a rational decision to pursues the development of a WMD 
capability. Armed with WMD, the non-state group (particularly if it is able to 
maintain its anonymity), negates the game of mutual vulnerability which has 
been the cornerstone of deterrence-compellence theory. Here the power 
afforded by WMD, coupled with the relatively invisible "cross section" such 
groups typically present, leads to proliferation when certain supply variables are 
also evident. Unfortunately, though Realism theory explains why WMD 
acquisition would be an attractive option for the non-state group, it does not 
explain why some groups have pursued WMD capabilities, while others have 
eschewed them. 
Recognizing that a non-state group's decision to pursue a WMD program 
is the sum of complex motivations and dynamic interactions (dynamics that are 
truly a function of internal group variables such as leadership, individual and 
group psycho-social orientations, and the like), Organizational Process Theory 
was fused with those of Structural Realism in an effort to account for the 
influence of internal variables not considered by the latter. This "synthetic" 
model provides a more finite understanding that explains not only why certain 
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groups will choose to use WMD, but why certain groups will not. This is indeed 
exemplified through analysis of the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican 
Army. Even though Theory of Structural Realism scored higher in cases where 
both theories predicted Effective Demand, Structural Realism "mispredicted" the 
PIRA case, a case that the synthetic theory predicted correctly:· Minimally, this 
comparison shows that Structural Realist Theory tends to be more 
"deterministic" (rigid}, while "Synthetic Theory .. allows much more room for 
analytic nuance. In any event, each of these "models" provide those tasked with 
examining these issues a starting point with which to further investigate the 
phenomenon of WMD terrorism. 
B. WHAT COMES NEXT? 
An examination of statistics of those that die in the U.S. each year 
suggests that 38,000 of these deaths can be attributed to incidents involving 
hand guns, shotguns, and rifles. When compared to statistics detailing the 
number of annual deaths (of U.S. citizens) attributable to terrorist violence, the 
threat terrorist violence poses to U.S. citizens is truly minor. Unfortunately 
terrorist acts create within many people a superordinary sense of fear and 
vulnerability, the likes of which are not even generated by inner-city crime. 
The fact that this "security dilemma"exists in the face of statistical 
evidence that suggests a greater chance of dying on a metropolitan freeway 
does little to appease anyone. This "security dilemma" has been thoroughly 
enhanced by events that have occurred since 1993, events which include the 
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bombing of the World Trade Center; the nerve gas attack of the Tokyo subway; 
the murder of 168 Americans in the Oklahoma City bombing; the death of twenty 
four U.S. service personnel through two bombings conducted in Saudi Arabia; 
and what may very well turn out to be a terrorist act in the downing of TWA flight 
800 (an event that touched me personally as I regularly took care of the children 
of one of the casualties when I was of high school age). With these things in 
mind, the Executive branch, the Congress, and the Department of Defense are, 
as of this writing, enjoined in a multitude of prescriptive measures that will 
hopefully minimize the occurrence of terrorism in general, and WMD terrorism in 
particular. These measures include a series of new anti-terrorism laws and 
policies that:481 
D Make it a federal crime to commit an international terrorist attack in 
the U.S., punishable by execution of a death occurs adjunct to the 
terrorist act. 
D Make using the U.S. as a base to plan a terrorist attack overseas a 
federal crime. 
D Give the Executive Branch new authority to designate foreign 
terrorist groups, subject to congressional and judicial review, and 
lets the government freeze assets of foreign terrorists before the 
designation becomes public. 
D Ban terrorist groups from engaging in fund raising activities in the 
U.S .. 
o Expedite deportation of alien terrorists. 
o Bar members or representatives of foreign terrorist groups from 
entering the U.S .. 
481 
"Terrorism Bill Glance," Associated Press. March 17, 1996. 
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o Provide $2 billion dollars for enhancing terrorism-fighting measures 
for federal and state authorities. 
In addition, multilateral, mutually cooperative efforts are being fervently explored 
with our international allies and friends, efforts that should help mitigate potential 
threats posed by terrorist. 
Because WMD terrorism poses some unique challenges to those involved 
with WMD terrorism crises response and consequence management, a whole 
range of programs are being developed that will hopefully provide our major 
metropolitan ''first responders" with the equipment, training and coordinated 
interface that will allow them to effectively mitigate the damage caused in an 
attack should it occur. That said it is glaringly evident that anJ1ime crises 
response-consequence management teams have to go to work, we are already 
playing a game of "catch up football," particularly in the WMD scenario. 
Success in this area is truly dependent on the creation of extremely 
robust anti-terrorism capabilities, capabilities that will only be realized if new 
ideas are encouraged, and cooperative efforts are enjoined between local, state, 
federal and international entities, particularly in areas related to intelligence 
sharing. Note that I do not advocate an increase in legislative mandates that 
would further restrict, minimize, or otherwise intrude on the freedoms and 
protection we enjoy as U.S. citizens. Draconian methods are neither required or 
desired. What I do suggest is that a "Revolution in Anti-Terrorism/Counter-
Terrorism Affairs" takes place that will specifically focus at how we are presently 
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doing business with the multitude of assets we presently possess to combat the 
terrorist phenomenon. If these things are done right, we minimize the potential 
of our "having to exchange business cards " at future disasters such as the 
bombing of New York City's World Trade Center, and Khobar Towers, Saudi 
Arabia. General Shalikashvili put this in context when he stated that: 
notes: 
... We are going to have to do things differently ... lf we miss the 
opportunity, nothing will happen and we will have to wait for the next 
Khobar Towers. 482 
As Leslie Rodrigues of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute 
Chemical and biological terrorism can strike at any time in the heartland 
of America well out of the immediate reach of highly trained (military) 
strike units. The victims of such an attack wold assureqly meet a 
catastrophic demise as untrained and uncoordinated local and state 
emergence response teams attempted to ameliorate the horrible fate of 
these victims and quite possibly become victims themselves. Preparing 
first responders a, bolstering local, state, and federal coordination, and 
defining a national strategy to confront a domestic chemical and biological 
terrorist attack are (not) surmountable challenges so long as time, 
attention, and resources are devoted towards these ends. Doing so 
entails a major commitment by the Executive branch, Congress, and many 
others, but the costs of inaction are too horrible to contemplate. 483 
In conclusion, if there truly exists a terrorist threat to U.S. citizens, 
particularly one involving the threatened use of weapons of mass destruction, 
local and state law enforcement-emergency response agencies are going to 
have to rely on the Federal government for funds, training, and equipment. This 
482 
"Gen. Says Americans Need Cover," Associated Press. November 19, 1996. 
483 Leslie Rodrigues ''The Emerging Threat of CHEMBIO Terrorism: Is the 
United States Prepared?" CBACI The Arena, n. 6, November 1996, 6 
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can certainly be accomplished without our having to go on a permanent war-
time-footing. Most of those individuals who have recently attempted to 
characterize the nature of this threat are not suggesting that "the sky is falling." 
However, if we don't engage in a few sound precautionary measures, it just may. 
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APPENDIX. LOUIS BEAM'S "LEADERLESS RESISTANCE DOCTRINE" 
This essay was written by Louis Beam in 1983 and published at that time. 
Republished for purposes of this study. 
The concept of Leaderless Resistance was proposed by Col. Ulius Louis 
Amoss, who was the founder of International Service of Information 
Incorporated, located in Baltimore, Maryland. Col. Amoss died more than fifteen 
years ago, but during his life was a tireless opponent of communism, as well as 
a skilled Intelligence Officer. Col. Amoss first wrote of Leaderless Resistance on 
April17, 1962. His theories of organization were primarily directed against the 
threat of eventual Communist take-over in the United States. The present writer, 
with the benefit of having lived many years beyond Col. Amoss, has taken his 
theories and expounded upon them. Col. Amoss feared the Communists. 
This author fears the federal government. Communism now represents a threat 
to no one in the United States, while federal tyranny represents a 
threat to everyone . The writer has joyfully lived long enough to see the dying 
breaths of communism, but may, unhappily, remain long enough to see the last 
grasps of freedom in America. 
In the hope that, somehow, America can still produce the brave sons and 
daughters necessary to fight off ever increasing persecution and oppression, 
this essay is offered. Frankly, it is too close to call at this point. Those who love 
liberty, and believe in freedom enough to fight for it are rare today, 
but within the bosom of every once great nation, there remains secreted, the 
pearls of former greatness. They are there. I have looked into their sparking 
eyes; sharing a brief moment in time with them as I passed through this life. 
Relished their friendship, endured their pain, and they mine. We 
are a band of brothers, native to the soil gaining strength one from another as 
we have rushed head long into a battle that all the weaker, timid men, say we 
can not win. Perhaps ... but then again, perhaps we can. It's not over till the last 
freedom fighter is buried or imprisoned, or the same happens to those who 
would destroy their liberty. 
Barring any cataclysmic events, the struggle will yet go on for years. The 
passage of time will make it clear to even the more slow among us that the 
government is the foremost threat to the life, and liberty of the folk. The 
government will no doubt make today's oppressiveness look like grade school 
work compared to what they have planned in the future. Meanwhile, there are 
those of us who continue to hope that somehow the few can do what the many 
have not. We are cognizant that before things get better they will certainly get 
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worse as government shows a willingness to use ever more severe police state 
measures against dissidents. This changing situation makes it clear that those 
who oppose state repression must be prepared to alter, adapt, and modify their 
behavior, strategy, and tactics as circumstances warrant. Failure to consider 
new methods and implement them as necessary will make the government's 
efforts at suppression uncomplicated. It is the duty of every patriot to make the 
tyrant's life miserable. When one fails to do so he not only fails himself, but his 
people. 
With this in mind, current methods of resistance to tyranny employed by 
those who Jove our race, culture, and heritage must pass a litmus test of 
soundness. Methods must be objectively measured as to their effectiveness, as 
well as to whether they make the government's intention of repression more 
possible or more difficult. Those not working to aid our objectives must be 
discarded or the government benefits from our failure to do so. 
As honest men who have banded together into groups or associations of 
a political or religious nature are falsely labeled "domestic terrorists" or "cultists" 
and suppressed, it will become necessary to consider other methods of 
organization-or as the case may very well call for: non-organization. One should 
keep in mind that it is not in the government's interest to eliminate all groups. 
Some few must remain in order to perpetuate the smoke and mirrors vision for 
the masses that America is a "free democratic country" where dissent is allowed. 
Most organizations, however, that possess the potential for effective resistance 
will not be allowed to continue. Anyone who is so naive as to 
believe the most powerful government on earth will not crush any who pose a 
real threat to that power, should not be active, but rather, at home studying 
political history. 
The question as to who is to be left alone and who is not, will be 
answered by how groups and individuals deal with several factors such as: 
avoidance of conspiracy plots, rejection of feeble minded malcontents, 
insistence upon quality of the participants, avoidance of all contact with the front 
men for the federals-the news media--and, finally, camouflage (which can be 
defined as the ability to blend in the public's eye the more committed groups of 
resistance with mainstream "kosher" associations that are generally seen as 
harmless.) Primarily though, whether any organization is allowed to continue in 
the future will be a matter of how big a threat a group represents. Not a threat in 
terms of armed might or political ability, for there is none of either for the 
present, but rather, threat in terms of potentiality. It is potential the federals fear 
most. Whether that potential exists in an individual or group is incidental. The 
federals measure potential threat in terms of what might happen given a 
situation conducive to action on the part of a restive organization or individual. 
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Accurate intelligence gathering allows them to assess the potential. Showing 
one's hand before the bets are made, is a sure way to loose. 
The movement for freedom is rapidly approaching the point where for 
many people, the option of belonging to a group will be nonexistent. For others, 
group membership will be a viable option for only the immediate future. 
Eventually, and perhaps much sooner than most believe possible, the price paid 
for membership will exceed any perceived benefit. But for now, some of the 
groups that do exist often serve a useful purpose either for the· newcomer who 
can be indoctrinated into the ideology of the struggle, or for generating positive 
propaganda to reach potential freedom fighters. It is sure that, for the most part, 
this struggle is rapidly becoming a matter of individual action, each of 
its participants making a private decision in the quietness of his heart to resist: to 
resist by any means necessary. It is hard to know what others will do, for no man 
truly knows another man's heart. It is enough to know what one himself will do. A 
great teacher once said "know thyself." Few men really do, but let each of us, 
promise ourselves, not to go quietly to the fate our would-be masters have 
planned. 
The concept of Leaderless Resistance is nothing less than a fundamental 
departure in theories of organization. The orthodox scheme of-organization is 
diagrammatically represented by the pyramid, with the mass at the bottom and 
the leader at the top. This fundamental of organization is to be seen 
not only in armies, which are of course, the best illustration of the pyramid 
structure, with the mass of soldiery, the privates, at the bottom responsible to 
corporals who are in turn responsible to sergeants, and so on up the entire chain 
of command to the generals at the top. But the same structure is seen in 
corporations, ladies' garden clubs and in our political system itself. This orthodox 
"pyramid" scheme of organization is to be seen basically in all existing political, 
social and religious structures in the world today from the Federal government to 
the Roman Catholic Church. The Constitution of the United States, in the 
wisdom of the Founders, tried to sublimate the essential dictatorial nature of 
pyramidal organization by dividing authority into three: executive, legislative and 
judicial. But the pyramid remains essentially untouched. 
This scheme of organization, the pyramid, is however, not only useless, 
but extremely dangerous for the participants when it is utilized in a resistance 
movement against state tyranny. Especially is this so in technologically 
advanced societies where electronic surveillance can often penetrate the 
structure revealing its chain of command. Experience has revealed over and 
over again that anti-state, political organizations utilizing this method of 
command and control are easy prey for government infiltration, entrapment, and 
destruction of the personnel involved. This has been seen repeatedly in the 
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United States where pro-government infiltrators or agent provocateurs weasel 
their way into patriotic groups and destroy them from within. 
In the pyramid type of organization, an infiltrator can destroy anything 
which is beneath his level of infiltration and often those above him as well. If the 
traitor has infiltrated at the top, then the entire organization from the top down is 
compromised and may be traduced at will. An alternative to the pyramid type of 
organization is the cell system. In the past, many political groups (both right and 
left) have used the cell system to further their objectives. Two examples will 
suffice. During the American Revolution "committees of correspondence" were 
formed throughout the Thirteen colonies. 
Their purpose was to subvert the government and thereby aid the cause 
of independence. The "Sons of Liberty", who made a name for themselves 
dumping government taxed tea into the harbor at Boston, were the action arm of 
the committees of correspondence. Each committee was a secret cell that 
operated totally independently of the other cells. Information on the government 
was passed from committee to committee, from colony to colony, and then acted 
upon on a local basis. Yet even in these bygone days of poor communication, of 
weeks to months for a letter to be delivered, the committees without any central 
direction whatsoever, were remarkable similar in tactics employed to resist 
government tyranny. It was, as the first American patriots knew, totally 
unnecessary for anyone to give an order for anything. Information was made 
available to each committee, and each committee acted as it saw fit. A recent 
example of the cell system taken from the left wing of politics are the 
Communists. The Communist, in order to get around the obvious problems 
involved in pyramidal organization, developed to an art the cell system. They 
had numerous independent cells which operated completely isolated from one 
another and particularly with no knowledge of each other, but were orchestrated 
together by a central headquarters. For instance, during World War II, in 
Washington, it is known that there were at least six secret Communist cells 
operating at high levels in the United States government (plus all the open 
Communists who were protected and promoted by President Roosevelt), 
however, only one of the cells was rooted out and destroyed. How many more 
actually were operating no one can say for sure. 
The Communist cells which operated in the U.S. until late 1991 under 
Soviet control could have at their command a leader, who held a social position 
which appeared to be very lowly. He could be, for example, a busboy in a 
restaurant, but in reality a colonel or a general in the Soviet Secret 
Service, the KGB. Under him could be a number of cells and a person active in 
one cell would almost never have knowledge of individuals who are active in 
another cell. The value of this is that while any one cell can be infiltrated, 
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exposed or destroyed, such action will have no effect on the other cells; in fact, 
the members of the other cells will be supporting that cell which is under attack 
and ordinarily would lend very strong support to it in many ways. This is at least 
part of the reason, no doubt, that whenever in the past Communists were 
attacked in this country, support for them sprang up in many unexpected places. 
The efficient and effective operation of a cell system after the Communist model, 
is of course, dependent upon central direction, which means impressive 
organization, funding from the top, and outside support, all of which the 
Communists had. Obviously, American patriots have none of these things at the 
top or anywhere else, and so an effective cell organization based upon the 
Soviet system of operation is impossible. 
Two things become clear from the above discussion. First, that the 
pyramid type of organization can be penetrated quite easily and it thus is not a 
sound method of organization in situations where the government has the 
resources and desire to penetrate the structure; which is the situation in this 
country. Secondly, that the normal qualifications for the cell structure based 
upon the Red model does not exist in the U.S. for patriots. This understood, the 
question arises "What method is left for those resisting state tyranny?" The 
answer comes from Col. Amoss who proposed the "Phantom Cell" mode of 
organization. Which he described as Leaderless Resistance. A system of 
organization that is based upon the cell organization, but does not have any 
central control or direction, that is in fact almost identical to the methods used by 
the Committees of Correspondence during the American Revolution. Utilizing the 
Leaderless Resistance concept, all individuals and groups operate 
independently of each other, and never report to a central headquarters or 
single leader for direction or instruction, as would those who belong to a typical 
pyramid organization. 
At first glance, such a type of organization seems unrealistic, primarily 
because there appears to be no organization. The natural question thus arises 
as to how are the "Phantom cells" and individuals to cooperate with each other 
when there is no intercommunication or central direction? The answer to this 
question is that participants in a program of Leaderless Resistance through 
phantom cell or individual action must know exactly what they are doing, and 
how to do it. It becomes the responsibility of the individual to acquire the 
necessary skills and information as to what is to be done. This is by no means 
as impractical as it appears, because it is certainly true that in any movement, all 
persons involved have the same general outlook, are acquainted with the same 
philosophy, and generally react to given situations in similar ways. The pervious 
history of the committees of correspondence during the American Revolution 
show this to be true. 
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Since the entire purpose of Leaderless Resistance is to defeat state 
tyranny (at least insofar as this essay is concerned), all members of phantom 
cells or individuals will tend to react to objective events in the same way through 
usual tactics of resistance. Organs of information distribution such as 
newspapers, leaflets, computers, etc., which are widely available to all, keep 
each person informed of events, allowing for a planned response that will take 
many variations. No one need issue an order to anyone. Those idealist truly 
committed to the cause of freedom will act when they feel the time is 
ripe, or will take their cue from others who precede them. While it is true that 
much could be said against this type of structure as a method of resistance, it 
must be kept in mind that Leaderless Resistance is a child of necessity. The 
alternatives to it have been show to be unworkable or impractical. Leaderless 
Resistance has worked before in the American Revolution, and if the truly 
committed put it to use for themselves, it will work now. · 
It goes almost without saying that Leaderless Resistance leads to 
very small or even one man cells of resistance. Those who join 
organizations to play "let's pretend" or who are "groupies" will quickly 
be weeded out. While for those who are serious about their 
opposition to federal despotism, this is exactly what is desired .. 
From the point of view of tyrants and would be potentates in the 
federal bureaucracy and police agencies, nothing is more desirable than that 
those who oppose them be UNIFIED in their command structure, and that every 
person who opposes them belong to a pyramid type group. Such groups and 
organizations are an easy kill. Especially in light of the fact that the Justice (sic) 
Department promised in 1987 that there would never be another group that 
opposed them that they did not have at least one informer in. These 
federal "friends of government" are intelligence agents. They gather information 
that can be used at the whim of a federal D.A. to prosecute. The line of battle 
has been drawn. Patriots are required therefore, to make a conscious decision 
to either aid the government in its illegal spying, by continuing with old methods 
of organization and resistance, or to make the enemies's job more 
difficult by implementing effective countermeasures. 
Now there will, no doubt, be mentally handicapped people out there who, 
while standing at a podium with an American flag draped in the background, and 
a lone eagle soaring in the sky above, will state emphatically in their best 
sounding red, white, and blue voice, "So what if the government is 
spying? We are not violating any laws." Such crippled thinking by any serious 
person is the best example that there is a need for special education classes. 
The person making such a statement is totally out of contact with political reality 
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in this country, and unfit for leadership of any thing more than a dog sleigh in the 
Alaskan wilderness. The old "Born on the fourth of July" mentality that has 
influenced so much of the American patriot's thinking in the past will not save 
him from the government in the future. "Reeducation" for non-thinkers of this 
type will take place in the federal prison system where there are no flags or 
eagles, but abundance of men who were "not violating any law." 
Most groups who "unify" their disparate associates into a single structure 
have short political lives. Therefore, those movement leaders constantly calling 
for unity of organization rather than the desirable unity of purpose, usually fall 
into one of three categories. 
They may not be sound political tacticians, but rather, just committed men 
who feel unity would help their cause, while not realizing that the government 
would greatly benefit from such efforts. The Federal objective, to imprison or 
destroy all who oppose them, is made easier in pyramid organizations. Or 
perhaps, they do not fully understand the struggle they are involved in and that 
the government they oppose has declared a state of war against those fighting 
for faith, folk, freedom and constitutional liberty. Those in power will use any 
means to rid themselves of opposition. The third class calling for unity and let us 
hope this is the minority of the three, are men more desirous of the supposed 
power that a large organization would bestow, than of actually achieving their 
stated purpose. 
Conversely, the last thing Federal snoops would have, if they had any 
choice in the matter, is a thousand different small phantom cells opposing them. 
It is easy to see why. Such a situation is an intelligence nightmare for a 
government intent upon knowing everything they possibly can about those 
who oppose them. The Federals, able to amass overwhelming strength of 
numbers, manpower, resources, intelligence gathering, and capability at any 
given time, need only a focal point to direct their anger. A single penetration of a 
pyramid type of organization can lead to the destruction of the whole. Whereas, 
Leaderless Resistance presents no single opportunity for the Federals to 
destroy a significant portion of the Resistance. 
With the announcement by the Department of Justice (sic) that 300 FBI 
agents formerly assigned to watching Soviet spies in the US (domestic counter 
intelligence) are now to be used to "combat crime", the federal government is 
preparing the way for a major assault upon those persons opposed 
to their policies. Many anti-government groups dedicated to the preservation of 
the America of our forefathers can expect shortly to feel the brunt of a new 
federal assault upon liberty. 
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It is clear, therefore, that it is time to rethink traditional strategy and tactics 
when it comes to opposing a modern police state. America is quickly moving into 
a long dark night of police state tyranny, where the rights now accepted by most 
as being inalienable will disappear. Let the coming night be filled with a 
thousand points of resistance. Like the fog which forms when conditions are 
right and disappears when they are not, so must the resistance to tyranny be. 
"If every person has the right to defend--even by force-his person, his 
liberty, and his property, then it follows that a group of men have the right to 
organize and support a common force to protect these rights constantly." ---The 
Law. Frederick Bastiat Paris, 1850. 
308 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abrahamain, Ervand Khomeinism: Essays On The Islamic Republic, Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press, 1993. 
Abu-Amr, Ziad, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza, 
Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1994. 
Adams, James, The Financing of Terror, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. 
Address by Senator Sam Nunn during WMD-Terrorism conference sponsored by 
Los Alamos National Laboratory and Harvard's Center for Science and 
International Affairs (CSIA), Washington, DC, May 23, 1996. 
Adorno, T.A., Else Frankel-Brunswick, Daniel J. Levinson, R. Nevitt Sanford, 
The Authoritarian Personality: Studies in Prejudice, New York: Harpers and 
Row Publisher, 1950. 
Agence France Press, "Five Russian Troops Killed in Chechnya: Federal 
Command," November 23, 1995. 
Aho, James A., The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism, 
Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1990. 
Alabstro, Ruben, "Philippines Vows To Protect Leaders From Islamic Militants, 
Reuters, January 10, 1996. 
Alexander, Yonah "Will Terrorists Use Chemical Weapons?," JINSA Security 
Affairs, June-July, 1990. 
Ambassador Anthony C. E. Quainton, "Moral and Ethical Considerations in 
Defining a Counter-Terrorist Policy," in David Rapaport and Yonah Alexander, 
eds.,The Rationalization of Terrorism, Maryland: University Publications of 
America Inc, 1982. 
American Survival Guide, v. 18, n. 10, October, 1996. 
"Anti-Islam Jewish Judge Sentences Islam's Scholar for Life + 65 Years in 
Prison Along with Others," report, The American Islamic Group, San Diego, CA, 
January 18, 1996. 
Associated Press, "Judge Cautions Bomb Defendant," May 29, 1996. 
309 
Associated Press, "3 Suspected White Supremacists Charged with Robberies," 
October 10, 1996. 
Associated Press, "Gen. Says Americans Need Cover," November 19, 1996. 
Atlantic Monthly, September, 1990. 
Babbie, Earl, The Practice of Social Research· Seventh Edition, Belmont: CA: 
1995. 
Baldy, Tom F., Battle for Ulster: A Study of Internal Security, Washington, DC: 
National Defense University Press, 1987. 
Barkun, Michael, Religion and the Racist Right: The Origins of the Christian 
Identity Movement, Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1994. 
BBC interview with Bruce Hoffman, Ph.D. and senior lecturer at St. Andrews 
College, Scotland, NPR, May 26, 1996. 
Bell, J.Bowyer, The Gun in Politics, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction 
Publishers, 1987. 
___...._. The Secret Army: The IRA 1916-1979, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
MIT Press, 1979. 
Bonante, Luigi. "Some Unanticipated Consequences of Terrorism." Journal of 
Peace Research. vol. xvi, no. 3, 1979. 
Brenner, Charles, M.D., "The Mind as Conflict and Compromise Formation," 
article, New York Psychiatric Institute. http://plaza.interport.net. 
Builta, Jeffrey A., Extremist Groups: An International Compilation of Terrorist 
Organizations Violent Political Groups and Issue Oriented Militant Movements, 
Chicago, Ill: The Office of International Criminal Justice, 1996. 
"Building a Permanent Peace in Ireland: Sinn Fein's Submission to the 
International Body," document, Sinn Fein, January 10, 1996. 
Bullard, Janice, "Bombing Investigators Looking At Reclusive Oklahoma Cult," 
Gannet News Service, May, 23, 1995. 
310 
Campbell, CDR J.K., "Arms for the Insurgency," unpublished research paper, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Fall1995. 
Cash, J.D., "Agents Probe OKC Bombing Links To Bank Robberies," McCurtain 
Daily Gazette, July 16, 1996. 
Cassway, Nick, ''The Wit and Wisdom of Gas Attack Guru Shako Asahara," 
http:// www. webcom. com/-conspire/sayings. html. 
Clark, Richard C., Technological Terrorism, Old Greenwich, CT: Devin-Adair 
Company, 1980. 
Clutterbuck, Richard, The Future of Political Violence: Destabilization Disorder 
and Terrorism, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 
Coats, J., Armed and Pangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist Right, New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1987. 
Cohen, Norman, The Pursuit of the Millennium, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1970. 
Cooperman, A. and K. Belianinov, "Moonlighting by Modem from Russia," !.!.£. 
News and World Report, April 17, 1995. 
Crenshaw, Martha, "The Subjective Reality of the Terrorist: Ideological and 
Psychological Factors in Terrorism," in Robert 0. Slater and Michael Stohl, eds., 
Current Perspectives on International Terrorism, New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1988. 
__ . ''Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," in 
David C. Rapoport, ed., Inside Terrorist Organizations, New York: Columbia 
University, 1988. 
__ ."The Causes of Terrorism," Comparative Politics, vol. xii, no. 4, July, 
1981. 
__ . "An Organizational Approach to the Causes of Terrorism," Orbis, vol. 
xxix, no. 3. Fall, 1985. 
__ .''The Logic of Terrorism," in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
311 
Curtain, Maj. Larry, "White Extremism in the U.S. Military," thesis Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, 1996. 
Dees, Morris, "False Patriots: The Threat Of Antigovernment Extremists," report, 
Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, AI, 1996. 
Dillin, John, ''Terrorist Incidents in the US Raise Immigration Concerns," The 
Christian Science Monitor, March 19, 1993. 
Dillon, Martin, The Dirty War, London: Arrow Books Limited, 1990. 
Dollard, John, Frustration and Aggression, New Haven: Yale University, 1939. 
Douglas, Mary, Risk Acceptability According to the Social Sciences, New York: 
Russel Sage Foundation, 1985. 
Douglass, Joseph D. Jr., and Neil C. Livingston, America the Vulnerable: The 
Threat of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 
1987. 
Emergency Net News Service "Twin Car Bombs Explode at N. Ireland Base," . 
October 7, 1996. 
Emerson, Steven, ''The Other Fundamentalists," The New Republic, v. 212, June 
12, 1995. 
__ . Presentation at the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute 
conference on Chemical and Biological Terrorism, Washington, DC, 29 April, 
1996. 
1995. 
"Sunday Focus: The Trial We Should Be Watching" Newsday, July 7, 
Esposito, John L., The Islamic Threat: Myth of Reality?, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992. 
Europa, Prudencio R., "Saudi Trader Held In California Jail Linked To Muslim 
Extremists," Filipino Reporter, March 27, 1995. 
Ferguson, Doug, "Okla. Leader Says Community Anti-Government, Anti-
Violence," The New York Beacon, June 7, 1995. 
312 
Ferracutti, Franco, "A Sociopsychiatric Interpretation of Terrorism," Annal of th·e 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. cdlxiii, September, 1982. 
Gann, Lewis H., Guerrillas in History, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1991. 
George, John and Laird Wilcox, American Extremists· Militias Supremacists. 
Klansman Communists & Others. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1996. 
"Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study of Aum 
Shinrikyo," Congressional Testimony Hearing, October 31, 1995. 
Goble, Paul A., "Ethnicity as Explanation, Ethnicity as Excuse," in Robert L. 
Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., eds., Ethnic Conflict and Regional 
Instability, Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College, 1995. 
Goldman, John and Ronald J. Ostrow, "Iraqi is Nabbed in Pakistan and 
Returned to U.S. After a 2-Year Manhunt," Los Angeles Times, February 9, 
1995. 
Goldman, J.J., and R.L. Jackson, "Sheik, 9 Others Guilty in N.Y. Terrorism 
Plot," Los Angeles Times, October 2, 1995. 
Goldman, John J., and Robin Wright, "N.Y. Police Act to Avert New Terrorist 
Attacks," Los Angeles Times, February 15, 1995. 
Grier, Peter. "Evidence Linking Khartoum's Diplomats To New York Bombing 
Was Not Key Decision," The Christian Science Monitor, August 19, 1993. 
Guest, Robert. "Cult's Commune Of Torture: Harrowing Purification Rituals," 
The Daily Telegraph. March 24, 1995. 
Gurr,Ted Robert., ''Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases," in 
Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1990. 
Gurr, Ted R., Why Men Rebel, Princeton: Princeton University. 
Haass, Richard N., Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional 
Disputes, New Haven, Connecticutt: Yale University Press, 1990. 
Haeri, Safa., "Iran: Vehement Reaction," Middle East International, 19 
March, 1993. 
313 
Hales, Donna., "A Look At One Wilderness Compound, Gannet New Service, 
March 29, 1995. 
"Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood: Islamic Extremists and the 
Terrorist Threat to America," report, Anti-Defamation League, New York, 1993. 
Harber, David, Assorted Nasties, Arizona, Desert Publications, 1993. 
Harnden, Tony, "New Bombing Alert As IRA Proposals for Ceasefire are 
Rejected," London Daily Telegraph, November 27, 1996. 
Hoffman, Bruce, "Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Terrorism in the 
United States," R-3618, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1988. 
Hoffman, Bruce, Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a 
Religious Imperative, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1993. 
Hoffman, Bruce, Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum, 
Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1994. 
Huntington, Samuel P., "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs, v. 72, n. 3, (Summer, 1993). 
Interview with Bob Sands, November 3, 1996. 
Interview with Jerrold Post, MD, conducted February 9, 1996, in San Francisco, 
CA. 
Interview with Jerrold Post, MD, George Washington University, May 1, 1996. 
Interview with Jerrold Post, MD, George Washington University, October 25, 
1996. 
Interview with Linn A Campbell, MD, November 11, 1996. 
Interview with Don Silver, MD, and B.K. Campbell Ph.D., September 2, 1996. 
"Ireland," Microsoft Encarta, Microsoft Corporation, 1993. 
lshimura, Chiaki, "Events surrounding Doomsday Sect Aum Supreme Truth," 
Agence France Presse, March 22, 1995. 
314 
"Islamic Extremists and the Terrorist Threat to America," report, Anti-Defamation-
League, New York, 1993. 
Jackson, R.L., "Islamic Militants Given Life Terms in N.Y. Bombing," Los 
Angeles Times, Wednesday, May 25, 1994. 
Japanese Economic News Wire, April 4, 1995. 
Jenkins, Brian M., "Statements About Terrorism," Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. xiii, September, 1982. 
__ . "The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems," in Yonah Alexander and 
John M. Gleason, eds., Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism, 
New York: Pergamon Press, 1981. 
__ . The Potential for Nuclear Terrorism, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1977 
Joseph, Robert G., "WMD: A Proliferation Overview," in William H. Lewis and 
Stuart E. Johnson, eds., Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on 
Counterproliferation, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 
1995. 
Juergensmeyer, Mark, "The Logic of Religious Violence," in D. Rapaport, ed., 
Inside Terrrorist Organizations, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988,177. 
Kahane, Meir, Forty Years, Miami, Florida: Institute of the Jewish Idea, 1983. 
Kamp, Karl-Heinz, "Nuclear Terrorism-Hysterical Concern or Real Risk?," 
German Foreign Affairs Review, v. 46, n. 3, 1995. 
Kaplan, David E. and Andrew Marshall, The Cuft at the End of the World, New 
York: Crown Publishers, Inc, 1996. 
Kaplan, Abraham, "The Psychodynamics of Terrorism," Terrorism, vol. i, nos. 3-
41978. 
Karber, Philip A. and R. William Mengel, "Political and Economic Forces 
Affecting Terrorism," in Patrick Montana and GeorgeS. Roukis, eds., Managing 
Terrorism Connecticut: Quorum Books, 1983. 
Kee, Robert, The Green Flag, N.Y.: Delacorte Press, 1972. 
315 
.-!; 
Kernberg, 0., Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism, New York: 
Jacob Aronson, 1975. 
Kessel, Kelly P., "White Supremacist Said Grateful for NAACP Assistance," 
The New York Beacon, May, 3, 1995. 
King, Jeanne, "Profile of Sheik Omar Abdei-Rahman," Reuters, Oct 1, 1995. 
Knowsley, Jo, "Railway Police Set Up Nerve Gas Task Force," London Daily 
Telegraph, June 3, 1996. 
Knutson, Jeanne N., "The Terrorists' Dilemmas: Some Implicit Rules of the 
Game," Terrorism, v.4., 1980. 
Koontz, Harrold, Cyril O'Donnel, Heinz Weihrich, Management, New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1984. 
Kristof, Nicholas D., "Poison Gas Targets Secret Cult; Japanese Raids Turns Up 
Chemicals," The International Herald Tribune. March 23, 1995. 
Kristof, N.D., "Japan Police Arrest 2 Found Beneath Sect Headquarters," NY 
Times. April27, 1995. 
Kunii, Irene M., "Engineer of Doom," Time, June 12, 1995. 
Kupperman, Robert H., and Jeff Kamen, Final Warning: Averting Disaster in 
the New Age of Terrorism, New York: Doubleday, 1989. 
Kyodo News International, "Aum Member Says Deadly Sarin Gas Attack was 
Right," March 25, 1996. 
Laqueur, Walter, The Age of Terrorism, Massachusetts: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1977. 
__ . "Interpretations of Terrorism: Fact Fiction and Political Science," Journal 
of Contemporary History, vol. xii, no. 1. January, 1977. 
Leites, Nathan, "Understanding the Next Act," Terrorism, v.3, n. 1-2, 1979. 
London Sunday Times, "Syria Builds Nerve Gas Arsenal," November 17, 1996. 
MacNeil/Lehrer News Report, May 4, 1995. 
316 
Maranto, Robert, "The Rationality of Terrorism," in Martin Stann and Bernard 
Schechterman, eds, Multidimensional Terrorism, Boulder, Colorado: lynne 
Reiner, 1987. 
Marrs, Robert W., "Nuclear Terrorism: Rethinking The Unthinkable," thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December, 1994. 
Mendels, Pamela, "Arab linked To Anti-Terrorist Network," Newsday, March 
17, 1995. 
Merkl, Peter H., and leonard Weinberg, Encounters With The Contemporary 
Radical Right, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. 
Miller, Marjorie, "A Gun-Toting Society Confronts its Ambivalence Over Easing 
Controls," los Angeles Times, November 14, 1996. 
Morrison, Dan, "Threats Found On Bomb Mastermind," Newsday, October 7, 
1995. 
Mundi, S.D., Pangs of Proximity: India and Sri lanka's Ethnic Crisis, California: 
Sage Publications Inc, 1993. 
Mylroie, laurie, ''The World Trade Center Bomb," The National Interest, winter 
1995/96. 
New York Times, "After Bombing, New Scrutiny for Holes in Immigration Net," 
March 12, 1993. 
Newsweek, "Doomsday Cults: 'Only the Beginning,'. April 3, 1995. 
Newsweek, "Doomsday Cults: Only the Beginning," April3, 1995, 40. 
Newsweek, "A Cloud of Terror-And Suspicion," April3, 1995. 
Pasternak, Judy, "Did Bandits Bankroll Extremists?," los Angeles Times. March 
30, 1996. 
Post, Jerrold, MD., "Prospects for Nuclear Terrorism: Psychological Motivations 
and Constraints," in Paul levanthal and Yonah Alexander,eds., Preventing 
Nuclear Terrorism, lexington, MA: lexington Books, 1987. 
__ ."Its Us Against Them: The Group Dynamics of Political Terrorism," 
Terrorism, vol. x, no. 1. 1987. 
317 
__ . Living With Terrorism, London: Faber &Faber, 1975. 
__ . "Psychological Profiles of Terrorists," presentation, Association of 
Former Intelligence Officers 1996 Conference, Washington, DC, 25 October, 
1996. 
__ . "Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of 
Psychological Forces," in Origins of Terrorism, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990. 
__ . "Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior," Terrorism, 
vol. vii, no. 3. 1984. 
__ . "Narcissism and the Charismatic Leader-Follower Relationship," Political 
Psychology, v.7, n. 4. 1986 
Post, Tom, "Doomsday Cults: Only the Beginning," Newsweek, March 29, 
1995. 
Powel, William, The Anarchist Cookbook, New Jersey: Barricade Books, Inc, 
1989 
Press, Robert M., ''They Play War Games in U.S. Countryside," The Christian 
Science Monitor, March 23, 1981. 
Purver, Ron, "Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the 
Open Literature," report, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, June, 1995. 
Rafferty, Kevin, "Japan looks to Transvestite Actor to Save It From Doomsday 
Terror Cult," The Observer, April23, 1995. 
Ragin, Charles C., The Comparative Method, California: University of California 
Press, 1987. 
Rapoport, David C., "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious 
Traditions," American Political Science Review, v. 78, n. 3, September, 1984. 
Rapoport, David C. and Yonah Alexander, eds., The Morality of Terrorism: 
Religious and Secular Justification, New York: Columbia University Press, 
"Recent Trends in Domestic and International Terrorism," report, Center for 
National Security Studies, Washington DC, April 26, 1995. 
318 
"Reducing the Threat of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Proliferation and 
Terrorism," prepared testimony of Donald D. Cobb, Director Nonproliferation and 
International Security Programs and Walter L. Kirchner, Director of Defense 
Programs, March 13, 1996 to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate. 
Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism (RISCT), Northern 
Ireland: Reappraising Republican Violence, Great Britain: The Eastern Press 
Limited, 1992. 
Reuters, "MEPs plead for EU Action Against Dangerous Cults," February 29, 
1996. 
Reuters, "Expert Sees Growing Extremist Use of Chemicals," August 1, 1996. 
Reuters, "Egyptian Bombing Trial Underway in Denmark," February 28, 1996. 
Reuters, "US Lists Saudi Businessman As Extremist Sponsor," August 14, 1996. 
Reuters, "Danish Bomb Plot Trial to Climax on Thursday," March 9, 1996. 
Reuters, "Deadly Israeli Bus Blast Rocks Mideast Peace, "March 3, 1996. 
Reuters, "U.S. House Report Sees Terror Drive Launched," August 1 , 1996. 
Reuters, "Huge Bomb Wounds More Than 100 In London," January 2, 1996. 
Reuters, "Sudan Says Saudi-Born lslamist Left Five Weeks Ago," June 18, 
1996. 
Reuters, "Chronology of IRA Attacks and Major Bomb Finds," September, 23, 
1996. 
Reuters, "U.S. House Report Sees Terror Drive Launched," August 1, 1996. 
Richey, Warren, "U.S. A Safe Haven For Paramilitary Groups That Provide 
Legal Mercenary Training," The Christian Science Monitor, October 8, 1985. 
Risen, James, "Case of Spy in Anti-Terrorist Mission Points Up CIA's Perils," 
Los Angeles Times, February 11, 1996. 
Robbins, Ira, "Sheik's Side Witness Lies Won't Sway Jury," Newsday, March 
11, 1995. 
319 
Roberts, L. "Secret Tapes Key in U.S. Case Against Sheik," Los Angeles Times, 
January 8, 1995. 
Rodrigues, Leslie, 'The Emerging Threat of ChemBio Terrorism: Is the United 
States Prepared?" CBACI The Arena, n.6. November, 1996. 
Ronfeldt, David and William Sater, The Mindset of High Technology Terrorist: 
Future Implications From An Historical Analogy, Santa Monica, California: 
Rand, 1981. 
Russell, Charles A. and Bowman H. Miller, "Profile of a Terrorist," Terrorism, 
vol i, no 1. 1977. 
Ruth, Robert, "Conspiracy Is Focus Of Case In East," The Columbus Dispatch, 
November 17, 1996. 
Ruth, Robert, "Robbers laid Plans Carefully," The Columbus Dispatch, 
November 18, 1996. 
Sagan, Scott D., "The Origins of the Pacific War," in Robiert I. Rotberg and 
Theodore K. Rabb, eds, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, New 
York: W.W.Norton & Company, 1995. 
Salinas California, "Bad Batch of Heroin Sends Crazed Addicts to Hospitals," . 
May 11, 1996, 8A. 
Schecterman, Bernard, "Irrational Terrorism," in Martin Stann, and Bernard 
Schecterman, eds., Multidimensional Terrorism, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Reiner, 1987. 
Schelling, Thomas, "Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism," International Security, 
v.6, n.4, Spring 1982. 
Scherer, Ron, 'Verdict In N.Y. Bomb Trial Seen As Signal To Terrorists," The 
Christian Science Monitor, March 7, 1994. 
Schmid, Alex P., Political Terrorism: Research Guide to Concepts. Theories 
Data Bases and Literature, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1983. 
320 
Senator Sam Nunn's comments made during November, 1995 Congressional 
hearings on issues related to Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
Sheehan, Ruth, "Roots or Racism," San Francisco Chronicle, May 5, 1996. 
Shimbun, Yomiur, "Aum Recruiters Given Decorative Swords," The Daily 
Yomiuri, April17, 1995. 
Simon, Jeffry D., "Terrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons: A 
Discussion of Possibilities," R-3771-AFMIC, Santa Monica CA: Rand 
Corporation, 1989. · 
Smith, Brent L., Terrorism in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1994. 
Sprinzak, Ehud, The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991. 
Stern, Jessica "Contribution to Round Table Discussion on C/B Terrorism," 
manuscript for Politics and Life Sciences, May, 1996. 
Stohl, Michael, "States, Terrorism and State Terrorism: The Role of the 
Superpowers," in Robert 0. Slater and Michael Stohl, eds., Current 
Perspectives on International Terrorism, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988. 
Tahari, Amir, Holy Terror, Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1987. 
Tarrow, Sidney, Power in Movement, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1995. 
The Mainichi Daily News. April 25, 1995. 
The Irish Times, April 1, 1995. 
The Irish Times. April 1, 1995. 
The U.S. National, "Seventh Man Is Indicted In New York Bombing," August 6, 
1993. 
The Dallas Morning News, April 14, 1995. 
The Economist. March 25, 1995. 
321 
-------------------------------------. 
Thompson, Damian. "As The Millennium Approaches, The Armageddon 
Business Is Booming," London Daily Telegraph, August 8, 1996 
Thor-Dahlburg, John, "Bhutto Says Trade Center Suspect Also Targeted Her," 
Los Angeles Times, March 19, 1995. 
Turk, Austin T. "Social Dynamics of Terrorism," Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. cdlxiii, September, 1982. 
Tyre, Peg, "Sheik's Lawyers Rocked by Evidence," Newsday, March 13, 1995. 
"Sheik's Sermon's Haunt Him," Newsday, July, 3, 1995. 
"Sheik Sought Slaughter," Newsday, January 1, 1995. 
"Sheik Called Backer in U.S. Terror," Newsday, February 2, 1995. 
__ ."Bomber's Song FBI Makes Prison Calls for Testimony About Sheik," 
Newsday, March 27, 1995. 
__ . "Yousef Denies Role By Sheik In Terror Plot," Newsday, June 22, 1995. 
Ueno, Teruaki, Reuters. April20, 1995. 
USA Today, "Islamic Jihad Vows More Bombings Against Israel," April 1, 1996. 
USA Today, "Prosecutors Detail Guru's Alleged Crimes," April25, 1996. 
Van Biema, David, "Prophet of Poison," Time, April 3, 1995. 
Walsh, James, "Shoko Asahara: The Making of a Messiah," Time, April 3, 
1995. 
Walsh, James, "The Making of a Messiah," Time Magazine, April 3, 1995. 
Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 
Inc, 1979. 
Waltz, Kenneth N., "War In Neorealist Theory," in Robert I. Rotberg and 
Theodore K. Rabb eds., The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars, 
Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
322 
Wassim Absood, "The Militant lslamist Threat To Egypt." 
http://infomanage.com/nonproliferation.html. 
Watt, Nicholas, "IRA Threatens Renewed Violence Over Demands," The 
London Times, November 25, 1996. 
Wheeler, N.J. and K. Booth. "The Security Dilemma," in J. Baylis and N.J. 
Rengger, eds., Ditemmas of World Politics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. 
Wick, Steve. "Terrorism Evidence Destroyed FBI, CIA Point Fingers," Newsday,. 
April16, 1995. 
Wilcox, Philip C. , Jr. Statement of 25 June, 1996, Mr. Wilcox is the department 
coordinator for Counter-terrorism, U.S. State Department. 
Wooden, Kenneth, The Children of Jonestown, San Francisco: McGraw-Hill, 
1981. 
Wright, Robin, "First of 2 Trials To Open For Key N.Y. Blast Figure," Los 
Angeles Times, May 12, 1996. 
Xinhua, "French Minister/No Lesson To Learn From U.S. On Terrorism," 
August 7, 1996. 
Yelaga, Priti, "Worldwide Terror Plot Targeted 20 U.S. Jet Flights," Newsday, 
April14, 1995. 
Yudelson, Larry, "Search For Suspects In N.Y. Bombing Prompts Reopening Of 
Kahane Case," Jewish Telegraphic Agency, March 17, 1993. 
323 
324 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 2 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd. Ste 09442 
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox library 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Rd. 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
3. Dr. Frank Petho 1 
Chairman, National Security Affairs (NS/TE) 
Naval Post Graduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
4. Superintendent: 1 
ATTN: Professor Gordon H. McCormick 
(Code CC/Mc) 
Naval Post Graduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
5. Superintendent: 5 
ATTN: Professor John Arquilla 
(Code CC/AR) 
Naval Post Graduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
6. Superindendent: 1 
ATTN: Professor Peter Lavoy 
(Code: NS/LA) 
Naval Post Graduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
7. The Honorable H. Allen Holmes 1 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC 
The Pentagon, RM 2E258 










GEN Henry H. Shelton 
Commander in Chief 
US Special Operations Command 
MacDill AFB, FL 33608-6001 
Commander 
US Army Special Operations Command 
ATTN: J-2 
Ft Bragg, NC 28301-5000 
RADM Thomas R. Richards 
Commander 
Naval Special Warfare Command 
San Diego, CA 92155 
MG Michael A. Canavan 
Commander 
Joint special Operations Command 
Ft. Bragg, NC 28307 
The JCS Staff 
J-3 Special Operations Branch 
Washington, DC, 20318-3000 
COMNAVSURFLANT 
ATTN: VADM D.J. Katz 
1531 Dillingham Blvd 
Michigan House 
Norfolk, VA, 23511 
The JCS Staff 
ATTN: BG Conway 
Code J34 
Washington, DC, 20318-3000 
The JCS Staff 
ATTN: VADM J.S. Redd 
Code J5 










16. The Honorable Richard Danzig 1 
Undersecretary of the Navy 
1000 Navy 
Rm 4E732 
Washington, DC, 20350-1000 
17. Dr. Robert Joseph, Director 1 
Center for Counterproliferation Research 
National Defense University 
FT McNair, Bldg. 59 
Washington, DC 20319-6000 
18. Dr. Joseph Pilat 1 
Los Alamos National Laboratory 
Code F612 
P.O. box 1630 
Los Alamos, NM 87545 
19. OASDIISP 1 
Counterproliferation Policy 
2600 Defense, The Pentagon 
Washington, DC, 20301-2600 
20. The Honorable Ashton Carter 1 
Department of Defense 
OU&SD(P)/OASD/ISP 
The Pentagon, Room 4E817 
Washington, DC 20301-2600 
21. Dr. Gordon Oehler 1 
Nonproliferation Center 
Central Intelligence Agency 
Washington, DC 20505 
22. Andre Bossard 1 
Vice President 
C.I.S.C.P. 
78 Av. Der Champ ~lysces 
Paris, France 75015 
327 
23. Graham Saltmarsh 1 
Directorate of Intelligence 
S011 Branch 
Victoria Block 
New Scotland Yard 
Broadway 
London, SW1 H OBG 
24. Joseph L. Narog 1 
Defense Intelligence Agency 
Joint Military Intelligence Training Center 
DAJ-1 
Washington, DC 20340-5100 
25. Wendy Nicol 1 




Canada, K1A OR2 
26. Bruce Rossing 2 
Defense Intelligence Agency 
CodeTWJ 
Washington, DC 20340-5100 
27. Office of the Special Assistant to the President 1 
for Nonproliferation and Export Control 
National Security Council 
A TIN: Steven Aoki 
382 Old Executive Office Building 
Washington, DC 20504 
28. CDR M. Schumaker 1 
Office of Naval Intelligence 
Code Saber 
4251 Suitland Road 
Washington, DC 20395 
328 
29. CAPT Bill Hirst 1 
Code 02 
Office of Naval Intelligence 
4251 Suitland Road 
Washington,DC 20395 
30. Dr. Daniel S. Papp 1 
School of International Affairs 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, GA 30332-0610 
31. Julien Hansen 1 
Director Ml-5 
Ministry of Defense 
Whitehall 
London, UK 
32. Jerrold Post, MD 2 
2013 G St. N.W. 
George Washington University 
Washington, DC, 20052 
33. B.K. Campbell, Ph.D 1 
29994 N. Western Hwy 
Farmington, Ml 48334 
34. Linn A. Campbell, MD 1 
2621 Spring Grove 
Brighton, Ml48116 
35. Federal Bureau of Investigation 2 
ATT: Counter-Terrorism Branch 
93 Pennsylvania Ave 
Washington, DC, 20535 
36. R.M. Totten 1 
SSA 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
450 Golden Gate Avenue 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
329 
37. Terrence Taylor 1 
Assistant Director 
International Institute for Strategic Studies 
23 Tavistock Ste. 
London WC2E 7NQ 
UK 
38. CDR J.A. Weidner 1 
Nuclear Counterterrorism Programs 
199901 Germantown Rd 
Germantown, MD 20879 
39. Department of State 1 
Code S/CT 
2121 Virginia Ave 
Washington, DC, 20037 
40. CBACI 1 
A TT: Leslie Rodrigues 
2111 Eisenhower Avenue 
Suite 302 
Alexandria, VA 22314 
41. John Webster 1 
US Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
193 Russell Building 
Washington, DC 20510 
42. Honorable Carl Levin 1 
US Senate 
193 Russell Building 
Washington, DC 20510 
43. Honorable John Glenn 1 
US Senate 
193 Russell Building 
Washington, DC 20510 
44. Honorable William Cohen 1 
US Senate 
193 Russell Building 
Washington, DC 20510 
330 
45. Honorable Richard Lugar 1 
US Senate 
193 Russell Building 
Washington, DC 20510 
46. Honorable John Murtha 1 
US House 
Rayburn Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
47. Graham Allison 1 
Harvard University 
79 JKF st, #L-368 
Cambridge, MA 02138 
48. Charles Campbell 1 
Central Intelligence Agency 
3134 Ordway St. 
Washington, DC 20008 
49. Connie Fenchel 1 
U.S. Customs 
1301 Constitution Ave. NM 
Washington, DC 20229 
50. Lawrence Gershwin 1 
Central Intelligence Agency 
NIO/S&T, Rm &E47, OHB 
Washington, DC 20505 
51. Bobby Thompson 1 
usss 
1800G Str NW 
Washington , DC 20223 
52. James Reynolds 1 
U.S. Departmetn of Justice 
Criminal Division 
Washington, DC 20530 
331 
53. Brad Roberts 1 
Institute for Defense Analysis 
1801 N. Beauregard St. 
Alexandria, VA 22311 
54. Jennifer Duncan 5 
Center for Special Operations 
Naval Post Graduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
55. Library 1 
Army War College 
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013 
56. Library 1 
Naval War College 
Newport, Rl 02840 
57. Strategic Studies Group 1 
Naval War College 
Newport, Rl 02840 
58. Department of Military Strategy 1 
National War college (NWMS) 
Ft. Leslie J. McNair 
Washington, DC 20319-6111 
59. US Army Command and General Staff College 1 
ATI: Library 
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 20319-6111 
60. Library 1 
Air War College 
Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6428 
61. Marquat Memorial Library 1 
US Army JFKSWCS 
Rm. C287, Bldg 3915 
Ft Bragg, NC 28307-5000 
332 





#2 Navy Annex 
Washington, DC, 20380-1775 
63. CAPT John McTighe 1 
1636 Regulus Ave 
Virginia Beach, VA 23461-2299 
64. CDR J.K. Campbell 2 
831 Indian Head Ave . 
Indian Head, MD 20640 
333 
